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PREFACE.

TI^ author's best apology for the prescnt b001i
must be the absence of ally single English work, so
far, a t least, as he knows, which professes to give
a comprehensive account of the land of the Afghans,
the people, and their history, including all that is
most important in the past, as well as the more
immediately interesting subject of the present, relations of Afghanistan with Great Britain. If the
following pages in any way carry out the above idea
of what is required at the present juncture of affairs
on our Indian frontier, the author's object will have
been accomplished. I t .remains to him to acknowledge the very great obligations under which he lies
to the authors and publications natned on a subsequent
page, besides many that have escaped mention.
One subject of regret the author has had in connection with this work. H e had hoped to have
been able himself to see it through the press; but,

Prefnce.
having to return to
suddenly than he bad
the task of revisiilg
to whose lrindlless in
deeply indebted.
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i
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duty in India rather more
expected, he has had to leave
the proof-sheets to a friencl,
uildertalcing it the author is

FRED.I-I. FISHER.

.,.,.,.....,., ..,.....,.,.,.,..
~

P.S.--It was originally intended to have a niap
prepared especially for this volume, but the excellent map published by Messrs. George Philip
and Son, of Fleet Street, having since appeared,
it has been decided by the publishers t o supply
i t for the use of the readers of this volume.
The ollly drawback t o its adoptioil for this purpose
is that the spelliilg of some of the names of
places differs somewhat from the author's. The
orthography used in this volume is that which
has now obtained almost universal currency, being
employed by Sir Henry Rawlinson and other
acknowledged masters of Indian subjects. 1x1 this
system a few names that have acquired a prcscriptivc
title to a conventional (although iaaccurate) mode
of spelling retain the convelltional form, such a s
Cabul, Candahar, Calcutta, Dclhi, &c. Other names
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are spelt according to Sir William Jones' now welllcnown method of transliteration. T h e accentuation,
hoivevel; has been omitted, as it gives a n awkward
look t o names, and is of very little practical use.
T o diminish any inconvenieilce that may arise from
having different modes of spelling in the letterpress
ancl the map, a list of the more important names that
are spelt differently in them is appended.

P UBLISFIERS' NOTE.
P ~ O Isevernl
/ L passages 7e1hich occlir i ?the
~ Intier po~tion,
it will be seelb that this ze~ork 7CMS zoritte?~prezliouu to the
recent pz~blirntio7t of the OBcinl Corresjo~tdena072 /lj$$rhn?t
A f i i r s . The foregoing .Prt$nce will exkZni7l 7tthy these hnnle
re~lninedns 7~jrittet~.

S P E L T DIFFERENTLY IN MAP
AND LETTERPRESS.
,.,~n,>an,.fiA*An,\

JJZLrdkq5rt.s~.

zve

IJZ
&Iaj.

Pronot~~zcen',

Andkhui

Andkhooi

~ndkhh-i

Bannu

Bunnoo

Biinnoo

B ha\valpur

Bahawulpore

Bahk (or Bhl)
wulpoor

Cabul

Rabool

Clivbul

Candahar

ICandallar

CBndahar

Ghazni

Ghuznee

Ghilznee

Hari Rud

Heri Rud

Hhree Rood
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Jalalabad

Jelalabad

Jelklabad
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Karachi
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P eshawar
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INTRODUCTION.

A FEW weelrs ago the writer of thcse lines Ioolted
down from a window near the site of old Temple
Bar upon a scene of triumph. An English Premier
was passing in his carriage of state through a
double row of vociferatilig Londoners of the untnistaltable Jingo type. His progress was now and
again .impeded by tlie entiiusiasm of certain of the
unwashed who insisted upon climbing upon the steps
of their idol's chariot, and talring a close vicw of
that idol's noble featul-cs. Over the remaining stone
buttress of Temple Bar and its shain counterpart on
tlie opposite side of the way two unicorns were
conspicuous, and a banner bearing the now familiar
device, " Peace with Ilonour." The corthge passed
slowly on ; the Sphinx-like occupant of the first
coach bowing with undoubted satisfaction to the
multitude. After the great man's carriage had disappeared, suddenly, almost as if by pre-arrangement,
a fire-engine swept past a t full speed, clearing the
street, as if by magic, of its terror-striclren foot-

xx

I

17ttrodz~ction.

--

passengers. One felt for a moment somewhat of
~vonderat the coincidence, and all sorts of absurd
fancies crowded upon the mind. Of what was it the
omen ? Did the instant intelligence of a conflagration
that was flashed upon the spectator
by the appearance of the fire-engine, in immediate
connectioil tvith the State-ceremony of a Prime
Minister's triumphal processioll, prefigure a concurrcnce of analogous events in the political world ? All
inen know now how hollow was the "Peace," and
hotv doubtful was the " Honour," that were said to
have been secured at Berlin. The peace has barely
survived the summer and autumn, and early winter
sees us locked in a struggle, which at the best will
severely tax our energies and strain our resourcesfor what ? To satisfy that " Honour" which, we were
told, had been amply vindicated at Berlin.
Those who least admire Lord Beaconsfield must .
be constrained, we thiiik, to admit that he possesses,
in a degree rarely excelled, the faculty of versatility,
the crab-lilte power of grasping each new situation
and adapting his own programme, itself by no means
a fixed one at any time, to whatever novel circumstances present themselves, with such tact as to
dazzle the multitude into the belief that he had all.
along foreseen, and with infinite sagacity had provided for them. The Secretary-of-State-for-India's
despatch to the Viceroy, which saw the light in the
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Tilnes of zrst November, is the latest example of
feature in the Premier's character. No one
supposes that the document in question was other
than a manifesto for the benefit of the English
p b l i c , intended to be a vindication of the policy of
the present Government, which is quite willillg to
accept all the credit of what is likely to be approved,
2nd to shift on to the shoulders of their PI-edecessors
of the oppositc party the responsibility of all that
is worthy of condemnation. Thus it is cleverly
shown that the present difficulty is to be traced
entirely to the follies of Lord Nortl~broolr'sGovernment, tile blame of which is again ingeniously
fathered up011 I-Ier Majesty's then Government a t
home (Mr. Gladstone's). If Lord Northbrook had
o ~ l l yguaranteed the Amir's dominion against all
his foreign euemies-just as Lord Beaconsfield has
guaranteed Asiatic Turlrey against Russia-all
would have been well. The Amir would have accepted our handsome subsidies, and presents of arms,
like a good boy, and been all the more prepared in
consequence to give us battle whenever the bloodfcud that has existed for the last forty years or more
should break out again ! Because Lord Northbrook,
o r rather Mr. Gladstone, declined to pledge Ellglalld
to support Shere Ali in evely case against foreign
foes-a
pledge which, if once given, would have
encouraged that ruler in ali sorts of aggression upon

I

'

xxii

,
I

'

his neighbours-the Amir became sullen and reserved. From 1874 to the present time it has beell
the coilstant endeavour of the Premier and his colleagues to break down this reserve and remove this
sullenness. The promise of protection and active
countenance which Shere Ali had vainly desired
from Lord Northbroolr has been offered to hiincoupled with the condition that English Agents
should be given access to positions in his territories
other than at Cabul itself. The offer was refused,
and has been continually refused ever since.
accepted if made by Lord Northbroolr. MTc question very much if it would have met with any other
response then than the one given now. Shere Ali
tvas willing to accept our guarantee, our subsidies,
and our guns, but whether he would ever have consented to admit British Agents, and so become reduced-in his own eyes, at least-to much the same
position as that held by such semi-independent
Inclian potentates as Scindia, the Nizam, and
Nepal, is more than doubtf~il. This argument,
however, suits Lord Beaconsfielcl's purpose aclmirably, which is to show that the present war has
been really necessitated by the perverse conduct of
Mr. Glaclstone's Government.
In effect it does not seem that the apportionment
of praise and blame is to bc made so easily. The
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wisdom that comes after events will aIways be able
to indicate where a fault has been committed which
it can be shown has entailed disaster that might
othcrwise have been averted. If we were to venture
to indicate the weak point in the recent forcigil policy
of Englatld, we should find it in the exaggerated idca
of Russia's desigils upon India which some Englishmcil entertain. T h a t Power seeins rather to rccluire
peace to recover herself after the recent devastating
mar with Turkey than a war which shall ilrgc her
still further to the verge of banlrruptcy. It is premature now to discuss the morality of the present
invasioil of Afghanistan. I t 11zc;ly be justifiable, and
we must hope for the Ilonour of England that ample
reason will be forthcolnil~gto satisfy both the English Parliament and the English people that we have
not violated right in order to obtaiil for ourselves a
doubtful advantage.

AFGHANISTAN
AND

THB CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.

A FGHA NISTA N-ITS

N A TURAL FEA TURES.

NaturaI I3ounda~ies-Approxi~nntc Extent of Afghanistnn-Origin
of
Name-Independent
Territory-What
Afghan Dominions IncludeCornparisoil of Afghanistan wit11 Switzerland-Mountain-rangesI-Iindu Icushand its Prolongations-Safed ICoh-Suliman MountninsPasscs on the Indo-Afglian Frontier-Fort
of Ali Musjid-Natural
Divisions-Rivers-Laltes-Proviuces
and Towns.
A F G H A N I S T A N , or, as its name signifies, the land of'
t h e Afghans, may be roughly conlpared in area with
Germany. The north-eastern part, called the CabuL
valley, from the river of that name which waters it,
is really the upper dominating section of the Indus.
b a s i n ; and there is some ground, therefore, for the
statement which has been made that physically, a t
least, Eastern Afghanistan is part and parcel of
I n d i a . And if all the nationalities of the earth were
t o strike for "natural boundaries," India might have
as good a. right to cIaim the Cabul valley as her own

2

1

Afghnnistnn.

as Spain would have to include Portugal, or Germally
to take Belgium and Holland.
What was said just now as to the extent of
Afgllanistan must be regarded as a mere approximation to the truth, for the best maps can 0111~ keep
pace wit11 sltilled explorers, and these have been few
and far between in the countries between the Oxus
and the Indus, so that accurate information is not
yet to be had on many interesting points collnected
with their natural features. Enough, however, can
be gathered for a rough conception of them from
scattered notes of hasty travellers, who passed
through the country keeping, so to speak, one eye
on the scenery and the other on their holsters. The
name, it should be premised, by which the country
is lcnow~lso extensively outside its own limits, is
only as old as the short-lived Durani empire of
Ahmed Shah in the middle of the last century. The
Afghans rarely use the term, spealting of themselves as Pushtanu (plural of Pushth), and their
country as Wiliyat. The wlzole Afghan dominions,
including, in addition to Afghanistan IJroper,+ that
part of the Oxus basin to which tlie name Afghan

* Afghanistan Proper is nearly co-extensive with the ancient
provinces of Aria (Herat), Dra?tginna (Seistan), the region of
the Pnro$nn~isad~(Cabul), and Aracltosia (Candahar), with
Gn?tn'nrilis(Peshawar and the lands of the Yuzufiais). Of the
latter district part now is the British district of Peshawar, and
the rest independent.
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Turkestan has been applied, may be regarded as a
quadrilateral plateau, about 600 miles from east to
west, and 600 miles from north to south. Excluding
Afghan Turkestan, the extent of the country from
north to south must be decreased to 450 miles.
Both in the larger and smaller areas there would be
included some territory which is free from Afghan
control altogether, and other tracts over which the
hold of the Alnir is spasmodic and precarious.
Examples of the former are the valleys north of
Peshawar in the possession of the Yuzufzais ; those to
the west and south-west of the same district, occupied
b y the Mohmands, Afridis, Vaziris, and other tribes ;
and the elevated valleys of Chitral or Kashgar, and
of the independent ICafirs (non-Muhammadans)
among the higher spurs of tbe Hindu Kush. T o
the semi-independent territories belong the eastern
districts of Ichost and of Kuram, which are contermillous with British territory; the Icakar country
in the extreme south-west ; and part of the mountain
region in the north-west, inhabited by the ~ i m a k s
and Hazaras; to which may probabIy be added
Badakhshan,
T h e boundaries of Afghanistan, roughly stated, and
subject to correction on account of some independent
and semi-independent territories included by them,
may be.thus defined :T h e Oxus forms the northern boundary line from
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its source in Pamir to Khoja Salih Ferry in 65" E.
long. nearly. Thence the Afghan territories become
.-conterminous with those of lchiva, t he line that divides
them runnir~g south-west, and skirting the Turkoman
desert to tile lvlurgllaD rlver, ana passlllg rnence in
the same direction to a point on the Hari Rud river,
a few miles south of Sarakhs, in about lat. 36".
On the west, the boundary line runs from the lastmentioned point, first south-east for a short distance,
, - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - , .. ---- -.
--.,
it bends eastward across Lake I-lamun or Seistan,
and again turns westward, being continued to the
intersection of lat. 30" with the lake, including, from
its point of divergence to its termination, a triangular
tract which forms part of the plain of Seistan. All
to the west of this line is Persia.
On the south there is no natural boundary, and it
can only be roughly given as a line from the Lake of
Seistan, in lat. 30" to the Helmand river, and thence
south-east to Nushki, whence it runs north-east
through the southern valleys of the Lova, dividing
the Pishin valley from Quettah, or the Shal territory,
belonging to the Baluch state of Icelat. Further
east, the bouildary line has a southern declination,
and terminates not far from the Indus.
The eastern boundary from a point a few miles
distant from Mittan Kot, on the Indus, is formed by
the eastern spurs of the Suliman Mountains as far
I
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as Peshawar, and thence northward the boundary is
for a time the Indus, but thereafter lies in almost unknown country.
Except portions of the lower valley of the Cabul
river, small tracts towards the Indus, and the space
included in a triangle formed by joining Herat,
Candahar, and the extreme south-west point of the
Lake of Seistan, the whole of the quadrilateral
plateau of Afghanistan has a minimum height of
4,000 feet above the sea. A tract that would be indicated by a straight line of zoo miles drawn from
the Rushan Pass in the Hindu Kush Mountains,
passing about 35 miles west of Cabul to Rangak, on
the road between Ghazni and Candahar, is nowhere
less than 7,000 feet above the sea. The lowest level
taken-that of a position in the Lalte of Seistan-is
1,280 feet above the sea, Herat is 2,650, Candahar
3,490.
Briefly, then, Afghanistan Proper is an clevated
table land, having an area of more than 211,500
square miles, somewhat larger than France, and is
bounded, on the north by Turlrestan and Khiva, on
the west by Persia, on the south by Baluchistan, and
on the east by the Panjab. Westward of the Hindu
Kush the Koh-i-Baba cuts off Afghanistan Proper
from the tract known as Afghan Turlrestan, which
reaches down to the bank of the Oxus, and
includes the various minor Khanates or States
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of Kunduz, IChulum, Balkh with Alrcha, and thc
Chnhar Wilaynt, or " Four Domains " of Sir-i-pul,
Shibrghan, Andkhui, and Maimana, together with
such of the Hazara tribes as lie north of the Hindu
Kusll and its prolongation in the Icoh-i-Baba.
Besides these the name Afghanistan is sometimes
made to iilclude also Badalthshan, a poor mountain
tract between the Hindu Icush and the Oxus, which,
though nominally it forms part of thc Amir's
dominions, is of small value to its suzerain, the tribute annually paid to Cabul being said to amount to
no more than about EI,SOO. The barren mouiltains
which, compose Badakhshan can hardly, indeed, be
said.to belong to Afghanistan by other than a precarious tenure of suzerainty or protection, since the
present princes obtained the territory by the aid of
Shere Ali, from their uncle, who was anxious to
become the feudatory of the Bokharan ruler.
I t has been pointed out that the main features of
the coast-line of Europe are repeated on a grander
scale in Asia.. The peninsula of Spain and Portugal finds its counterpart in Arabia; France in
Asia Minor and Persia ; Italy in India ; Turltey,
Greece, and the Grecian Archipelago, in Burmah,
Siam, and the Eastern Archipelago ; and Russia in
the Chinese Empire ; while the British Isles on the
west of the Euro-Asian Continent are placed
symmetricalIy with Japan on the east. S o striking
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has the parallelism between Italy and India seemed
to some writers, that they have not hesitated to state
that the Hiinalayas are repeated in the Alps ; the
Rhone and the Po in the Indus and Ganges ; whilc
Genoa (or IMarseilles) is Karachi ; Venice, Calcutta ;
Milan, Delhi ; Naples, Bombay ; and Sicily, Ceylon.
I f the authors of this compariso~lhad carried it a
little furtl~erinland, they would hardly have failed
to find a counterpart of Switzerland in Afghanistan.
Whether or not an ingenious geographer could find
the representatives of a11 the chief natural features,
such as mountai~ls, plains, rivers, and lakes, in
sufficient corresponde~lccto bear out the comparison,
it cannot but be evident that in its relations to India
on the east, Persia on the west, and Asiatic Russia
on the north, Afghanistan is physically situated
with regard to them, not dissimilarly from the
position that Switzerland holds with reference to
Italy and Austria 011 the east, France on the west>
and Germany on the north. Baluchistan, however,
which is thc southern boundary of the Amir's
dominions, is not yet so completely British-Indian as
Piedmont and Lombardy are Italian.
T o give a detailcd account of the mo~lntainsystem of Afghanistan would be to transcend the
modest limits of this work. A rough outline may,
however, be attempted. I t has been a common
error with some journalists of late years to describe
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Afghanistan as lying beyond the I-Iimalayas. I t
really lies within the Hindu Kush section of that
Indian mountain girdle. Or, to be still more correct, the Western Himalayas are extended into
Afghanistan, and forin four mountain regions, which
are ltnown from east to west by the names Hindu
I<ush, Paghman Mountains, Koh-i-Baba, and Ghor
Mountains. The last were ltnown to the Greeks
as the Paropamisus, and consist of two parallel
chains, collectively called b y Persian historians the
Ghor Mountains, but distinguished now, the northern
as the Safed Koli, or White Mountains, and the
southern as the Siyah Icoh, or Blaclc Mountains.
T o take all the northern mountains in order, we
And between 34" and 35" W. lat. two vcry lofty
mountain-ranges, between which flows t h e Indus.
T o both of these the name of Himalaya Mountains
i s applied as far as long. 70°, the eastern being
undoubtedly a part of the great Indian northern
mountail1 barrier, and the western as certainly a
continuation of it. A glance a t the map will, however, show that this western range, although it rises
in somc places as high as 20,000 fcet, and runs
from east-south-east to west-north-west, does not
form the watershed of the rivers of this region.
For the watershed, according to most geographers,
we must look farther north to a range called the
Icarakoram Mountains, which run almost due east
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and west, and are clearly a continuation of the
Icuenlun Mountains, which stretch across Tibet
This western continuation of the
into China.
Kuenlun is called in Afghanistan the Hindu ICus11,
or Hindu Icoh (" koh," in Persian, meaning mountain). I t will be observed, further, that the Indian
range of the 13imalayas and the Hindu I<ush do not
run parallel, but converge and unite in one mountainmass between 70" and 69" east longitude, including
between them the country known to the Afghans
as Icafiristan (the land of the infidels, i.e., nonMuhammadans).
Thus it seems to be optional with us to regard the
Hindu Icush as an extension of either the Icarakoram or the Himalaya range of mountains, or,
better still, as the continuation in a single chain of
both.
Only the northern declivity of the Western
I-Iimalayas is included in Kafiristan, the southern
belonging to Afghanistan. From the plains these
mou~ltai~ls
appear to rise in terraces, so that as
many as four ridges, one overtopping the other,
may a t some places be seen. There are wide valleys
among them, but only a narrow strip of cultivable
soil along the line of drainage. Betweell the higher
portion of the ridges, alld the base of the hills, is an
inclined plane-often very wide-strewed or entirely
.covered with boulders and shingle, without a particle
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of soil. On the declivity of the hills, however, where
the inclinatioil of the upper strata is less perpendicular, there is found a rich soil of some depth.
Advantage is taken of this for cultivation, and, where
this has not been done, high forest trees occupy the
ground to an elevation of 10,000 feet above the sealevel. Up .to 4,500 feet these consist chiefly of a
species of oak, called " balut " ; but beyond that
height they are largely mixed with a kind of olive,
called " zaitun," up to.6,500 feet, where it gives place
to the " deodara." These forests are the m o s t
extensive in Afghanistan.
From the point of convergence of the Himalayas
with the Ilindu Kush, at about 70" E. long., the
sides of the mountains are destitute of trees, and are
devoid of soil, the roclrs protruding in every direction,
and huge angular d6h.is occupying the intervening
spaces. Dry and thorny bushes are the only vegetation, as far as 68" E. long., where the Hindu Kush,
strictly so~called,comes to an encl in a huge snowclad mountain-mass, called by that name, which
rises to the height of 15,ooo feet above the level
of the sea.
The best-known of the many populous valleys in
this region is the Panjshir valley, which has a total
length of seventy miles, and an average width of
about a mile and a-half. There are some seven thousand families living in the lower part, the upper bcing
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uninhabited, on account of tlle extreme cold in
winter. Although the soil is naturally very poor,
i t is extensively cultivated, orchards and mulberry
groves constituting most of the wealth of the people
in these valleys ; the inuIberries, when dried, yielding
a flour which is their principal food. Through this
valley passes the high road from Cabul to Kunduz,
and a t its upper end it traverses the famous Khawak
Pass, a t a height of 13,200 feet above the sea.
Through another similar valley, f ~ ~ r t h ctor the west,
watered by the Parwan rivcr, passes another roacl
across the I-Iindu ICush (by the Sar-alang Pass),
leading to the plain of the Oxus.
After running south-west, as just described, for
some 370 miles, the Hindu Rus11 ceases to be locally
lcnown by that name, although it is.sti11 applied to
the whole cl~ainof northern mountains. This chain
is continued in the smaller range of the Paghman
Mountains, which run nearly due south, and are of
lower elevation. This range consists of two parallel
ridges, ~vitlla valley between them of nearly tell
miles in width, having an elevation that seldom
sinks below 10,000 feet above the sea, and is, consequently, unfitted for cultivation. It affords, however, a grateful refuge from the summer heats to the
pastoral tribes in its neigl~bourl~ood. The two
enclosing ridges are from 12,ooo to I 3,000 feet high,
and, being free from snow in the summcr, several
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passes lead over them to the valley of Bamian, which
lies west of the western range, and is only 8,500 feet
above the sea. Of these passes the best known are
the Irak, attaining nearly 13,000 feet ; the I<allu,
12,480 feet ; and the Hajiyalc, 12,190 feet above
the sea.
Where the Paghman Mountains end, the ICoh-iBaba rises as a single range, and runs due west. Of
these mountains we have very much yet to learn.
We know that they commence at their eastern
extremity in an immense mass of roclcs about
14,000 feet high, with still loftier snow-clad peaks
above them that attain 15,000 feet a t least. T o the
westward the range is coiltinued in a series of lofty
peaks, and then breaks up into three parallel ranges,
enclosing the waters of the Murghab and Hari-rud
rivers. The northernmost of these finally loses itself
in the sands of the Turkomal~desert ; the middle
one, the Koh-i-Safed, or White Mountains, has a
westerly and longer course, runt~ingnorth of and
past Herat, where it turns northward and also merges
into the desert; while the southern range, called
Koh-i-Siyal~,or Black Mountains, follows a course
pretty nearly parallel with the last-named one, and,
it is believed, eventually unites with the ranges that
form the northern boundary of Persia a s far as the
Caspian. If this theory be proved to be a physical
fact, there would be shown to exist a n unbrolcen
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theI ~Eastern HimaIayas. Indeed, the
whole l i n e of AIpine watershed which we have been
describi~lg, stretching from the souther11 end o i
Pamir a c r o s s Afghanistan to Mash-had in I<horasau
was known to AIexander's historian as the Caucasus
-a fact ~.vhichseems to indicate that tlle probable
contiiluity of the ranges was even then surmised.
T h e southern spurs of the Koh-i-Siyah give rise t o
t h e Ichash-rud and I-Iarut-rud rivers and to soine
feeders of the HeIinand river.
A r e c e n t writer in the Geogmphicnl Mng~zcine
gives a solnewhat different statement of the conllectioil of the I-Iindu I<ush proper with its western
extensiops. H e regards the Koh-i-Baba as the
direct corltinuation westward of the Hindu I<ush
from the point where it changes its direction from
t h e south-west. A saddle connects the Hindu
I<ush here with the Paghman range, which encloses the I~cad streams of the Helrnand and
Ghorband rivers, and runs south-west, forming the
water-parting between the Helmand and Argandab, a n d ceasing at their confluence. According to
this a c c o u n t the two Paghman ridges are offshoots
from t h e Hindu Kus11, and not links in the chain,
A spur from the Paghinan range runs westward,
enclosing the source of the Argandab, and thence
extending parallel with the northern chain, bounding
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throughout its length the table-land of Ghazni and
the home of the Ghilzais, and ceasing just north of

t

Along the parallel'of 34" runs, due east and west,
the Safed-ICoh range (not to be confounded with
the western range of that name which forms part of
the Paropalnisan or Ghor Mountains), which constitutes the southern water-shed of the Cabul basin.
I t consists of a single range for about seventy-five
miles, when it splits into two ridges. Its connection with the Hindu ICush by means of the Attakoh
range has been asserted. The main range of the
Safed-Koh, which preserves a pretty uniform level
of about 12,500 feet in height, is richly clad with
pine, almond, and other trees. Its valleys abound
in orchards, cultivated fields and gardens, and mulberry, pomegranate, and other fruit trees are plentiful.
It is considered by some geographers that a network of low mountains runs generally south from
this range, and is merged in the table-land of Kelat
and the mountainous system of Baluchistan.
Next in importance to this great northern range
of the Hindu Kush is the eastern range, known as
the Sulimall Mountains, which on the map appear to
form the natural frontier line between the Afghan
table-land and the plains of the Indus. This is the
name applied by the best authorities to the range,
or ranges, running almost due north and south along
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the meridian of 70" E. ; from the Gomal Pass to the
twenty-ninth parallel of latitude, or thereabouts.
Major Raverty has described it as a mighty mountain barrier, containing in its northern section two
ranges which increase in number as they run southwards, till at its southern extremity, wliere the Sari
river breaks through, there are as many as twelve
distinct ridges, " like battalions in columns of companies at quarter distance," The mouiltaills increase
in height from east to west, and the highest, called
Milltar-Suliman, or Iioh-i-S~jall,is snow-capped in
winter.
Colonel Macg~egorholds a different view respecting this range. As one running north and south
along the meridian of 70°, he does not recognise the
Suliman at all. H e considers that from the Attalcoh
range, between Cabul and Ghazni, there springs a
range of mountains which proceeds southward without a break, throwing out spurs to the east and
west, and that this is the range which forms the
system of mountatins of Eastern Afghanistail and
Baluchistan. The weight of autllority, however, is
opposed to this view.
A peculiarity in connection with this range-the
Suliman-is
noticeable in the large number of
streams that pierce through its sides after draining
the table-lands to the west. These naturally afford
access, by means of the passes they form, from
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the valley of the Indus to the high plateaus of
Afghanistan.
$

I

i

f
I
I

PASSES ON THE INDO-AFGHAN FROKTIER.

This seems to be the proper place to speak of
these gaps in the great mountain barrier that
from the OXUSto the Indian Ocean, by
commerce penetrates from Central Asia to
India, and which formerly afforded paths to the
invading hosts that poured down to obtain tile
plunder of her rich cities. The four best-known
passes on the eastern frontier of Afghanistan are the
IChaibar, Kuram, Gomal, and Bolan. Besides these
there are innumerable others of every degree of
practicability, most of which are known only by
native report. In speaking of these passes, it must
be remembered that the names thus broadly given,
locally apply to only a particular part of the wllole
distance to be traversed before reaching the tableland beyond. Thus, what is commonly called the
IChaibar Pass includes a succession of gorges or
defiles, each designated by its own special name.
The Ichaibar Pass may be said, generally speaking
to commence at Jamrud, ten miles west of Peshawar,
and.to extend t o Dhaka, a distance of about thirtythree miles. The actual entrance to the defile, however, is at ICadam, a place three miles out of Jamrud,
which is a small village surrounded by a mud wall.
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This is (or was) the site of an old Silrh fort, which
was built in 1837, after the Afghan army, under the
famous sons of Dost Muhammad, AItbar Khan and
Afzal I<haii, had talten to flight at the unexpected
arrival of Railjit Sinh, whose famous march with
a relieving army from Guzerat has been seldom
equalled. Within 1,000 yards of ICadam the gorge
narrows to 150 yards, with steep, precipitous cliffs on
either hand. Between this and the Afghatl frontier
fort of Ali Musjid, distant about ten miles, the
mouiltains on either hand are about r,t;oo feet: in
height, slaty, bare, and, to all appearance, inaccessible. The width of the Pass varies in this part from
290 to 40 feet. The name of this fort figured for a
few days early in October last, rather conspicuously
in the Indian telegrams published in the London
daily papers. I t was incorrectly stated that our
troops had marched upon it from Jainrud, and
captured it from the Afghans. I t \van just below Ali
Musjid, too, that Major Cavagnari was in September
z ~ s t 1878,
,
told by the Afgl~anofficer, the Mir Althor
or Master of the Horse, that the British Mission
would not be allowed to proceed on its projected
journey to Cabul,
it was alleged, language of menace was used by the
Afghan officer, the report of which, filtering through
the inflamed channels of fiery special correspon2
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dents, roused a section of the English people to a
sense of gross insult received, and for a time induced
some of the stroilgest opponents of Lord Beaconsfield's Government to clamour for immediate redress.
Of.the exact nature of these proceedings between
the Afghan and English officers we shall come t o
speak later on. We may mention here that the little
fort of Ali Musjid taltes its name froin the ruins of
a small Muhammadan inosque (" Musjid " being
Persian for mosque) in its vicinity. I t s situation is
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nearly midway between ,Peshawar and Dhaka, about
ten miles from the eastern end of the Ichaibar Pass,
as abovestated, and twenty-six miles from the western
end, while it is seventy miles from Jalalabad. It
stands on the south side of the Pass, at the height of
2,433 feet above the sea, on the summit of beetling
crags, which tower perpendicularly above the roadway. The crests of the hills at this spot are barely
I50 yards from each other; and as on the northern
slopes a smaller masonry bloclthouse has been construtted, a very effective cross-fire can be poured on
troops advancing through the defile. T h e fort itself
is said to be not more than 150 feet long and 60 feet
wide, and is commanded, fortunately for an invader
from the Indian side, by higher positions, both on
tlze south and west. I t was by attacking it on these
faces that Colonel Wade succeeded in talting it in
19. Although, however, lze commenced the attack
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on the 25th of July, and was enabled in a few hours
to drive the defenders from their o u t ~ o r l i sby the
accuracy of his shcll-fire, the Afghans being armed
only with matcl~loclis,it was not until three days
later that the place surrendered. Its garrison was
under 1,000 strong, of whom 500 were irregular
Jazailchis (matchlock men), the remainder bei~lg
levies from the Afridi ancl Shii~waritribes. Wadc's
loss was over 150' killed and wounded. After its
capture the fort was placed under a garrison of
Yusufzai Pathans, with the object of keeping opcn
free comrnunication between Pesha~var and our
forces in Jalalabad a11d Cabul. I n November, 1841~
a desperate attack was made on the fort by a body
of about 2,000 men belonging to the neighbouring
Afghan tribes. They cut off the water supply, a n d
reduced the place to dreadful straits ; but the British
commandant, Lieuteilailt Mackeson, with his usual
fertility of resource, bought them off. A force,
under Colonel Moseley, consisting of 2,500, was
then sent to hold i t ; but, owing to iusufficiency of
provisions, that officer was compclled to retire in
eight days, wit11 the loss of 180 killed and
wounded. Sir George Pollock, on his advance
through the I<haibar with the avenging army in
1842, left a garrison in Ali Musjid; and on
evacuating Afghanistail in November of tlie same
year, he destroyed thc works, but they were
2-2
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speedily reconstructed by the orders of Dost
Muhammad.
The great drawback to the occupation of this
advanced fort is its extreme unhealtl~iness. I n 1839
the mortality in the British detachment llolding it
under Colonel Wade was something terrible. I n less
than eight weelts there were 2 5 0 deaths out of a
strength of a little over 2,400 men. This was mainly
owing to the water, which is strongly impregnated
with antimony; and even this supply is only obtained from the Ichaibar stream below, so that the
place can easily be forced into capitulation, should
time be no object with an advancing army. I t
would ]lave bcen unwise in the present instance to
have exposed our troops to the siclrness that proved
so fatal forty years ago, unless an immediate advance
upon Cabul had been intended. Several roads,
moreover, are lcnown to us now b y which this position of Ali Musjid, the most formidable obstacle
between Peshaurar and Jalalabad, can be completely
turned, so that its capture under the circumstances was wisely deferred. Among these roads
are the Tatara road, which enters the hills about
nine miles north of Jamrud, and joins tlie maill
route at Dhalta. The Icadapa road, and olle
through the Bara Valley also-both of them avoid
Ali Musjid-are practicable for lightly-equipped
columns.

Its Natural Features.

2I

------After this digression, which the importance that
has been attached in some quarters to the early capture of the fort of Ali Musjid seemed to warrant, we
continue the description of the Ichaibar Pass. For
a distance of two and a-half miles beyond Ali Musjid
it retains its difficult character. I t then enters the
Lala Beg Vallcy, about six miles in length, with an
3'3 deaths
,,; I
n. ?'his xt;.;;n s..,i-';
average breadth of a mile and a-half. The western
end of the valley finds the road entering a still
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32
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much of their inaccessible nature. Dhalra is distant
about eight miles, and here the defile ends. The
main road to Cabul is continued from this point
tl~roughother passes to the toivll and fortress of
..
Jalalabad-famous for General Sale's defence ot lt
"
;es 01
in 1842-passing on the way through
the
-- villag
. .
Lalpura, Hazar nau, Basawal, Batikot, Chardeh, Bari
Uah a n d ,
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,aghan.
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track. The descent, however, is along a well-made
road, and is not so difficult. On tllc west side of the
Pass the mountains gradually open out, and lose

J

;..; 1..

-

:

;:,

-

,.,

i1

22

Afghn~tistn~z,

I

I I
1

I

I

)I
0

1

I

I

l1
I?(

,
I

1

1
I

I

j!/

'I/

- --

\

by road is about ninety miles, and thence to Cabul,
through the Jagdallak, Lattaband, Khurd Cabul, and
othcr passes, is roo miles. I t was in these latter
defiles, within a few marches of Cabul, that the
'I Cabul massacre"
occurred, and not in the Khaibar
Pass, which none of the unfortunate army ever
reached on that occasion.
Of the passes to the north of the Ichaibar the
most important are the Baroghil and Karambar
passes leading from Cashmere, our outlying feudatory
principality, to Kholtand, the latest officially announced Russian acquisitioll in Central Asia. 7
also lead from ICashgar to Cabul and Cashmere b y
routes that cross at Chitral. T h e Barogl~il Pass is
ltnown to us from the reports of the Mullah employed by Coloilel Montgomerie, who travelled from
Chitral into Badakhshan by this route.
Captain Biddulph, who was attached to Sir Douglas
Forsyth's mission, visited Sarhad, the town at the
northern extremity of the Pass, but it is doubtful if
ally Englishman has traversed these routes throughout. Khokand, or Farghana, is separated fi-om British
territory by the Pamir Plateau, and although the
actual distance in a direct line between the Czar's
territory and ours is not much greater than zoo miles
at this point, yet the road that conilects them is not
one which a modern army could follow. Leaving
Kholtalld (1,540 feet above the sea), it passes through

1
I
I
(

f
1
t

I
a
I
1:

11

1

-------I bllence to Cabu],
U ~ u r dCabul,and
in these latter
Cabul, that tile
rjt in the Khaibar
llnatc army ever
61%

the Khaibar the
11 and Karambar

outlying feudatory
oficially an.
n t n l Asia. Thty
and Cashmere hy
I~aroghilPass si
' tllc Mullah em.
.ho travelled ON
I

lute.

~ u dto Sir Douglas
the town at the
t it is doubtful if
ie routcs throughrated from Rri tish
lnd although the
c hvcen the Czar's
cr than zoo miles
~ncctsthem is pot
follow. Leaving
it passes through

Its Nntt~ralFentt~res.
Marghilan to Uch Kurgail (3,100 feet). These
places are said to have been the scenes of indiscrirninate slaugl~terof the Kl~oltandiansin the campaign
of January, 1576. Bearing south, the road passes
through Isfairam, and over the Little Alai Plateau,
which stands 12,000 feet above sea level ; then,
crossing the Great Alai, at an altitude of 14,000
feet, it descends into the valley of Mult SLI,following
a south-easterly course to Sirich ; bending round to
the west it striltes the Oxus at Kila Panjab, the elevation of which is g,ogo feet ; then, ascending the
stream to Sarhad, which Biddulph determined to be
10,975 feet, the road crosses the Baroghil fifteen
miles to the southward, the altitude being 12,000feet.
From this point a road branches off to Mastoj, and,
following the course of the Runad stream, passes
through Cl~itral (7,140 feet), Dir, and Pashat to
Jalalabad.
A t Chitral another road from Sarnarcand, througl~
Penjakand, Hissar, IColab, Faizabad, and Zebak,
joins this route.
The road through the Barogl~il
Pass into Cashmere is a most difficult and mountainous pathway. I t touches few villages, the chief
being Yasin, in Afghan territory (height 7,770 feet),
and crosses the Maharajah of Cashmere's border at
Gaon Kuch. I t then runs through Gilgit (5,270 feet)
to Bunji on the Indus, and so through Isltardo and
Dras to Sirinagar.

The I<arainbar Pass is inerely a subsidiary road t o
that by the Baroghil. Leaving Sarhad, it follows a
more easterly course, passing by the Karambar Lalte
alld joining the main road at Gaon I<uch on the
These passes, it seems, were recently secured for
us by the Maharajah of Cashmere's troops, but the
danger to be apprehended from that side is not very
great, owing ' t o the enormous natural difficulties of
Along the north-western frontier there are innumerable passes, of which at least seventeen are
well-defined roads, practicable for the movemeilts of
lightly-equipped columns, and thcre are certainly
four up which guns could be talten. Of these, the
Ichaibar, already described, and the Bolan are the
best Itnown, the Kuram and Gomal being the other
two chief ones. T h e great drambaclc to the two
latter being utilised in the event of war is the fact
that our means of communication within our own
border are of a very imperfect Itind, so that some
military authorities are of opinion that the difficulties
a force would encounter before it could reach the
eastern end of the Icuram or ~ o m a l ' P a s s e swould
,
be
almost as great as those to be met with in the mountains themselves.
The Icuram Pass is so called froin the rivcr of that
name, which debouches through it and flows south-
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west through Thal and Bannu to the Indus, receiving
as tributaries the ShamiI, Tochi, Gambela,, and other
streams. The road through the ICuratn Valley,
which was traversed by Sir H. Lumsden's Mission in
1857, leads from Thal to Ghazni and Cabul, the route
to the latter city branching off near the Shutargardan
(Camel's Neck) Pass, north-west of the Paiwar. By
this route, Cabul is distant from Tllal not more than
150 miles. There is a longer road, available a t
seasons when the Shutargardan is not so, which follows t h e Ghazni road as far as IChushi. I t is described
as a fairly good road, but the turbulent conduct of
the Jajis involved Lumsden's party in great difficulties.
These tribes being hardly restrained by the Amir's
troops from massacring the mission-a fact which
will scarcely warrant our regarding them as very
friendly to us. The climate of the ICuram Valley is
described as being magnificent: for about six weeks
the winter is severe, but during the spring and autumn
it is most charming. I t is very fertile, filled with
orchards, and exceedingly well cultivated.
The Gomal Pass is the next in importance, and is
similarly formed by a river, from which it is named.
General Chamberlain in 1860 led a force against the
Mahsuds up the Zam Valley from Tank, to the north
of t h e Gomal River. Kaniguram, the capital, was
taken, and considerable chastisement inflicted on the
marauding tribe. From the facts collected during

I
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this expedition is derived most of our lcnowledge of
the Gomal Pass, which leads direct to Ghazni, and is
credited with being the route by which hlahmud of
Gl~aziiimade most of his invasions of India.
Besides the Drapall Pass, from Dera IslnaiI IChan,
and others north and south of it, Major Ravertg gives
details of no less than thirty-four passes (exclusive of
small ones) between the ICaura and the Sari. These
are too distant from the Indus to be of much use for
military purposes'. T h e priilcipal are the ICaura,
Vihowa, Barltoi, Wrug, Trundi, Saunra, Szri, and
Vador Passes, the last of which leads from Dera
Ghazi IChan.
The Bola11 Pass leads direct to Quettah, which is
a t present our most advanced post wcstward, being
beyond the G7th degree of longitude, while Cabul
itsclf is to the east of the 69th degree. Sir John
Kaye speaks of the Bolan as commcilcing a t Dadur,
but it is, perhaps, more correct to say that i t begins
about five miles to the north-west of t h a t place,
From Shikarpur in Siildh to Dadur is I ~ miles,
G
and
this distance was traversed by the Bengal column in
February and March, 1839, in sixteen painful
marches. Water and forage were so scarce that the
cattle suffered terribly oil the way, the camcls falling
dead by scores o n the descrt. T h e Uolan Pass is
60 miles in length, and the passage was accomplished
by the coiumn just spolten of in six days. It is
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from 70 feet to So feet broad, with steep cliffs on each
side-can be easily forced by a British column. Its
suminit is stated to be 5,800 feet above sea-level, and
its average ascent go feet to the mile. ~t sir-iBolan (the head of the Pass) a mountain-torrent
sometimes bars the way during the height of the
rainy season. On emerging from the Bolan Pass the
traveller enters the beautiful valley of Shal, " a
favoured spot in a country of little favour." The
clear, crisp climate is one ~eculiarlysuited to the
European constitution, and over the wide plain,
bounded by noble mountain-ranges, intersected by
many sparl~lingstreams, and dotted with orchards
and vineyards, the eye ranges wit11 delight. Quettal~
itself, which is ten miles oft; is described by Hough
as "a most miserable mud town, with a small castle
on a mound, on which. there was a small gun on a
rickety carriage."
There are other passes besides the Bolan though
the Brahu range, of which the principal are the Mula,
Nagau, and Bhor Passes. The Mula, otherwise
ltnown as the Gandava, follows the willdings of the
Mula river, which has to be crossed repeatedly, and
is considerably to the south of the Bolan. I t leads
through Nard to Kelat, a cross-road leading through
Gaz t o Khozdar, a Balucl~town of some importance.
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Anjira, a village at the top of the Pass, is at an
elevation of 5,250 feet, but the inclination is, on a n
average, only 45 feet to the mile for the whole distance-roz miles. This greater length, and the fact
.that it only leads to Icelat-which is IOO miles south
of Quettah-render the Bolan, altl~ougha more difficult road, the preferable one for an advance upon
Candahar.
NATURAL DIVISIONS O F AFGHANISTAN.

Having talten a rapid survey of the mountain
systems of Afghanistan, and the rneails by which
access is to be had to her chief cities from the one
side of Russia11 Turkestan and British India, we
pass on to consider the natural divisions of the
country. These we shall find it coilvenient to classify
as follows :(I.) The Valley or Basin of the Cabul River.
(11.) The Central Tablc-land, on which stand
Ghazni and KalAt-i-Ghilzai, embracing thc upper
valleys of ancient A ruchosin.
(111.) The Upper Helmand Basin.
(IV.) The Lower Helmand Basin, embracing
Giriskh, and the Afghan portion of Seistan.
(V.) The Basin of the Herat River; and
(VI.) The Eastern Portion of the Table-land, draining by streams, which are cliiefly occasional torrents,
towards the Indus.

Its N n t z ~ m Features.
l
T o these some add(VII.) The northern mountain regions ; and,
(VIII.) T h e Southern Table-land, lying between
the Iihoja Amram range and the Muri and Bugti
mountains, and descending to the west, where it
terminates in the desert of Baluchistan, just short
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(I.) The Vnllq) of the Cnbul Xiuer.--This has its
~ ~ o r t l ~ elimit
s n in the range of the Hindu Kush,
beginning on the west at the foot of the Paghman
Mountains, and stretching eastward to the banlts of
thc Indus, a clistance of about zoo miles, in a
straight line. In the extreme west the valley is
~ o , o o o feet above the sea ; but at its eastern
end, near the Indus, it is not more than 750
feet above sca level. The southern boundary of
the valley is formed by, an uninterrupted chain of
heights of varying deviation, which is separated from
the Paghtnan range by the narrow plain, called the
Valley of Maidan, which is 7,747 feet above the sea
and is well cultivated.
The road from Cabul to Ghazni and Candahar
passes through this plain. T o the east of this
road coinmellces the chain just spoken of, which
consists at first of isolated hills of moderate elevation. They are described as low, with little grass,
bad water, and treeless, their dismal appearance
corresponding with that of other mountain regions

1
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that have bee11 found to contain great metallic
riches. While the English occupation existed inany
beds of very rich copper ore were discovered in
several places, but the natives work them only to a
small extent.
At Tazin, twenty miles from Maidan, these hills
change their aspect, rising higher and becoming
clothed with trees. They merge into the Safedkoh
range, of which, indeed, they may be considcred the
western extension, this elevated rocky mass occupying a distance of some thirty to forty miles from
west to east, and from fifteen to twenty miles from
north to south.
The highest summits of the Safed Roll reach t o
16,000feet above the sea, and the sides are covered
to thc height of ~o,ooofeet, with forests, chiefly of
deodara, while orchards, cultivated fields, and pasturegrounds sltirt the base. The peaks are snow-capped
all the year round, and from the snow risc many
streams, that flow uninterruptedly through the
summer.
The high mountains of the Safed Koh terminate
at about 70" E. long., and the Tira or Khaibar hills,
that succeed them to the cast, are of lower elcvation, declining steadily in height as they approach
the Indus.
The northern slopes of the Ichaibar hills arc
steep, and generally bare, or clothed with scanty
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grass, except aftcr the autumnal rains. There are
plateaus of some extent, however, on thesc high Ili]ls,
which have a deep soil, and f~lrnishgood crops where
irrigation is possible.
T h e Cabul river (the Cophat of Alexander) rises in
t l ~ Unai
e
Fass, about thirty-seven miles west of Cabul,
in the near neighbourl~oodof the source of its rival,
t h e Helmand. I t drains thc Maidan valley, and below
Cabul is joined by the Logar river, which flows north
from t h e Ghilzai plateau.
I t flows in a westerly course for about 300 miles,
draiiliilg the southern slopes of the Hindu ICush on
t h e left and the northern watershed of the Safed
R o h on the right, and falls into the Indus at Attok,
I t s tributaries on the right are numerous, but,
exceptiilg the Logar, are insignificant in volume,
owing t o the nearness of the watershed, On tile
north o r left bank the Cabul river receives the large
streams of the Panjshir, Alishang, IC~lnar, and
Landai Sin. Of thcse the Kunar or Chitral river is
t h e longest, and, indeed, as regards length, might
count as the main stream. Higher up in its course
it is called the river of Kashgay and the Bnilnm, and
h a s been identified with the Chonspes and RfaLaninntz~sof the ancients. I t rises in a small lake
near t h e borders of Pamir, and flows in a south-west
direction through the length of ICashgar, its whole
length to its junction with the Cabul river being not

'",

less than 250 miles. . Tlie Cabul river, in part of its
course, betweell Cabul and Jalalabad, descends 4,000
feet in fifty miles, and its banlts and bed consist of
hLge rocks. Tlie lowest ford (a dry season one) is
near Jalalabad, before the junction of the river with
the Icunar. From this point a safe and rapid
descent is made by means of rafts on inflated skins,
and boats of 50 tons can be floated from Jalalabad
downwards. During the floods the distance between
Jalalabad and Peshawar (not less than IOO miles)
can be traversed in this way in twelve hours. T h e
river is lowest in the winter, and is at its greatest
height in August, when the upper snows beg-in to
descend. '
A t a point sixty miles from the Icunar confluence,
the Cabul rivcr issues from the mountains, by which
it has been hitherto hemmed in, and enters the plain
of Peshawar. I t soon after receives the Landai Sin,
which is the name given to the joint streams of the
Swat and Panj ICora, wliich drain the great valleys
of the Yuzufzais ; Lafzdai Sift, or Little River, being
applied to it by way of distinguishing it from the
Abba Silt, or Indus. Both rivers, on entering the
plain, form deltas, which are increased by artificial
canals made for irrigation.
The valley of the Cabul river is naturally divided,
by the mountain-ranges of the Lataband on the
west and the Khaibar on the east, into three basins,
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called, from the principal towns in them, the Cabul,
Jalalabad, and Peshawar basins.
The basin of Cabul includes a tract about
thirty-six miles from east to west, and from eight
to sixteen miles from north to south. This tract
is again divided by two ridges of hills into three
plains. The western plain, called Chahar-deh (or
"Four villages ") is about eight miles wide and
twelve long. The town of Cabul stands a t the
base of a ridge of hills (called the Talt-i-shat)
running from south to north, through which the
Cabul river flows in a deep gorge. The Chahar-deh
plain, which is t o the west of this ridge, is very
fertile, and abounds in fruit trees.
The eastern portion of the basin is wider, and is
called I<ohistan. On the west it is hemmed in by
the Pagl~manMountains, and on the north and east
by the Hindu Kush. Its length is thirty miles, and
average width seven miles. The western side of the
plain of Icohistan is much higher than the eastern,
along which flows the drainage of the opposite
mountain. I t is the favourite country residence of
the Cabul inhabitants, and is thicltly-studded with
their strongly-built dwellings and well-cultivated
gardens.
The plain of Logar is the third of the plains that
are included in the upper basin of the Cabul river.
, It is about twenty miles wide from east to west, and
3
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about half 'that distance i n length from north t o
south. Much of it is a swamp during part of the
yeal; and it is surmised that the whole was a t one
time a lalre. I t is chiefly valuable as s grazing
ground for the cattle, and especially the horses, of
the Cabulese, but it also contains orchards and
vineyards.
The Lataband Pass leads from the Cabul t o the
Jalalabad division of the valley. This mountainous
region extends for about thirty miles, and numerous
offsets reach it from the Safecl Koh, leaving narrow
valleys intervening. .A series of steep ascents and
descellts is here met with, the ridges sometimes
rising r,mo or 1,500 feet above the valley, which are
overhung with frowning boulders. T o the south of
this barren region is the Khurd Cabul Pass, through
which runs the road from Cabul to Tazin a n d Jagclallalc. At Jagdallalc this road is joined b y t h e road
from Cabul through the Lataband Pass, whicla
thenqe proceeds eastward through Gandainalr t o
Jalalal~adand Peshawar.
A marked change in the character of the valley of
the Cabul river occurs at Gandamak, where the
Jalalabad divisioil of it may be said to begin. This
extends from west to east about forty miles, and is
on an average about ten iniles wide. It is reached
from Gandamak by a sudden descent from a n elevation of 5,000 feet to one of z,ooo. The descriptiot~
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quite another world. The timber is different; its
grains are of another sort; its animals are of a
different species ; and the manners and customs of
its inhabitants are of a different kind.'' I t is possible
to leave the wheat harvest in progress at Jalalabad,
and to find a t Gandamak, only twenty-five miles
distant, that it is but a few inches above thc ground.
" Here," exclaims one writer, " nature has planted
the gates of India. T h e valleys of the upper basin,
though still in the height of summer affected by a
sun of fierce power, recall the climate and products.
of the finest part of temperate Europe; the region
below is a chain of narrow, low, and hot plains, with
climate and vegetation of an Indian character."
A narrow tract along the Cabul river is richly.
cultivated ; beyond that on either side are barren
wastes up to the foot of the hills, where village life
and cultivation again appcar. I n April and May
this region is visited by the same fierce hot winds
that a t this season prevail in the plains of India.
T h e Ichaibar Pass leads from this central division
of the Cabul basin to its most eastcrn portion,
the plain of Peshawar, now British territory, but
formerly, along with ~ i n d h an
, integral part of the
Afghan dominions. I t has been 'conjectured that
down to a coinparatively late date in the tertiary
3-2
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period a great inland lake filled up the deep basin of
Peshawar, and even rose to a considerable height
along the sides of the neighbouring hills, being fed
by the Cabul and Swat rivers. I t is supposed that
in course of time the outlet by which the lake
emptied its surplus stores into the Indus created a
deep gorge through the rocky barrier that hemmed
it in, and, step by step, the waters subsided to lower
and yet lower levels, until a t length the whole valley
was drained of its overflowing flood, and became a
mere circular glen, traversed by the united stream of
the Cabul and the Swat, which had formerly filled its
whole expanse. Yet even to the present day many
signs of this primeval condition remain stamped
indelibly upon the face of the Peshawar basin. Its
bottom consists of a thick alluvial deposit, the relic
of its ancient lacustrine state ; and through the
yielding soil the rivers cut their way in numerous
divergcnt channels, which still recall the memory of
the almost forgotten lake. Especially in the rich
wedge of land known as the Doab (i.e., the tract
between two rivers) do these numberless minor watercourses carry off and distribute the swollen current
of the great mountain streams, thus preventing the
possibility of inundation, and parcelling out the
fertilising waters to the green fields around. I n this
way the Peshawar valley is freed from the danger of
those two ever-present and alternative Indian curses,
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with such appalling rapidity during the
seasons respectively.
The fertilitv of the vallev is so famous
of Bara, grown along the banks of a stream beari..,
the same name, has the reputation throughout India
of being food fit for princes.
The plain of Peshawar falls short of the Indus.
Its elevation is 5,000 fect lower than the plain of
Cabul, Peshawar itself being only 1,165 feet above
the sea.
(11.) The Ce~ztralTable-h~zdis hardly more than
twenty miles wide at its northern extremity, where
it meets the plains of Maidan and the Logar river,
which lies between it and the basin of Cabul. I t
widens in its length from N,E. to S.W., till a t
Ghazni it is nearly one hundred miles across, and
this width is continued to its southern extremity,
near Candahar. Its greatest elevation is reached at
the Sher-i-dana Pass, north of Ghazni, and it slopcs
down on the northern side from g,ooo feet, near
Gl~azni,to less than 8,000 feet in the Maidan plain,
and in the south it sinks towards Candahar as low
as 3,500 feet. The variations of temperature experienced in this tract are, consequently, very great,
ranging from a cold climate in the north to a comparatively hot one in the south. Thus Ghazni is
very cold, and has a winter that lasts four or five'
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lnollths, during which hard frosts are experienced,
the ice ill the pools attaining a thickness of several
feet even in a mild season. Candahar has, however,
a temperate climate, with only slight frosts, and
great heat in the summer, while the thermometer
often varies as much as 40" between sunrise and
three p.m. The rainfall here is small, and recourse
has to be had to irrigation, for which ingenious
methods are adopted. In the northern part good
crops of barley and wheat are obtained b y these
means. The fruit of this region is considered inferior to that of Cabul. In the middle and southern
tracts, occupied by the Ghilzais, a nolnadic tribe,
there is little cultivation, and that only near the
large rivers, but pasture-grounds are numerous.
Near Candahar, on the banks of the Argandab,
wheat, rice, barley, and Indian corn are cultivatecl,
and orchards are plentiful.
(111.) The Upper Helmawd Basin is the tract t o
the north-west of the Central Table-land, and is the
least-known tract of Afghanistan. T h e Helmand
rivcr (the classical Etynznndev) has its highest sources
in the ICoh-i-Baba and Paghlnan Mountains, betwcen
Cabul and Bamian. I t exceeds the Cabul river in
length, and probably also in volume. I t s upper
course is through the Hazarah countiy, and it is
believed that for a course of nearly 300 miles this
river has not beul seen by a European. This un-
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ltnown part of the river ends at Girishk, xvllere the
principal route from Candahar to Ilerat crosses it.
From native sources of information it is gathered
that the I-Ielmand, until about forty miles above
Girishlc, has all the characteristics of a mountain
stream. I t receives its chief tributary, the Argandab
(supposed to be the ancient Amchotz~s),about forty
miles below Girishlt, and here becoincs a considerable stream, 300 yards wide and g feet deep. I t
coiltinues fordable, howevel; to within IOO miles of
its mouth. I n its lower course the left banl; is
within a mile or so of the desert with its moving
sands, but the vegetation on the banks is luxuriant.
Cultivation seems to have fallell off froin what it was
in former times, the lower outlet appearing to have
been the seat at some more or less remote period of
a flourishing population.
Following generally a south-west course from its
source till it enters Seistan, the Hclrnand there
turns nearly nortl~tvardsfrom a point situated a
little to the north of 30" north latitude, and continues to flow in that direction to its outfall by
several mouths in the laltc of Seistan or Harnun
(the ancicnt Aria Palus). The whole length is
about 700 miles.
(IV.) The Lower Helvzaad Basin extends from
the road leading from Girishk to Farrah on the
,north to the desert of Balucl~istanon the soutll and
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south-east. On the west the plain of Seistan is its
boundary, part of this plain being now included i n
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(V.) The Bnsiyz of t/te Heyat River lies between
the I-Iazarah country on the east, and the Ghurian
hills in Persian territory on the west. The Hari-rud
or Herat river rises in the lofty Hazareh country,
not far from the source of the Ballrh river. For
more than IOO miles its course is westward, a t a
height of many thousand feet above the sea. It
then descends rapidly in the same direction to Aoba,
where it begins to be used for irrigation. About:
sixty miles beyond this place it flows past Herat,
at a distance of three iniles south of the city. T h e
Candahar road crosses the river near Herat by a
masonry bridge of twenty-six arches. Numerous
deep canals are here drawn off. The river turns
north-west below I-Ierat, and rapidly decreases in
volume, owing to the immense stores taken from it
for irrigation. I t flows past Sarakhs, having previously received the Tejend or Mash-had stream,
but accurate information of its further course is
wanting. I n a recent map the Tejend-rud (or Tejend
river) is given as the main stream, into which t h e
Hari-rud falls at Agha Derbend, fifty miles south of
Sarakhs. Beyond that town a conjectural northwest course is indicated for the point of stream of
at least 250 miles, and it is made to end in a lake
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called ~ a l i eTejend, about fifty miles south of the
ancient bed of the OXUS,on the borders of the
Turltoman desert.
of Herat is of considerable extent, and
The
is .covered with fortified villages, orchards, gardens,
and cornfields. The heat is excessive for
two months, but the winter is cold, and snow fa11s
iIl great quantities. South of Herat is the plain of
Sabzawar, thirty lniles long and twenty wide, alld
partly cultivated. This plain and the AnanClara t o
tile south of it are watered by tlie Harut-rud, alld
tile canals drawn from it. This river, besides
receiving a considerable affluent, the I<hushltalq or
Khushrudak, forms a truc delta with fifteen branches.
T h e H a r u t - r u d has a coussc of about 250 miles t o
its outfall in the Lake of Seistan. I t has been
confounded with the Hari-rud, or river of Herat,
which has led, perhaps, to the long-prevalent mistake that the latter flowed south into the Seistan
Lake.
(VI,) The Emtern Portiorz of the Table-lamiis very
little k n o w n , as it has been rarely visited by Europeans. It is believed to be little cultivated, and to
be occupied b y nomadic tribes, of whom the GhiIzais in the north, the I<altars in the south, and the
Vaziris i n t h e east, are the principal. The Gomai
river d r a i n s the northern part, but rarely reaches the
Indus e x c e p t in times of flood. This region may be
-
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said to extend from .the Suliman Mountains to t h e
watershed between the tributaries of the Indus o n
the east and the Helmand on the west respectively,
This watershed is a ridge about 1,000 feet above t h e
table-land, and is lcnown by several names, such a s
the Jadran Mountains in t l ~ enorth, and the Icohnak,
'J<and, and I<apar Mountains in the centre and south.
(VII.) The N o ~ t h e ~Ilowztnilt
~z
regioons ay t/te
H m r a h mzd Ei~nn6occupy, together tvitl~,the ICohi-Baba, the whole country between 34" and 36" N. late,
and between 6 8" and 63" E. long., covering an a r e a
of about 50,ooo square miles. The climate of t h e
nortfiern part is very severe on account of its high
elevation, and tbe Hazarahs are obliged to cut great
quantities of grass for their sheep, which, during
three months of the winter, are generally housed
under the same roof with their owners. The country
of the I-Iazarahs has an averagc elevation of ~ o , o o o
feet. In the Eimak country the elcvation of tile
mountains is less, and the general level is also I,owcr.
During the heats of summer pastures are sought here
by the Durani tribes, who come up from the plains
below, where all the grass is completely burnt u p
in that season.
(VIII.) Tlze Saz~the~~tz
TnBle-lnnd is the tract bctween the Khoja Amran range and the Mari a n d
Bagti Mountains, and consists of the valley of t h e
rivkr Lora, and the country of Thal. This river
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from the Pishni valley westward is unlrnown, and,
although it is usually considered to belong to the Helmand basin, it has not been ascertained that its waters
ever reach that river. I t rises -near the Icand and
Joba pealrs in an offset of the Suliman Mountains,
and flows westward, The greater part of the Khoja
Amran range is unlcno~vn,as, indeed, are the upper
courses of the Arghasan and Icadani streams, ~vhich
join the Dori, a coilfluent of the Argandab,
Besides these main natural divisions of Afghailistan
Proper, the IChanates of Afghan Turlcestan and
Badakhshan are included in the Afghan dominions,
as the former are subject, atld the latter tributary,
to the Amir of Cabul. Afghan Turlcestan includes
the IChanates of ICunduz, Ichulm, Balkh, with
Alrcha ; the western Khanates of Sir-i-pull Shibrghan,
Andlrhui, and Maima~la,which are lcnown as the
" Four Domains " {Chiliar Wilayat) ; and such of the
Hazarah tribes as lie to the north of the Hindu I<ush
and the Paropamisan chain. This tract includes the
whole southern half of the Oxus basin, from the
ICokcha to the Murghab river.
Between the district of Swat and the dependencies
of Badalchshan and Icunduz, and in the heart of the
hill-country beyond the India11 frontier, lies the interesting tract called Icafiristan, or the land of the
Kafirs (the term used by Muhammadans for all who
have not embraced Islam). Roughly speaking, it
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may be defined as the country that lies on the eastern
slopes of the Hindu Kush, from the Valley of
Panjkir, near Cabul, and as far north as Mastoj and
Chitral, or Kashlcar.
RIVERS.

The chief are the Cabul, Helmand, I-Iarut, Harirud, Gomal, and Lora, with their tributaries, which
have, perhaps, been sufficiently described in the preceding pages.
T h e Kuram river rises in the Safed ICo11 Mountains, and drains the southern slopes of the Salt
Range. The upper part of its valley is known as the
Bangash-i-bala, or Upper Bangash, and the lower
part descends gradually to the Indus, forming the
plain of Bannu. Tbis plain, as well as the tract
called Danian, which lies south of Bannu and to the
east of the Suliman Mountains as far as Mittan-Icot,
is included in British territory.
The rivers of Afghan Turkestan and Badakhshan
are mostly tributaries of the Oxus, which forms the
boundary of these provinces as far as IChoja Salih
ferry. T h e Icolxha, or river of Badakhshan, is
famous for the mines of lapis lazuli in its neighbourhood. The Kunduz river has its chief source in the
Bamian stream, and just where the latter receives a:
confluent from the Hajihalc Pass, extensive ruins
are found, the name of which, Zohak, connects
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Balkh, and Murghab are the other
this part of the Afghan dominions ;
numerous tributaries. Tlie last is
Merv, and is then lost in the desert.

Besides the Lora Hamun, the name given to the
lalcc in which the Lora river is supposed to end, a
small part of the Lake of Seistan or Zarall is
included in Afghanistan ; and there is also a salt
lake called the Ab-i-istada (standing water) on the
Gl~ilzaiplateau. This last is about forty miles in
circuit, and very shallow, nowhere, perhaps, exceeding twelve feet in depth. The chief feeder is the
Ghazni river, but the waters of the lake itself are so
salt and bitter, that fish entering them sicken and
die. The dreary and barren aspect of the shores of
this lake is said to rival that of the shores of the
Dead Sea.
PROVINCES AND TOWNS.

The present political divisions of Afghanistan are
not known with accuracy, but they probably consist
of Cabul, Herat, Ghazni, Candahar, Jalalabad,
Afghan Turkestan, and the Hazarah division.
Besides Cabul, I-Ierat, Ghazni, Candahar, and
Jalalabad, there are few places of such importance as
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to deserve the name of towns. Istalif, Charilcar,
I(alaJt-i-Ghilzai, and Girishk, are all places connected
with our former occupation of Afghanistan, at some
of which British troops were stationed.
Farrah and Sabzawar, in the west, are places of
some irnportal~ce, from a military point of view.
Zarni, to the east of Herat, is noted for the ruins in
its neighbourhood, supposed to be those of tile
ancient capital of Ghor, the seat of a inonarchy
which supplanted t11c Ghaznavites, and obtained
extensive domillion in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. The rule of the Ghori Icings extended
at one time over Ichorasan, Afghanistan, Sindh, and
Lahore.
Icunduz, the capital of an old Khanate, is a
mere collection of mud huts. Ballch; the ancient
Bactra (of which no certain trace remains), is now
entirely deserted for another site, Talctapul, eight
miles east of the old city. Altcha, the capital of a
recently-conquered Uzbelc Khanate, is a fortified
town, with a citadel.
T h e chief towns in the "Four Domains " are
Shibrghan (12,ooo inhabitants), Andlthui, Maimana,
and Sir-i-pul.
Ilaving now completed our rapid survey of the
'natural features of Afghanistan, we pass on to consider the climate, productions, and commerce of the
country, which form the subject of tlie next chapter.
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which frequent mention has been made in the preceding pages, is due to difference of elevation rather
than . of latitude. So severe are the winters at
Gliazni (7,730 feet) that the people stay in their
houses nearly all the winter. Indeed, if tradition is
to be credited, the entire population has perished in
former times from severe snow-storms. On the
other liand, the summer Izeat, except in the very
elevated p a r t s of the Hindu ICush and other high
mountains, is everywhere very great. The soutli\vesten-11 portion of the country is exposed during the
s u m m e r t o a deadly hot wind, which renders the
~ v l ~ o l ecountry a sandy and aImost uninhabited
desert. Ferrier says that at Herat the wind blows
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constantly from May to September from the northwest, and its violence is equal to prostrating houses,
uprooting trees, and other similar devastation. T h e
summer heat in the provillce of Candahar is intense,
in Seistan almost unbearable. The rains of the
south-west Inonsoon reach the eastern border of the
Afghan table-land, but owing to the distance from the
sea they are scanty, and last only for a month, from
the middle of July to the middle of August. They
do not extend beyond Jalalabad in the valley of the
Cabul river, but they fall at the head of the ICuram
valley. They are not experienced to the west of the
Suliman range.
In the higher regions the summer is dry, rain
not falling from May to September or October,
and being rare in November.
The winter rains are the most considerable, and
are accompanied with falls of snow, while sleet falls
with the spring rains in the valley of the Cabul river.
Herat is credited with a milder climate, the most
agreeable, it is said, in Asia. , The temperature, says
Ferrier, rarcly exceeds 91" to 93" (Fahr.), and was
The
never more than 98" while he was there.
winter, too, is so mild tltat only in one year out of
four is there enough ice to enable it to be stored.
The Emperor Baber, speaking of the extent to
which change of climate can be obtained near Cabul
by change of place, says that at one day's journey

from that city you may find a place where snow
never falls, and, a t two hours' journey, a place where
snow never melts !
Some local clitnates are much lauded by the
Afghans for healthiness and comfort, such as the
Toba hills and some valleys of the Safed Koh range
of mountains.
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The llcnowledge we have of the geology of Afghanistan is meagre; but there seems reason to believe
tllat the mineral wealth of the country is great,
although little utilised. Dr. Lord, who was with the
army of occupation in I 839, remarks that antimony,
iron, and lead are found in the Gllorband valley,
and marble quarries in the hills near Maidan.
According to a Russian authority, the hills southwest of Cabul and the Hazarah districts are the
richest in mineral wealth.
Gold (on the same authority) is found in the
rivulets of Paghman, in the rivers Cabul, Kunar,
and their tributaries. The principal places where
gold is washed down on the CabuI river are said to
be Jalalabad and Michni ; on the Kunal; ChacharBag, Peshat, and Kirch. I t is believed that all the
rivers coming from the western side of the Hindu
I(us11 are auriferous. Silver, formerly milled in large
quantities in Kohistan, is now only gathered in the
4
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valley of Ghorband; Lead occurs. in. the I-Iazarah
district .north of Canddhal; and in the Ghorband
valley. Of copper, there are large quantities in the
Gal I<oh hills, in the teri-itory of the Jaguri tribe of
the. Hazarah. Here there is also antimony, which is
also met with north of Candahar, and in the Khaibar
hills. Sulphur, saltpetre, and salammoniac may be
dug out of the Ghorband and Jaguri territories.
Iron is abundant along the western slopes of the
Hindu Kush. There are mines in the valley of the
Panjlrora, and in the hills west of Bunnu, whence the
article i s . exported to India. Iron worlrs also exist
in Badakhshan, near Faizabad, and in Soutl~crn
Cabul, near Kaniguram. The iron, being entirely
smelted with charcoal, is highly valued in the
adjoining countries.
Coal is said to be found in places between the
Upper I<uram and the Gomal valleys. Nitre is
.abundant in the soil, all over the south-west of
Afghanistan, and affects the water of the subterranean canals, called " Karez," which are made for
purposes of irrigation. Salt is found in ample
quantities in the Salt Range, a chain of low hills,
that do not rise more than 2,000 feet above the level
of the Indus, and extend from its western banlr
W.N.W. to the Suliman Mountains, which they
touch a few miles south of the Safed I<oh. The
chief worltiilgs of this rock-salt are a t Kalabagh, 011
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the Indus, whence it is exported to different parts of
Upper India.
VEGETABLE KINGDOM.
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From Dr. Bellew's interesting Journal, and other
worlts, an exhaustive account of the distribution of
vegetation on the mountains of Afghanistan can be
obtained. Vegetation is almost entirely absent from
the distant and terininal prolollgation of t l ~ egreat
mountain chaiils ; but there is abundant growth of
forest trees, and, indeed, every form of vegetation on
the main ranges and their larger off-shoots.
On the Safed ICol1 and its immediate branches, we
have abundant growth of large forest-trees, at a
hcight of 6,000 to 10,000 feet, among which are
cn umerated Ced~z~sdeodnru, A bits exceIsa, Pilzz~s
Zo7olzgz~oliu,P. Pilznster, the edible pine, and the larch.
The yew, hazel, juniper, walnut, wild peach, and
almond are also found. Under these grow the rose,
lloneysucltle, gooseberry, currant, hawtl~orn, rhododendron, and a greensward of the richest kind. The
lemon and wild-vine are commoner on the northern
mountains.
Down to 3,000 feet the wild-olive, rock-rose, wildprivet, acacias, and mimosas, barberry, and zizyjhz~s
are met with. T o the eastward CPzn7~~~1?~qs,
Bignolzin, shis/lnm, Salvndorn persim, vsrbntn, and
ncn7~thusare found. T h e scanty vegetation on the
4-2
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terminal ridges is mostly herbal, with rare and
stunted shrubs ; but many of them are naked rocks.
Ferns and mosses are confined to the lofty ranges.
The rue and wormwood found among the low
brushwood of the dreary plains south of Ilerat are
used as domestic medicines, the former for rheumatism and neuralgia, the latter in fever, debility,
and dyspepsia, as well as for a vermifuge. T h e rue,
owing to its nauseous odour, is believed t o drive away
evil spirits.
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Planted by the hand of man are such trees as t h e
mulberry, willow, poplar, ash, and plane, found only
in cultivated districts. The gum-resin of Western
Afghanistan (Candahar and Herat) is a valuable
article of commerce, being used in India as a condiment. Edible rhubarb is mentioned as a great
luxury. It grows wild in the hills, and is eaten both
raw,and cooked. Salzjit and sale$ are names of a n
edible fruit and root exported to India. T h e
pistachio-nut is found in the extreme north. Mushrooms and similar fungi are largely consumed.
There are two lcinds of manna sold ; one, tz~~n;lz~'bi7z,
is talten from the camel-thorn and dwarf tamarisk ;
the other, say-haslzt, from a tree called " black-wood "
(siyah chob) by the natives.
The fruit of the mulberry-tree, of which there are
as many as twelve varieties, is ground into a flour,
and forms an important article of food in the country

Its CIivznle mzd P~odz~ctiotzs,
near the I-Iindu Kush. Some individuals possess as
many as 10,ooo trees. A tree of the best Icind will
so~netimesbear 800 lbs. of mulberries, and talcing a
third of this as the average produce, a larger popuIation could be supported by it than by tillage. Sillr
is not produced to any great extent, ancl only in a
few places.

'

AGRICULTURE.

S o far as is known, the land belongs to local chieftains, who, while letting it to vassals, themselves have
t o pay a tribute to their suzerains. Only on the ,
well-watered banks of rivers and canals, where agriculture attains to some degree of perfection, is the ?
land owned or rented by individuals. Pastures are
always the common property of the clans, steppes
being considered nobody's property. Like all other
rights and personal possessions, title-deeds are worth
but littIe in Afghanistan. Everybody's hand being
against everybody, landcd proprietors are frequently
expelled, or else expelling others, to transfer themselves t o fresh sccncs. Some emigrate t o neighbouring Khanates, and by dint of the strong arm manage
t o cstablisll themselves on ground belonging to
another clan.
Speaking generally, there are in Afghanistan, as
in India, two harvests, the spring (606araX.')sowll in
October and reaped in April, consisting of wheat,

1
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barley, and lentils ; and the autumnal (ti~~fzni),
SOW12
in April or May and reaped in September, of which
rice, millet and vorghum, maize (Phnseolus M T L I Z ~ O ) ,
tobacco, beet, and turnips are the chief crops. T h e
higller districts have, however, but one harvest.
In consequence of the difference of climate in
various parts of the country, agriculture is by n o
means the same thing in the north as in the south,.
I n Cabul the land is well-watered by canals, and very
fertile. In the valley 'of the river Cabul, from the
Ichaibar hills to the capital, there is no barren,
unproductive soil. Arable land in those parts is so
.extrernely~.valuable
that-a rare thing i n Afghanistan
-it is amply provided with roads. There are here
plenty of arilts or open canals, not to speak of the
underground rills,' artificially laid down in soine
These water-courses are coilstructed by t h e
Government or village authorities, or by charitable
individuals wishing to confer a benefit upon their
neighbours. I n the case of Government waterworks,
a tax has to be paid for their use ; whercas, village
canals are frequently the joint
of t h e
The kind o f subterranean canal called " Rare%"
whiche~lables the water of a hill or rising ground
t o be brought out at its foot in a rivulet, so as to be
disposed of at the pleasure of the cultivator, is
common in 'the tracts to the south of Ghazni, where
.
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the i-ainfall is small, and the rivers of small volume.
The mode of their construction is thus described :A t the spot where it is wished that the water shall
issue, a well is dug; and above it, ill the acclivity,
another is made at the distance of five to twenty
yards. Other wells are made above at similar
distances from each other, the highest being made
the deepest, so that its bottom may be slightly
above the level of that of the one below, and so on.
When as many wells have been thus made as the
farmer can afford, or thinlts necessary, a subterranean
passage is burrowed from the lowest, joining the
bottom of each well, and the water rushes fort11 in
such fArce sometimes as to be able to turn a mill.
Some of these Kavezts extend to two or more.
miles-a
celebrated one near Ghazni, ascribed to.
Sultan Malimud, being said to be thirty miles long,.
including offsets.
I n tlie Icafiristan Mountains agriculture ascends.
to a considerable height, wherever an arable plot is
to be found. I n otlier parts, where corn cannot be
sown, the hills are planted with fruit trees in terraces.
The harvest in tliesc parts principally depends upon
the amount of rainfall.
South of the Safed Koli I~ills,in the district of
Kuram, agriculture js confined to the valley of the
Kuram, which in some parts is twenty-two miles
wide. I n this valley, as in all other valleys of East:

,
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.Cabul, are well cultivated, and supply corn to the
whole Principality.
In Candahar, from the source of the river 'Tarnak
(a tributaiy of the Argandab), to the capital, the
country offers but scanty opportunity for agriculture.
Fields, as a rule, follow the river-bank in narrow
strips, or sometimes cluster round water-courses,
mostly subterranean in those parts ; nor is the lower
valley of the Tarnalc much more productive. A
more cheerful aspect is offered by the Helmand
valley, having fields and gardens to about a mile
and a-half to two miles on either bank, as far as the
Seistan Lake. South of the Helmand, the desert
appears rather unexpectedly. North of the river,
however, stretching away to the hills, it is here and
tliere studded with villages surrounded by oases wit11
artificial irrigation.
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Herat, possessing a good soil traversed by several
rivers, is considered the most fertile part of the
plateau of Afghanistan. Here the harvests are
uniformly good, yielding forty-fold. The district of
Ghorband is the storehouse of the country ; and such
is the superabulldance of land, that where corn might
be grown cattle are frequently pastured. Every
now and then the country is the scene of Persian
warfare, which prevents the development of agriculture.
Seistan, the ;basin of Lake Hamun, and of the
deltas of surrounding rivers, is a plain intersected
by low ridges. Two-thirds of the surface is sand,
the remaining third being alIuvial soil, capable of
high cultivation, but mostly occupied by tamarind
trees. T h e delta of the Helmand, with its many
paraIlel water-courses, is very fertile, and wholly
under the plough. The fields are here separated by
quick-set hedges ; the harvests are abundant, and
much is exported.
Of the Turkestan Khanates under Afghan control
Ballch is the most productive, thanks to its extensive
system of irrigation.
Notwithstanding political
troubles, and the consequent decrease of the population, Balkh still yields enough to supply some of
the neighbouring Principalities. The valley of
Icunduz, though fertile, is swampy, and has an
unhealthy climate, compelling people to live in the
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hill districts. All attempts at agriculture have failed,
colonists invariably succumbing to malaria.
There is a deal of arable, well-ilArigatedground in
the other Khanates; but they are too frequently
'exposed to war and robbery to permit of the labour
of the husbandman. I n all these parts plenty of
good land lies fallow.
The agricultural produce of Afghanistan is very
various. Wheat, maize, barley, and millet form the
principal food of the population. Rice requiring
, much water is only planted in the valleys of the
tributaries of the Indus, in I<uncluz, Ballth, and some
localities of Herat. Every variety of fruit Itnow11
in Europe grows well, the rhubarb being especially
fine, Indeed, fruit is one of the great staples of food
in the country, and a principal article of exportation.
The Cabul valley gardens are famous for peaches,
apricots, oherries, apples, pears, pomegranates, figs,
and quince; the Jalalabad valley has also lemons
and dates. The white mulberry-tree is found everywhere ; the other species with red fruit is also
there. I t has been mentioned already that the mulberries themselves tare -dried, ground into flour, and
made illto caltes, either with or without corn-flour,
Pistachio-nuts are grown in such quantities in the
neighbourhood of Maimana that they are exported
in caravans to Persia and Bagdad. I t is a peculiarity oflthe climate that -all these excellent comes-
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tibles get ripe a t a considerable altitude. Pomegrai~atesflourish at 4,500 feet above the sea, while
apricots ascend to 8,000 feet, and mulberries to 9,000
feet. Grapes are plentiful, and the malting of wine.
is a chief branch of industry, especially in Kafiristan.
Considerable quantities of grapes are dried and
eaten as raisins. Somc sorts are gathered before
they are ripe, and exported to Bombay, and other
parts of India. I n Herat a special tax is imposed
upoil the manufacture of wine, which can oilly be
carried on by Goverilment licence. Tobacco is
much grown and used. T h e three most approved
growths in East Afghanistan are the Candahar,
Balkh, and Mansurabad, of which the last is the
best. I n Herat tliere :are two tobacco harvests in
the year, the first being accounted the best. ,There
is little cotton produced in the country, except in
the Bangash district, near the Indian frontier; but
this, too, is indifferent in quality and quantity. Of
other plants we may mention the madder, in Candahar and Ghazni, much employed for dyeing
woolleil cloth, and also exported ; Indian hemp used
in brewing a narcotic beverage; a species of rhubarb, producing oil for lamps; assafcetida, a shrub
encountered everywhere, but more especially in the
south, from whicli pitch is extracted. This pitch,
used in Afghanistan for medical purposes only, is
frequently exported to India. A decoction made
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from the young leaves is drunlc by the Afghans and
Baluchis in Seistan.
ANIMAL KINGDOM.

The tiger is found in the north-eastern hill
country. The leopard, panther, hyzna, the wolf
(said sometimes to attack single horsemen in the
wilder tracts), wild dog, and small Indian fox are
more or less common. Bears of two Himalayan
species are met with. Wild sheep, Indian deer,
especially the bara si~zgha,the wild hog, and the
wild ass, are found. No elephant or rhinoceros
has been traced witbin many hundred miles of
Afghanistan; but they formerly existed in the
Peshawar plain. Only one species of bird is known
to be peculiar to the country; but vast numbers
of birds of Indian and desert forms flock to
it in the breeding season. Among reptiles a
tortoise peculiar to Afghanistan has been discovered. Our knowledge of the zoology of the
country is confessedly fragmentary and imperfect
in the extreme,
Of domestic animals the most important are the
sheep, of which there are two kinds, both having the
broad, fat tail, which in some parts of thc Eimalc
Mountains is said to be of such a size that a small
cart is put under the tail. They are the chief property of the Hazarah and Eimak tribes, who Iive
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chiefly by selling wool and woollen stuffs. The
sheep on the mountains give two fleeces, the spring
one being coarser than the autumn one. Mutton is
the principal animal food of the people. The goats,
generally of a black variety, seem to be of an
itlferior breed, except in the higher ranges of the
Koh-i-Baba and Paropainisan Mountains.
Cattle-breeding here, as in the steppes and hills
of Russian Asia, requires in this climate a frequent
change of pasture. Thus the Ghilzae, Afridi, and
other clans pass the summer in the Safed I<oh hills,
descending for the winter to the plain of Candahar
and the Indus valley, and sometimes crossing the
frontier into Rritish territory. T h e Baluchis nomadise in summer near the river Helmand ; but in
autumn, with the first frost, may be seen wandering
to the southern steppes, where water is found only at
that season. Excepting in the Cabul valley, cattle
breeding is carried on in all parts of Afghanistan by
a nomad population, living side by side with the
sedentary and agricultural inhabitants. The nomads
rarely apply themselves to agricultural pursuits. Of
the domestic animals, camcls, dromedaries, and a
cross between the two, are used for riding and
draught, as well as for the inillc and butter they
yield ; their flesh is only eaten by the very poorest.
The clan Gesarai, living in the hills where camels are
of little use, value them, however, for their wool.

f

Cabul has few camels, and only a cart-horse sort of
horse. The species of horse called yabu is employed for draught in the hills. Afiner breed is seen
'among the Hazarahs, in the Khanate of Maimana.
I n the south, the breeding and sale of horses are
almost exclusively in the hands of the Baluchis ;
but a peculiarly valuable kind introduced by Nadir
Shah from Persia is only met with among the Afghan

'
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The cows of Candahar and Seistan are said to give
very large quantities of milk.
Dog-breeding is pursued with advantage, owing
to the favourable climate.
The so-called " Persian " cats in reality chiefly come
from Afghanistan.
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE.

The industrial products of Afghanistan are confined to a little silk, chiefly used in clomestic manufacture ; carpets from Herat, some of whicli are soit,
brilliant, and durable, and pass in India for "Persian"
carpets ; felts and woven goods made from the wool
of the sheep, goats, and Bactriali camel ; sheepskins ; and rosaries made from chrysolite.
T h e manufactures of Afghanistan include a list of
the simplest trades of semi-civilised life, such as
jewellers, gold ancl silver smiths, sellers of armour,
sellers of bows ancl arrows, sellers of glass ornaments
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for women, confectioners, tobacconists, embroiderers,
and such like. T o these are added a few boolcsellers
and bookbinders. The inhabitants of the Eimalc and
Hazarah Mountains clo not export their tvool, but
manufacture it illto carpets, grain-bags, rugs, &c. As
there are few, if any, navigable rivers in Afghanistan,
nor any wheeled carriage, the mode of conveyance of
goods is by beasts of burden, chiefly camcls, though
mules and asses are largely used in the mountainous
districts. The principal trade of India with Western
Asia and Europe has from time immemorial bee11 by
sea ; yet large and valuable caravans at one time
carried Indian products into Persia, Turkestan, and
Cllina by the four lines of communication that pass
through or near Afglran territoiy. The most northern
leads from Lc11 in Ladakh to Yarlcand in Chinese Turkestan, and is the most difficult and dangerous. The
second passes through Lahore, Peshawar, the Ichaibar
Pass, to Cabul, where it divides into two roads, one
passing over the Bainian and other passes into
Afghan Turkestan, and the other running through
Gllazni to Canclahar, where it meets the two southern
lines. These last are divergent portioils of the
third linc wlzich passes through the Gomal Pass
from Dera Ismail Khan, and divides on the tableland into two roads, one running to Cabul and the
other to Ghazni and Candahar. The fourth road
begins a t Icarachi, iollotvs the Indus to Shikar-
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pur, diverges thence to the north-west, and passes
through the Bolan Pass into the valley of Shal. I t
continues through Quettah to Candahar. From Candal~arthe joint road passes westward across the
Helmand, through Farrah, Sabzawar, and Herat, t o
Mash-had in Persia, and thence to Teheran, the
capital. From Herat to Merv and Bokhara is allother
trade route. T h e Syads of Herat, who are large
horsedealers, used to carry on a considerable trade in
slaves, getting their chief victims from the Hazarahs,
whom they sold to the Turkomans. A large traffic
in wool has of late years sprung up from the regions
west of the Indus, some millions of pounds being
annually shipped from Karachi, the port of Sindh.
The Povindaks, a class of merchants that are the
representatives of the oldest Asiatic traders, carry
on traffic between India, Khorasan, and Bokhara,
by means of long strings of camels and ponies
banded in large, armed caravans. They battle their
way twice a-year between Bokhara and the Indus,
bullying, fighting, evading, or bribing the hostile
and marauding foes in their path. I t is interesting
to observe how these ancient traders accommodate
themselves to modern conditions of commerce,
They cannot pass armed through British territory,
so they quietly deposit their weapons a t the Indus.
Leaving their camels and families in the plains of
the Panjab, they take their goods by rail to the
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great cities of Hindustan, and even penetrate as far
as Boinbay and Rangoon. In March they return to
their fainilies, and back. again to the Ghilzai Tableland, whellce they despatch caravans again to Cabul
Bolrhara, and other cities in Western Asia,

C H A P T E R 111.
THE PEOPLE, LA.&-GI7A GE, LITERA TUR E, AND
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T h e Afghans, Pathans, or Pnshtanahs-Division into Tril~es-Non-Afghan
Population- Estimated Population - Rus51nn ilccount -Supposed
Jewish Origin-I<afirs--Sir John Rnye's Descr~ptionof the Afg+ans
-Language and 1,iterature-J~ldicial Institutions-hl~litary SysternRussian Account of the Afghan Anny-Antiqulties.

ALTHOUGH
the country derives its name from the
Afghans, these people are but a portion-barely
half, it is conjectured-of
the total inhabitants.
According to some authorities, thc name Afghan is
not applied to any tribe by its own members; b u t
the better opinion seems to be that t h e Afghans, o r
Pathans, or Pushtanahs, as tliey are variously called,
include a large number of tribes, of which the most
important are the following :(I.) Dura7zi or Abdali, to svhich Ahmad S h a h
belonged. They dwell in the south and south-west.
(2). Ghilzni, the strongest and bravest, said t o be
iclentical with the Khiliji dynasty of Delhi kings of
the tenth and eleventh centuries.
(3.) Yus7f~ai, a turbulent race, dwelling partly in
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t h e Rritisll district of Peshawar, and partly as an
independent tribe it1 the hill country north of thc
Ichaibar.
(4.) Knknrs, chiefly independent, it1 the south-east
of Afghatiistan, near Baluchistan.
.T h e non-Afghan population consists of numerous
tribes, among whicb the T@is and lr'nclbns/lis
include thc most industrious of all the inhabitants of
Afghanistan. T h e Hazn~whsare supposed to be of
Mongol or Mz~ghnlorigin, and pay tribute to the
Afghans only when compelled. These people are
said to be notorious for loose domestic morals, like
tlre ancient Massngcta who occupied thcir mountains.
T h e y are found all over Afghanistan as menial scrvants, and are, or were, often sold as slaves. Ekuzat
is t h e name given t o a nomadic tribe dwclling near
t h e Hnsnms. Hilzdki.~,or ~ e o p l eof Hindu descent,
Jrtts, and Rnlnchis, are names of other tribes. Colonel
Macgregor makes the following estimate of the
population :-

............

Afghan Tnskestan
642,000
Cl~itralisand Kafirs . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 0 , ~
. . . . . . . . . 400,000
Ernialcs and Hazarahs
Tajiks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500,000
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150,000
Rnzlbashis
. . . . . . . . . . . . 500,000
Hindkis and Jats
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ",OW
Rohistnnis
Afghans ancl IJatlians (including 400,000
independent Yusufzais, Bic.)
2,359,000

......

4,901,000

b

I

,

\

T h e Russian Military Department sets down the
total population of Afghanistall a t ~,OOO,OOO,
occupying an area of 10,000 geographical square miles.
The sparsity of the population on this estimate inay
be concluded from the fact that Germany on the
same area supports over 40,000,000 people. A n
attempt has also been made by the Russian Military
Department to estimate the population of each province and district, but as these figures are admittedly
conjectural to the last degree, we will not burden our
pages by quoting them.
T h e very elaborate account of the races and tribes
which has been published by the same department
deserves more attention. I t states the number of
distinct races to be nine-Afghans, Tajiks, I<azlbashis,
Hazaris, 'Usbelts, Hindus, Jats, lcafirs, and Arabs.
The Afghans are said to number about 3,000,000,
and to be divided into five tribes, and these again to
be subdivided into 405 clans (Ithail), each of which
includes numerous families. Of the 405 clans, 277
call themselves Afghans, and the remaining 128 prefer the patronymic of Pathan. All boast of deriving
their descent from the Ten Tribes of Israel, their own
chroniclers calling the Afghans BafziLi-Israel (Arabic
for Sons of Israel). They claim to be the offspring
of King Saul, through a son whom they ascribe to
him named Jeremiah, who again had a soil named
Afghana. The desceilda~~ts
of Afghana were, accord-
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ing to the legend, removed by Nebuchadnezzar, and
found their way to the mountains north of Herat.
They embraced the faith. of Muhammad, by their
own showing, nine years after the prophet's announcement of his mission. The earliest written statement
of this sto1.y dates from the sixteenth century. We
cannot enter at any length into t l ~ carguments which
have bee11advanced in favourof the Jewish origin of the
Afghans. The most weighty appears to be the facial
resemblance they bear to the Jews ; but this is shared
by the inhabitants of Cashmere, the Tajiks, and other
Asiatics.
Though spread over the whole country, the bull< of
the Afghan population live in the eastern and southeastern provinces, being inveterate mountaineers, and
preferring the lofty hills on the Indian frontier t o any
more profitable and convenient residence. Of those
living in the adjoining valleys some are in the
habit of nomadising on British territory part of the
year.
The principal clans in the north-east are the
Sllifzvnri, north of Cabul, almost independent ; the
Tarknl~zf~ni,in the south-western basin of the
Panjkora, capable of sending 10,000 men into the
field ; tlic Yfisrfl:ni, divider1 into two branches,
having separate lchntls and about 70,000 fighting
men, whose country has already been indicated ; the
Utllzntt lL"/reZs on the left bank of the Cabul river,
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who muster 10,000 fighting men ; and the Upper
Momunds.
South of the Cabul river in Cabulistan and t h e
Panjab hills, lining the Iildus valley, the Tarnokhi
muster 6,000 fighting men. T h e Africli, the most
numerous of the border tribes, spending the greater
part of the year on the Cabul hills, and descending
only in suminer into the Iildus valley, glory in t h e
possessioil of r 5,ooo armed men. T o them belong
the Ichaibar and Shinvari people, famous for their
martial and savage characteristics. Protected by t h e
Ichaibar hills, they are entirely independent, and
receive from. ~ o , o o oto zo,ooo rupees a year from
the Cabul Governineilt as a co~isiderationfor allowing caravans to pass. Some thirty years ago therc
were counted some zo,ooo armed men in and near
the Ichaibar Pass. The Ichaibar men are divided
into many sections, each of them having a scparate
Khan and refusing to ackiiowledgc any superior
authority. Among the more promillent branclics of
the Afridi, the Jawaki, the Zaka-Ichel, the Galli, a n d
the Adain Ichail deserve to be mentioned. T h c
Lower Momund ( ~ z , o o oarmed men) occupy t h e
south-western corner of the district of Peshawar.
The strip of land separating the British districts of
Peshawar and Kohat takes its name from the
Khattak, who, notwithstanding their rg,ooo warriors,
lead a pacific agricultural life. T h e Orakzai inhabit
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the Gauga valley south-west of ICohat, and the
Tiralc valley. West of them there are the Bangash,
in the valley of the Miranzai and part of the ICuram
valley, within the bou~ldariesof Cabul. South of the
ICurnm valley, between the districts of Bannu and
Tanlc, the country is infested by the robber tribes of
the Uatani (5,000 fighting-men), living partly 011
English, partly on Cabul territory. T h e Sulirnan
hills (Takhti Suliman, A~zglicL' the Throne of
Solon~on),in the south-eastern extremity of Afghanistan, harbours the three martial brotherhoods
of the Shirani, Ushterani, and ICazmni. Thc
Shirani, IO,OOOarmed men, make coilstant inroads
into the valleys, and up to the pacification of the
country by the English were the terror of the whole
region. They live in the direction of Dera Ismail
IChan. T h e Icazmni have about 5,000 rifles and are
less warlike.
\Vest of thcse, and still includcd in the C~tbul
frontiers, therc is the extensive district of Daur,
reaching from thc river Gomal to the river ICuram,
and inhabited by the Vezir people, divided into the
three branches of the Makhsud, the Vezir in the
south, the Dcrveshkl~cl in the centre, and the
I(abulkhe1 in the north. Thc Vczir are n powerful
and indcpcndcnt race, mostly tlomads, leading n
pastoral life, staying in thc hills in sulniner ; the
winter cuticcs them down to the Indus valley.

Afghn?ziskan.
Their principal centres are the towns of Icaniguram
and Makin. The upper valley of the Icuram is inhabited by the Turj and Jaji, of the Pathan division
of the people. .Further down the valley we meet
with a portion of the Zaimakht, whose principal
mass reside south-west. The mountainous district of
I<host, soutl~of the Icurarn, is the property of small
hill tribes-the Driplara, the Drikuti, Mattun, Gurbus,
Torzai, and others.
The powerful clan of the Ghilzai or Ghilji, with
numerous sub-divisions, are the owners of the I<ilati-Ghilzai region, Their southern frontier is formed
by the Durani country, ~vhichextends to Candahar.
In the environs of Candahar and Ghazni there are
also the Ashalcsai and Nurzai, and others whose
territories are less clcarly divided.
Of the branches of the Afghan people living in
the western parts of the l<ingdomwe lcnow but little.
The most numerous are the Berduran. T h e Baralczai to whom belongs the Khan, have 60,ow families,
and accordingly are one of the s t r o ~ g e s tAfghan
tribes.
Next to the Afghans, the Tajilcs are the most
numerous race in the country.
They are the
aboriginal elcment in the Western Yrovinces, and,
being a sedentary pcople, arc called Tajik-;.a,,
peasants, in contradistinction to the Turlc or warrior.
They are now divided into a sedentary portion call-
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ing themselves Parsivail or Parsi Zubail (that is,
Persian speaking), and nomads lriloivn as Eimaks.
The latter wander about in the hills surroundil~gthe
upper basin of the I-Iari-rud, and are mixed up wit11
the Turkish tribes who immigrated under Jengis and
Timur. Of these mixed tribes we lrnow the Char
Eiinak, the Jamshedi, the Firoz Icuzi, Taimuni or
Tegmuni, and the Zuri. Cognate to them are the
Timurs, formed by Timur Shah out of the heterogeneous mob of his camp toivards the end of the last
cei~tury. Tlle Taimuns are settled in the three
districts of Teivere, Darya Dere, and Devaza, each
having a separate Ichan. U p to 1844, when the
ruler of I-Ierat transplanted 45,000 to the country
adjoiniilg his capital, they were estimated a t ~o,ooo
souls. T h e Taimun territory is situated on the
southern declivity of the Sakh ICug llills, and was
anciently called Gur. T h e Zuri is an insignificant
clan. T h e Firoz ICuzi formerly lived further west in
Persian Kllorasan, but were trailsferred by Tiin~irto
their present settlement in I-Ierat. They are now
divided into five branches wit11 five chiefs living in
the forts of ICades, Darzi, ICuche, Chicharan, and
Daulat Yar, situated in the upper valleys of the Harirud and Murghab. Icades was subjugated in 1 8 4 b y
tlie Hazarah, but tlie other branches remained independent. T h e Zuri and Jamshedi, forlncrly potent
and respected, now occupy the small tcrritor~in the
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Murgliab, to which they emigrated in the heroic period
of Persian history. Their Khan resides a t Uala
Murghab, whence many raids are undertaken into
neighbouring lands. T h e sedentaiy portion of t h c
Tajilts are numerously represented only in C a b ~ ~ l
Icohistan, in the valleys of Ghorband, Panjshir, a n d
Nijaur, tvherc they amounted to 40,000 families a t
the beginning of this century. Thcy are warlike,
almost entirely independent, and divided into small
fraternities under the direction of special IChans.
The Tajilr branch in Logar, 8,000 families strong, is
distinguished for its bravery. I n the other parts of
Afghanistan the Tajilts are more or less mixed u p
with the Afghans, living sometimes in Afghan
villages, sometimes in separate colonies, under the
direction of Icetlthuds or Elders. I n these parts
they have no landed property, but rent land from the
Afghans, and altogether occupy a very inferior position. I n the towns they are a gentle, l ~ a r d t v o r k i n ~
race, and take to trades which the Afglians despise ;
in the villagcs they are justly famous for the excellence of their husbandry. Many of these Cabul
Tajiks serve in the Anglo-Indian forces, where thcy
are called Turks, and enjoy a good character. T h e
Tajiks also form the original populatioil of the
Badalrhshan region, where they are divided into tlie
three groups of Raman, Shagnan, and Vashan. John
Wood regarded the Chitral and Icafir people also as
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Tajiks ; but these being undoubtedly of different
extraction, the Persian origin of thc Badalcshan
Tajilcs must appear very problcmatic.
T h e third race are the ICazlbashi, transferred by
Nadir Shah from Persia to Cabul in 1737. They are
a mcclley of lJersians and Turks, of the Jevanshir,
Afshar, and Muradshahi tribes, who speak Persian,
and, indeed, arc Persian in every respect. They have
a n influe~ltinlcolony a t Cabul, and are accounted the
best-instructetl part of the populatio~~.
T h e I-Iazarah, accordiilg to some, are Mongols,
introduced by Jeilgis IChan ; according to others,
Turkish Usbelcs of the Uerlas tribe, fortnerly nomadising ncar Shazhrisab. T i ~ n u rin the year 799 of
the I-Iijra despatched a thousand familics of this
tribe to the vallcy of Badgis, on the Upper Murghab,
whcre they were called Hazarah, or " Tl~ousanders."
Thencc thcy extc~ldcdas far as Cabul on the east,
and I-Icrat on the west. Their division into tribes and
clans is very complcx, and they arc most of them
nomads and indcpcndent. The Eastcrn sections of
the racc OLLT allegiance to Cabul. Their clans have
separate Khans, and are in pcrpctual feud with each
other.
T h e Usbcks, of the Kutagan tribc, are the descendants of the Turlioman coilqucrors of Afghanistan, and thc ruling elemcnt i r ~thc IChanates north
of the IIindu I<ush.

The Hindus belong to the Kshatra or warrior
caste, are 300,000 strong, and live chiefly in the
The Jat, also about 300,000 strong, of unknowil
origiil, are probably aborigines. They are scattered
over the whole country.
The Kafirs, or Siyahposh, about I~O,OOO,
live on
the slopes of the Hindu Kush, north of Cabul. Of,
Caucasian type, their origin remains to be explained.
Thcy are divided into eighteen clans. T h e Swat,
Chitrals, and Safi belonging to the aboriginals border
up011 the Icafirs. They are said to numbcr no less
than 500,000 souls.
The Arabs, known as Syads, or descendants of the
Prophet, form a compact mass in the district of
ICunal; in Northern Cabulistan. They are also found
dispersed over the other districts, lilce Armenians
and Jews.
The Afghan tribes frequently intermingle, and
increase or decrease in consequence of families
leaving their old associatio~ls to form new ties.
Wars and feuds frequently result in the forcible
transfer of tribes, or parts of tribes, to new localities,
when embodiment with otllcr tribes usually ensues.
The tribes are least distinct in the towns. I n some
of them only one-fifth of the population are Afghans,
four-fifths consisting of Tajilcs, I-Iindus, Jews, Persians, kc.
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T h e most densely-inhabited parts of the country
are the valleys of the Cabul and Kuram, with their
tributaries. In thc wastes that occupy a considerable portion of the souther~lprovinces, people crowd
roulld the rivcrs, leaving the rest of the coui~try
empty. The regions bordering on Baluchistan are
t h e least inhabited. The inhabitants live mostly in
villages, isolated tenements being rendered impossiblc by the irequent wars. The villages, always
large and surrounded by walls, frequently-especially in Northen1 Cnbul-have up to 3,000 houses.
T h c inhabitants arc allnost exclusiveIy Sunnis, the
Hazarah and Kazlbashi alone being Shial~s. The
slnall number of Armenians in the country profess
Christianity.
The Kafirs follow a nondescript religion, having
some affinity to Hinduism, but none whatever, a s
some have supposcd, to Christianity. Their proper
name is Siyahposh (the " bIack-legged," from their
wearing leggings of goat-skins), and they are men&&tioned by Strabo uilder the name of
Ethnologically thcy are a most iilterestirig race,
having a considerable rcscmblance to Europeans,
and some havc supposed them to represent the
original Aryan inhabitants of Afghanistan and the
regions of the I-Iindu I<ush. Thc Kafir women are
said to bc as beautiful as tllc inen are handsome; but
before a young man is allowcd to marry he

'I

-is required to furnish proof of having slain a
Mussulman.
The Kafirs, however, seem well clisposed to the
English, and a recent writer says : " The Kafirs look
to us as Itinsmen and natural allies ; but the mountainous tracts of Buner, Swat, and Bajour forbid
intercourse, and in the far valleys of Kashgar and
of the Icunar river there yet rages the blood feud
caused by past wrongs inflicted and received between
the idolatrous Icafir and the fanatical Mussulman."
Sir John Kaye has left an eloquent description of
the Afghans as they were at the beginning of the
century, and they have probably altered very little
in character since that time. " The people," lie tells
hardy,
US, '' were a race-or a group of races-of
vigorous mountaineers. T h c physical character of
the country had stamped itself on the moral conformation of its inhabitants. Brave, independent,
but of a turbulent, vindictive character, their very
existence seemed to clepend upon a constant succession of internal feuds. The wisest of them would
probably have shalcen their heads in negation of the
adage-'Happy
is the country whose annals are a
blank.' They knew no happiness in anything but
strife. It was their delight to live i n a state of
chronic warfare." I t has been said that every
Afghan is more or less a soldier or a bandit. T h e
very shepherds carry their matchlocks ready for an
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a f i a y or a robbery a t any moment. I t inay seem
st,-nnge t h a t pastoral and predatory habits could
t h u s bc blended : but, so it is, " t h e tented cantoninents of t h e sheep-drivers often bristle into camps
Of xvar.I1
~ t is: but fair to say thcre is a brighter side t o the
picture. Outwardly grave, they are of a cheerful,
lively disI)osition, and this, notwithstanding their
long beards and sober garments. Tlley are fond of
chilcll-ei~, and delight in listening to the longest
stories, however improbab\e or romantic. Their
generosity and llospitality have bcen often described,
T h e y will entcrtain s t r a n ~ c r s without grudging,
and their dendlicst encmy is secure if hc comes
beneath their roof. T h e simplicity of their courtesy
is rcfreshillg xvhell contrasted with the polislled
insinccrily of the I'crsian, or the fercc arrogance of
the Indian I'ntl~an. Their respect for truth and
llollesty would not be great i f judged by a
Clll-istian standard, but is striking as compared
some of thcir Asiatic neighbours. They treat
their depcndcnts with kindncss and consideration,
arc rcwardcd by fidelity and zeal i n service.
T h c r e is little of the tyranny scen in othcr Easter11
countries towards the ininatcs of the Zanana and
domcstic slnvcs. T h e y care less for learning than
for manly cscrcises, and siinplici ty talccs with thetn
the place of ivit and eloquence.

Sumining up his description of Afghan politics in
the time of Zemaull Shah (x8oo), Sir John I<aye
says--" The history of the Afghan monarchy is a
llistory of a long series of revolutions. Seldoin has
the countly rested from strife; seldom has the sword
reposed in the scabbard. The temper of the people
has never been attuned to peace. They are impatient of the restraints of a settled government, and
are continually panting after change. I-Ialf a century of turbulence and anarchy has witnessed but
little variation in the national character, and the
Afghan of the present day is the same strange
mixture of impetuosity and cunning, of boldness
and treachery, of generosity and selfishness, of kindness and cruelty, as he was when Zemaun Shah
haunted the Coullcil Chamber of Calcutta with a
phantom of invasion; and the visioii was all the
more terrible because 'the shape thereof' no one
could d i s c e r i ~ . ~ ~
he vernacular of a large part of the non-Afghan
population is Persian, and this is familiar to all
educated Afghans. But the proper language of
the Afghans is Pzrslztz~ or Pz~hhtz~,an Aryan or
Indo-Persian (not Semitic) dialect.
T11e oldest
known work in Pushtu is a " Ilistory of the
Conqucst of Swat," b y Shailth Mali, chief of
the Yuzufzais, and leader in the coilquest (A.D.
1413-24). Their literature is rich in poetry, Abdur-

I

I

Peo$e,

Language, and Alztiq2~itie.s.

81

--

S, of

kind-

aun Shah
tta with a
ras all tile
~ f no
' one
ion-Afghan
iliar to all
anguage of
Aryan or
The oldest
~ r yoi the
i, chief of
p e s t (A.D.
!try, Abdar-

i

1'
i
t

1I
:
'

1t

i

+

1

\E
t

;

1-ahman (seventeenth century) being the best known
poet.
Major Raverty has made us acquainted with
some specimens of Afghan poetry, which convey
the idea of deep feeling. Most of it is of the
mystical lrind so familiar in Persian literature, by
which spiritual meaning is hidden in vely worldly
similes. I n the hills to the north, among the Icafirs
and other independent arid semi-independent tribes,
dialects more approaching the Sanskrit type are
found.
T h e judicial institutions of the Afghans are
rude in the extreme. The functions of judges in
criminal cases are discharged by the popular
assemblies of the tribes, assisted by Mullahs or
Muhammadan priests. Minor offences arc punished
by the village elders. The Muhammadan law has
of course general authority, but there is a special
code of peculiar Afghan usages, knolvil as PushtunWali, which has the force of law. I n towns we
find the courts of the Muhammadan judges called
Kncis, aided by the Muftis. T h e Amir-i-Mahkama is a kind of chief clcrlc and treasurer, and
the Darogha superintends the whole proceedings.
Justice, however, is a commodity to be bought
very largely here, as in other Muhammadan
countries.
W e have heard a good deal lately of the large
6
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standing army of Shere Ali, the present Amir.
According to some authorities, he has 60,ooo inen in
the field. This is not improbable, seeing that it was
believed that Zaman Shah, at the beginning of the
century, could collect 200,ooo mcn round his standard for any national object. Of the constitution of
the Afghan army our information is necessarily imperfect, but a part of it, at any rate, is modelled on
the Europeau system, as far as drill, dress, and
equipments are concerned.
Of their arms we have good
reason to lcnow
something, as the best of them are probably the
rifles, Enfield and Snider, supplied to the Amir by
former Viceroys of India, to the number of 20,000,
with ammunition, as well as a field-battery of
guns. The chief difficulty the Afghans have had
in using European weapons has been, i t is said,
from their inability to ma~lufacturepercussion-caps
for them, and their importation through British
India has been prevented by the Indian Government. Native arms are the formidable " jnzail,"
or long-rifled matchloclc, with which an Afghan
can hit a mark at Soo yards, the sword or knife, and
shield.
The followiilg more detailed account of the military
strength of Afghanistan, extracted from the records
of the Russian Central Staff Office at St.' Petersburg, was supplied to the Times by its Berlin corre-
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i l r ileriin carre-

s p o n d e ~in
~ t October, and seems to deserve quoting at
length :"Afghanistan is portioned out alnollg many semiindependent tribes, each of which has a separate ruler
and a standing army.
" Cabul and Candahar have a considerable regular
force, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
Tbe greater part of these troops is distributed over
rural garrisons, and undcr the control of the local
govcrnors. Tbe regular Cabul force, which does
i ~ o tseem to have been increased in the thirty years
illtervetling between 1838 and I 868, is as follo~vs:Infantly (Jazailclii), 2,500 nlcn ; regular cavalry,
3,000 ; irregular cavalry, 10,ooo ; artillery, 45 guns.
Bcsides these, there were, in times of peace, one
regiment of infantry at Candahar, one regiment at
Ghuznee, one regiment and five guns at 1Cala-iGhilzai, one regiment of infantry, one of rifles, and
five guns a t ICuram, and a force of full 10,000 men,
with three batteries, at Ballrh. The regular troops
are maintained and reinforced by conscription, irregulars being called in as time and circuinstances
require. I n Cabul, the troops receive pay and provisions, a practice which can hardly be said to obtain
with any degree of regularity in the provinces. The
infantry are armed partly with matchlocks, partly
with excelletlt modern rifles, the gift of the British
Government. They also carry swords and daggers.
6-2
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The Jazailchis, or rifles, are armed with long solid
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while the cavalry boast a large variety of weapons.
The infantry are, many of them, arrayed in cast-off
English uniforms, bought up by special agents of the
Cabul Government at Peshawar and Sindh. Some
regiments wear uniforms of European cut, made of
Afghan cloth-the
coats are brown, the trousers
white. The troops quartered in country towns
generally live upon the people. All the Afghan
troops endeavour to imitatc the Anglo-Indian forces
in their tactics, drill, and colnmissariat service ; but
in this respect the success of the Cabul military
is small in comparison with that of the Herat
men.
" The E-Ierat regular force was originally organised
by Sultan Jan, and consists of five regiments of
infantry of 500 men each, five detachments of
~avalry,one in each district, of 450 men each, and
eight guns. The whole forms a total of about 5,000.
Young men of the peasant class are liable to conscription at an age when they may almost be regarded
as children. The cavalry being thc more national
force, its recruits are supplied by the district
authorities. There is a Commander-in-Clef subject
to the personal comlnallds of the Sovcreign. The
artillery is under the direction of a special commander,
the Topchi Bashi. The regiments arc divided into
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.companies. Officers' titles are taken from the Englisll
a r ~ t i y; tlie Jarnal, ICoronel, and kIidjar aiiswering
respectively to the General, Colonel, and Major.
T h e Sovereig~lhas a special adjutant called Adjutant
Uashi, a post occupied in the days of Sultan Jatl by a
Russia11 ensign, Prince Vatcbnadse. Discipline is
exceedingly strict. Comma~iders have irnlimited
power, atid may Lill subordinates witli impunity.
T h e soldiers live in special houses with tlieir families,
and receive pay, rood, uniforms, and arms from the
Government. The cavalry, too, get pay from the
Government, but have to find their own arms ancl
horses. T h e inrantry are provided with flintlocks,
modern rifles, the crooked Afghan sword and daggers,
rrom I Tt, to r:Tt. long. The uniform is of light
sky-blue eotton, alter the English pattern, witli ample
rolds, statid-ltp collar, anlld metal buttons. The
trousers are of white cotton, very tiglit and short.
They wear a sort of slipper on their nalzed feet, black
Persian liats when o n duty, and red flat hats in undress. I n the case of recruits these hats are yellow.
All the' different regiments wear thc same unilorm.
T h e cavalry are distinguished by the national Afglian
dress, and armed with pikes, matchlocks, daggers,
and croolced swords. Drill, as a rule, is entrusted to
Anglo-India11 dese~.ters,and carried on in accordance
with English rules. There is a great deal or regimental service going on, with a fair degree or success

Af~hzoistn7t.
i n tactics and ~nanceuvringcapacity. T h e word of
co~nmandis given in English.
" T h e small Usbek Khanates in Northern Cabulistan also have stancling armies, the strength of
which some time ago may be seen from the following
Artillery.
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All these troops are liable to take the fielcl a t the
summons of tlic A ~ n i rof Cabul, their feudal lord and
sovereign. In addition to these regulars there is a
militia-a numerous force in a country, every male
inhabitant of which is ready to take up a y s a t a
~noment'snotice. A s was provccl in 1839, onc-eighth
of tlie cntirc population may be assembled, fully
cquippecl, a ~ i dsent out with tlie utmost dcspatcli.
By tlie side of tlie general levy tliere is a special
militia, callcd Defteri, whose ~iie~nbershave their
names rcgistered in time of peace, and are in receipt
of a small salary, or a certain quantity of corn, or

-.
else enjoy the free use of canal water. The strength
and division of the militia is the subject of the
follo~vingtahle :-
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"Almost every town and village in Aighanistan is
surrounded by a brick wall, and may be easily converted into a defensive position. There is also a
large number of stnall towers distributed over the
country, for the protectiotl . of passes, ravines, and
village grolrnds. Some oi.these towers, tlratllcs t o
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their advantageous situation, are formidable enough
to check the march of European troops, though none
could llold out against a regular siege.
" T h e most important fortress in the western parts
is Herat, enclosed \vithin a square wall, each side
4,200 feet in length. The wall is of brick, thirty-five
feet high, and stands on ground artificially raised.
I t is protected by a tnoat, and on two sides by a
glacis, constructed by the English in 1838. S i x
gates, defended by brick towers, lead to the city.
There is also a citadel, Chagar Bagh, in the southeastcrn corner of the city, likewise built of brick.
The town is provided with water by the Hari-rud
river. Farrali, another fortress near the Persian
frontier, is built on the same plan as Herat, but only
half the size. The walls of this place are of a very
solid sort of brick. Farrali protccts the road from
southern Persia to Afghanista~i.
"Northern Afghanistan is defe~idedby the fort of
Maimana, situated on a small river, in a mountainous
region. Its wall is five feet thick and 1 2 feet high.
The moat is shallow.
"On the eastern frontier there is Jalnlabad, a place
of respectable strength, but now abandoned. T h e
citadel of Cabul is likewise a strong place, and accessible only by a winding path. The citadcl can hold
out against a prolonged siegc, and comn~anclsthe
town, which has no walls.

" I n the interior olArgl~auistantlic most important
fort is Gliazni, thc citadcl of ~vhicli was accountccl
l~nconquerable before its capturc by tlie English.
Candahar is a large but weak fortress, beitig commanded by adjaccnt heights. The place has no
glacis and an insiguificant moat. I t is easy to cut
off the water supply. The citadel occupies the
northern part of thc town.
"All the important roads of Afgllanistan lead from
east to west, and are merely tracks, without t l ~ c
slightest attempt at assisting naturc. I n tlic more
open parts, howcver, they are serviceable for vcliicles
and field artillery. Taking Hcrat as a starting point,
we liave a whole network of roads leading respectively to Mash-llad, Merv, Maimana, Candaliar, and
Siestan."
ANTIQUITIES.
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Under this hcad we have ot~lyroom for a bricf
notice of two or three of thc more celebrated "relics
of tlic past."
The first of these are the caves of Uaniian. Up to
the present day wc liave no complete description of
them, nor, as far as we know, ally careful drawings
of tlie objects; but when they have been properly
described and photograplied tlicse remains at Bamian
will probably rank a s wonders in celebrity with the
Roek-cut Temples of India, or the Pyramids of
Egypt. There arc some slight accounts of the place

in more than one writer, from which wc may gather
nnrnr
; -d.
m
.
-...- .
.. of
. the archzeolocl-icnl remains a t this
I
t
is
about eighty miles in a straight linc to
spot.
tlie north-west of Cabul, and is on the direct road
, h-~.t, w- -.
r e.nthat
and Balkll, and in onc of the
-..-.- town
principal passes leading to the valley of tlie Oxus.
Tllc high road from Bactria to India went tlirough
this Pass, and it was on the line of conquest in the
time of Alexander. In the Pass there is a high
cliff of rock, extending for somc distance, and the
ivholc facc of the roclc is perforated wit11 n multitude
of caves. These are all excavated, and have
of communication and stairs, also cxca.gallel-ies
.
vated, so that the rock resetnbics a piece of sponge,
and Iiave been compared with the City of Cavelns
at Inlrermann. In addition to the caves there are
two ~iichesliollon~edout in the {ace of thc scarp, and
i n these niches the rock has Lee11 ca~.veclinto two
enormous figures about loo feet high. There is a
third and smaller figure which has n o niche ; some
projecting mass of rock has been cut away, and the
figure left standing out into the valley. A s rue have
110 exact date to go upon, it cannot be said as yet
\vhetller thcse figures existcd or not whcn Alexalider
with his Macedonian hosts went past. Certainly
these figures must havc looked down on many conquerors as they went on to!vards the Indus. I n our
own period a battle was fought in the valley under
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tllese Bgores, bctween Dost Muliamlnad a t ~ dlirigadicr
Uennie, on tlie 18th September, 1840. Latcr still
anotl~crbattle toolc place between the sons of Dost
Muhammad, a l i e ~ lthey were fightillg Tor tllc tbronc
alter his dcatli.
T h e Grecks who went rvitli Alexandcr rcportcd
.that tiicy llad seen tlie Cave or Prornetlieus i n thc
I-';lrofiarnisus, or the Indian Caucasus, and solnc
writers conclude, as thc geographical positio~ksuits
tlie theory, that this report must have been fou~ldecl
on the caves at Uamiat~,and that they csistcd a t
t h a t time. The Hindaos ascribe them to thc "I'a~ich
Pandir 1Ce Bhai," or the Five Pando Brothers, ~ v h o
are something lilce t h e Cyclops or the Grcclis or
giants of tile Northern nations, and gct thc credit of
all &antic works. There is a long ridge o i rock
like a petrified scrpetit, thc origin of which is thus
described :-Acco~.ding to the Ninclulegcnd, Arjunn,
one of the five brothers, went out walking, and whcn
labout four miles away he found on his pat11 a s~ialic
of 1111ge dimensions and o i dreadrul shape. It
attempted to s~vallow1113 Arjunn, but lie struclc it
dead a t tlie first blow, cutting it into two halves.
The stony monster is still to be seen, and still rescmbles a scrpcnt, wit11 water flowi~igtl~rouglr it.
Tliis is, no doubt, some old aqueduct coonccted
with tliewater supply of the place, to wliich the story
has been racked on. Tlkc hluhamrnadans call tlic

i
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two principal figures L a t and Manat, and identiry
tliem wit11 two idols, which have similar names, mentioncd in thc fifty-third chapter of the Koran.
Thcse are only a few of the traditions which, a s
might bc expected, such a very remarkable place as
this has given birth to. The general impression is
that thc ruins belong to the Buddhist period.
According to this theory, the caves were the cells of
a vast monastery of Buddhist monks. A t Ajtlrlta,
near Bombay, as well as at other places, there are
I numerous caves of this description. Such places
are called Viharas, and every mo~ilchad his separate
cell ; while some of the larger caves were callecl
cl;aityas, and in tliem they met as a congregation
for worship. From one or two slight slcetches or
the colossal figures which liave been brought ho~ne,
it is thought that a resemblance can be traced to
the style of the Buddliist figures found in the Peshawar district, which seems to bear evidence of
Greelc influence. If this theory of these caves and
figures being Buddhist should turn out to bc the
true one, then, as Buddhism is not supposed to have
progressed so far north at the date of Alexander's
march upon India, the conclusion will be that they
did not exist a t his time. Religious ascetics who
lived in the woods and in caves most probably
existed long before Buddhism, and it is quitc possible that there may have been caves a t Bamian at

Peopb, Lnrig~~nge,
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a very early period, and they might ]lave originated
the story of tlie Cavc of Protnetheus. If we suppose
that the place had acquired a celebrity for holy
tnen, it would -be exactly sucl~a placc \vliicl~ tlie
Buddhist monlcs would adopt for their Viltaras ; and,
if they did this, they may have extel~dedthe caves
and produced the largc figures, which, so far as ~ v c
cat1 a t present judge, seem to be figi~rcsof Duddha.
A Few accurate plans of the cavcs n ~ l da carefill
sketch or two of thc figures would soou put this
I

point beyond disputc.
1,
The foHo\ving relic belo~igsto a lntcr pcriod of
Afghan history. T l ~ ctomb of IVIalimud slill exists,
and tlie two celebrated minars of red brick arc still
,
erect, but the mosques to which they belonged ]lave
long since passed away.
The "Gates of Somnath " were supposed to have
been removed by Mallmud of Gbaeai, along w ~ t h
the otl~ertreasure of tlre temple, which 11e plntidcred
in the course or his last invasiou of India. These
gates were of sandalwood, and were said to have
been placed on llis tomb. This piece of liistory,
although dating as far back as tlie end of thc tcnth
c e ~ ~ t u rwas
y , so well known over India that on our
troops having retrieved tlie reputation ~v11icl1was
supposed to have bee11 lost in tlie Cabul disasters,
tlle gates on iNahmud's tomb were brought back by
the conquering army, aud Lord Ellenborougli's pro-

.
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clamation pointed out to, the Hindoos that these.
gates of their temple, which had been carried o f a s '
trophies by Mahmud, we had again borne hrck a s
trophies, and as visible evidence to the people of
1,ldia that our arms had triumphed, and that our
power was supreme. S o celebrated was this event
at the time that Lord Ellenborough was represented
ill caricatures as a new Samsoll carrying off the
gates of Gaza. T h e military autllorities who
brought these relics away had assumed that the.
wooden nates on the tomb of Mahmud must necessarily be the sandalwood gates of Somnatli, but if
they had had only a v e r y slight knowledge of Indian
art, these gates would most probably lievcr have
been heard of. I t was ollly w11e11the political fuss
was ended and tlie gatcs were resting in peace,
that those who Icnew somethi~igof I ~ i d i a nornamcnt
began to inspect them, and declared, i l l spite even
of the Governor-General's proclamation, that they
could not possibly be the gates of Somnatli. Those
who neither knew nor cared for art refused t o acccpt
this judgment, but a microscope demonstrated that
the wood of which they were made was deodar pine,
and not sandalwood. T h a t they are not the gates
of thc old Hindu shrinc is now an accepted point.
If tlie sandalwood gates ever rcally welit to Gl~azni
and ornamented the tomb of Mahmud, they must
have been destroyed at some time or other, and nc\v
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olles had been made of deodar, a wood wl~ichgrows
plcntirillly on the Salcd ICoh and the Hindu ICush.
T h e ortiamcnt upon them is .SO distinctly Mullamrnadali tiiat thc wonder is 110 one with the avcnging
army was able to discern the truth and point out
itlevitable conclusio~l.
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CHAPTER IV.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT'S J4A RCH THROUGJI
AFGHANISTAN ON INDIA.

-

1

Alexander's Army-Pursuit o l Dnriur hficr llno Dntllo ol Arbcln-Con.
qocel pi Parthin and Ayrennia-Founding
01 ~Iornt-Conql~esto l
Norlh-Easlenl Alghnnirtan-Cnmpnign
in naelrin-Alexander
an
Oriental Potenlrzte-Mnrringe with Rornna-Crosses the Hindu ICusll
into India-Campnigln in India-Voyngc ol Ncnrcl>us l ~ a mthe Indur
lo Lilt Eophnlcr-Aleril~~der'sMarell .4crois thc Dcrcrl ol Dniachistnn
Greek 1nRuencc on lile Oxus.

-

THEfirst invasion of India from the \Vcst in historical times deserves more than a passing notice, a s
exhibiting the vast difference i n tlte conditions of
conquest which the inventions of modern times have
imported into the art of war. From the day
when Alexander, son of Philip, a youth not yet
twenty-two years of age, but generalissimo of the
armies of Greece, marched from Pella in Macedonia
to the conqiiest of Asia, his small, but highly disciplined army reccived no check in its steady coursc
of victory, till its own mutinous refusal to g o further
made the great conqueror turn back froin the banks
of the Satlaj. T h e army with which Alexander
set out, in April 334 Il.C., numbered 30,000 infantry

I

j

and 4,509 cavalry. The historian tells 11s that the
smallness of this force must not be. viewed as a
matter of vague wonder, seeing that. 'one of. the
three modes by wliicli an invader mSy atternpt
the conquest of a coulitry is by "the . m ~ v s b l ~ .
colurnn, which tl~laws itself into the heart of j n
enemy's country, trusting to rapid success for
safety."
When we remember what tllis " movable colutn~l"
did, l~owfor eleven years it marched over tlie greater
part of Asia west of tlie Indus-reinforced, it is
true, by fresh levies from Macedon, and absorbing
into its ranks many of the Greelc mercenaries that
were found in Asia Minor-how, besides fighting
great battles against incalculable odds, it traversed
trackless deserts, crossed lofty mou~ltainsand mighty
rivcrs, and, moreover, founded cities which remain
t o this day, it may be safely remarl~ecl that it did
what no movable column ever did before, has done
since, or is likely to do to the cnd of the world's
history.
T h e countries through which this army passed
from Macedonia to Babylon were, doubtless, not
unwilli~lgto see in the y o u t l ~ f conqueror
~~l
a deliverer
fi.om the hated Persian yolce, and the terrible
examples which he set at Tyre and Gaza may have
The
had much to do with "securing his rear!'
moral effect of tlie battles of the Granicus a i d of

7

the Issus was enormous, so that distant cities scnt
to annoonce their submission.
I t is, however, with Alexander's most wonderful
marches that me havc to do now, which he made
after thc Battlc of Arbela, in pursuit of the Persian
Monarch, whose last hope was thus brolcen ; and
afterwards in the conquest of his most outlying
provinces, thosc of Aria (I-lcmt),
Dratlgia~la(Scistnn),
Arachosia (Ca~zdd~ar),
Bactria (Bnlih), Sogdiana
(Snfi~nrcnt~d),
to the confines of Scythia, bcyond the
Jaxartes (Syr Dniya), on tlle north, and of the
Gandaridae, beyond the Hyphasis (Sat&) on the
east. After the conqueror hacl come up with the
fugitive Icing, Darius, only to find him dead in his
chariot, trnnsfixcd by the spears of his satraps, who
wished to deprive the victorious invader of any
advantage he might have derived from the possession
of the Monarch's person as a prisoner, Alexander
rejoined his main army, and set before it the task of
subjugating the northern and eastern provinces,
beginning with Parthia and Hyrcania, to the east of
the Caspian. Thence he quicldy passed into Aria,
and here he founded the city of Alexandria ~ r i o r u m ,
the modern H m l . Reserving Bactria for his last
attack, he turned southwards into Drangiana
(Seisin?), on the banks of the river Erymandus
(Helmand). His stay at the capital Prophtl~asiamas
rendered but too me~norableby the fate of Philotas

-'-.
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and his fathcr Parmcnio, whosc dcath for alleged
treason followed upon the reports of somc selflaudatory spcecl~esdispleasing to their master which
they were said to have made.
Having spcnt the winter in completing the conquest of tlie proviiices which occupy the northcastern part of the table-land of what is now
Afglianistan-during which time hc Founded two
inore cities, Alcxandria in Aracliosia (probably
Car~n'nlm?~),
a i d Alexandria ad Caucasum, about
fifty miles north-west of Cabul-he
crosscd the
Hi~icluI<ush, while the passcs were still covered with
snow. His soldiers, whose imagination had been
fed wit11 the traditions of the Greek poets rcspectlng
Mount Caucasus, to pass which they deen~ed the
highest achievement of foreign ndventurc, either
co~~ceiveclthis range t o be a continuntion of that
chain, or flattered their cltief into the belief that it
was so by applying to it the title of tlie "Indian
Caucasus."
Alexander ivas nonr in Bactria, having crosscd, ip
all probability, b y the Bamian, the oi~lyone of the
four principal passes over the Hindu I<ush practicable in winter. Bessus, the last of t l ~ esatraps t o
yield, had crossed from Bactria, his own province,
wvhicli hc was too weak to defend, into Sogdiana, on
tlie other side of the O x ~ l s(Amv). Alexander
on through the ,sandy deserts, amidst great
7-2
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sufferings, to the most dificult river h e had y e t
crossed, and transported his army on their tent-skins,
filled with air and straw-a mode of transport which
is represented on the old Assyrian sculptures. After
the capture of Bessus and his punishment for thc
murder of Darius had been decreed, Alexander gave
a proof of the growth of Oriental vices in his
character by the massacre of the Greek colony of the
Rranchidz, i n Sogdiana-the
descendants of the
guardians of the temple of Apollo, near Miletus,
who had surrendered its treasures to Xerxes,. bv
.
~vliomthey were removed to Sogdiana, out of reach
of the vengeance of the Greeks. Ilaving talcen
Maracanda (Sn~rznvcntzd),the capital of Sogdiana,
Alexander advanced to the Jaxartes (Syv Dnryn).
On its banlcs 11e foui~ded the most distant of the
cities that bore his name, Alexandrescliata (probably
on the site of ICh+1rtE), near that which marked
the limits of the Empire of Cyrus, who had failed
in that attempt to subdue thc Scythianq which
Alexander proposed soon to renew.
Returning for the winter (LC. 339) to Bactria, or
Zariasp6 (the modern L'nlkh), he was recalled to
year, to put down a forSogdiana in the followi~~g
midable revolt headed by the late Satrap Spitamenes. I t was after this successful campaign and
on his return to Maraca~~da,
that the fatal banquet
was held at \vIiich the great conqueror, in a fit of

Th8 Macedat~insI7zvasiorr.
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drr~nke~lpassion, slew his boso~n friend, Clitus.
The only relief !vhich he could find froin the pangs
of remorse at this act was in renewed actio~i. For
a wlrole year the Sogdians, assisted by the Scythians,
carried on a desultory warfare with Alexander's invincible army, during which it penetrated their
deserts and mountains, and subdued their fortresses,
until Spita~neneswas slain by his Sogdian allies, and
his head sent to Alexander. I t was at the famous
sto?ming of the impregnable " Sogdian rock " that
the beautiful Roxana, the daughter of a Bactrian
chief, who afterwards became the first Asiatic wife
I'
of Alcxandel; fell into his 11ands as a captive. The
marriage was celebrated with great ponrp at Bactria,
and Alexander sho~vedhis progress towards Orientalism by attempting to exact the ceremony of prostration even from his Greek followers.
Wit11 the return of summer Alexander left
Bactria to re-cross the Paropamis~~s
(ZCo/r-i-Gab~)
and subdue the still unknown lands of India.
That name appears but once or twice in ancient
history ; as a region that excited, only to disappoint,
the ambition of conquerors si~ch as Semiramis,
Darius, and Alexatlder; and chiefly known, after his
time, by tlie rich products by which it rewarded the
co~nmercial enterprise which had its centre at
Alexandria.
T h e India with ~vhich Alexander
made his brief acquaintance of a year or two, was
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tributaries ; in other words, Sirzdh. and the P a y a h , or
country of thc Five Rivers. The details of Alexander's march through Afghanistan are fill1 of interest
for the geographer, but are chiefly rc~narkablefor the
liistoriao, on account of thc facility with which lic
subdued the mountaineers, whose descendants havc
proved so troableso~nein our timc. The campaign,
like his former passage of the Paropa~nisus, was
made in the depth of winter. Following the course
of the river Coplien (Cnbid), he crossed t h e Indus
near Attocl;, and was met by the prince of thc
country that lay between thc Indus and the
Hydaspes (Jhilnr~z),who came out to meet Alexander
with valuable presents, amongst '~vhichwere twcntyfive war-elephants, and brought a reinforcement of
5,000met1. We ~voolclgladly linger over the recital
of Alexander's battle with Porus (said to be a corruption of the Sanscrit P~nr+t~s/m,
a hero, and, therefore,
rather a title than a name of an individual), which
was fought on the left bank of the I-Iydaspcs
(%iin~rz). The Indian Icing became a tributary to
the conqueror, who founded the tolvt~ of Niccea, to
commemorate the victory. T h e rest of thc Panjab
was easily subdued. T h e swollen stream of ihc
Acesines (Chsznh) was crossed on . inflated sliins ;
and the Ilydrastes (Rnvi) with less dificulty. T h c
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Catl~ma~is
and otlier indepet~clenttribes made some
resistance, but their capital, Sangala (probably
Lnholv), was storrned ; 17,000 oftlie inhabitants being
put to the sworcl, and 70,000 taken prisoners.
Alexander had IIOW reached the farthest limits of
his conqt~csts,A t the Hyphasis (Scztloj) his ambition
was stirred afrcsl~by tlie intellig-encc that he could io
clcvcn days be o n thc grcat Ganges River, and meet
in battle t11c powerful ~iatkonof the Gsndaridac. But
the soldicrs of his army, eve11 the officers, who might
hove becn supposed to share his Iongi~igfor universal
conqwst, reft~scdto proceed furtlicr, and Alexander
wept, " not tilot tllere were no regions left to coilqucr,
but bccausc he was a t length made to fceI tlie curb
which dcpc~~tlet~cc
on fcllorv-1ne11 imposes on the
s t r o ~ ~ g ewill."
st
His rcturll was lnarliccl by the same daring spirit
that had cl~arncteriscdhis adva~tce. 111stead of setracing liis steps tl~roogh what is rlow called tlw
lcliaibar Pass, lie adoptcd tlie plan of follorr,ing the
course of l l ~ cIndus to its mot~tl~,
and c x p l o r i ~ ~the
g
sl~ores of the Indian Occan to the Euphrates.
Before lcavitlg thc Hyplulsis twclvc irnmense
altars wcrc built O I I its banks lo mark the
furtl~cst limits of his progress, it1 itnitation of
Hcrcules a t ~ d Dionysus. A t tllc I-Iydaspcs Ite
was joincd by a irinforccmct~t ~vl~icb
had mnrched
from Europc, n fact which testifies to the wonderful

tranquillity of his Empire. I t should not be forgotten, too, that Alexander's double march across
the Panjab was performed during the rainy season.
I t is difficult in these days to estimate the magnitude of the daring involved in that wonderful voyagc,
on which Nearchus, Alexander's Admiral, now embarked. Nine montlls were occupied in reaching thc
mouth of the Indus. T h e difficulty of t h e voyage
was enhanced by the barrenness of the shores along
which it lay, for navigation then was depe~ldenton
communication with the land. I-Ic brought the fleet
safely, however, to the port of Har~nozia(Or~lzn,:),
where he landed to report progress to Alexander in
Carmania, aud then returned to completc the voyage
to the Euphrates. H e fillally rcjoined Alexander
on the Pasitigris, near Susa, about February, BXc. 325,
having set sail from the Indus a t the preceding
autumnal equinox. Ilis reward of a crown of gold
was merited.
Meanwhile, Alexander with his veterans had been
accomplishing his celebrated march through thc
deserts of Geclrosia (Brcl?tclzistn~z),
in which he shared
to the fill1 the terrible sufferings of fatiguc and thirst
with his soldiers. The remainder of the march was
through his recently-conquered Persian provinces,
and appears to have been free from difficulty.
Although the outlying provinces of Alcxancler's
empirc fell away in rapid succession after his denth-
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nactria alolic remaining a Greek ki~igdomas late as
u.C. I Z S , . W ~ CitI Iwas overthrown by tlie Parthians,
w h o had previously shorn the empire of all the
other provinces beyond the Euphrates-a distinct
Helle~lisit~g
influence pervaded these new Asiatic
lringdotns from tlie large intermixture of Greek
elements in their government, their population, and
thcir language. I t would be beyond the limits
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assigned to this work to cnter further into this
interesting subject, but the materials are available for
its pursuit, and few fields of rcsearcli are more
inviting. The visible material monuments of Greck
influence ~ v l ~ i care
h known to exist in these regions,
a n d those which still await discovery, may yet throw
much light upon thc early history of the prcscnt
raccs that occupy the countries round the Oxus aud
t h e valleys of the I-Iindu I<ush and its co~uiected
chaios.

C H A P T E R V.
AFGEZAN >ISTOi7Y FROM MUiLIAMMAD T O
ZAIWAN SHAH.
Pr41 Appcarnnce or Afglmi?i~ta~
in r\fcdili.~val
History-Arab Sclllenncnts
-Story or ICnsi~naucl the Rnjput Princ-r-Tho
Ghnzni Monnrchy
Foundcd by Alplngin-I~~msion a l Il~dln-Posl>a\unr tilo Fint
Pel.rnnncnL hfuhnn~modnnConciucsi i n Indin-Sabaklngin-Piullder
of Solnnnlh->,lahrnud or GlmznCShohnbudclin-Jc11gi5 IChnnTirnur or T'amcrlsnc Invades Northcrn Indin-Babar Founds tile
bjugilnl Empirc of India-Nadir S i ~ s h Inv~dor nnd I'iunrlcrs tlle
l'anjnb-Allnmd Sllnh Pounds thc Durmi Empire oI AIghanisr*nlllvnder ladla-Dnille af Pa.ipat-Znrnml Shall-Threatcur Lo Invade
Il~din.

WE may date tlie appearance of Afgllal~istan in
tnedizval history froin the forty-third year alter t h e
Hijra,* or flight of Muhammad from Mecca to
Medina. T h e warriors of Islam, urged 011 by fanatical zeal on the one hand, and love of plul~deron
the other, liad quickly overrun Central Asia, and
in A.D. 664 liad advanced to Cabul, while tlie intervening provinces of Persia had been already brougllt
under tlic sway of the Arab Caliphs. We need n o t
attempt to trace the fluctuations of power that iollowed the first Arab settleinelits in Afghanistan.
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Suffice it to say that they resulted in the acceptance
of the Muha~nmadanfaith, and a nomii~al,if not in
some instances an actual, snbmission to the central
Muhaininadan governmeut. T h e further extet~sion
of Mul~ammadanpower into Northern India did not
succeed beyond a temporary hold on S i n d l ~by
Rasitn early in the eight11 century. This ICasiin
was nephew of Hejaz, Governor of Basra (Bnssor,nh)
and it is he of whom the story is relatcd which the
lovers of Eastern romance never tire of telling.
Two beautiful daughters of the Rajali D a l ~ uhaving
fallen into his hands, ICasim despatched them as a
prescnt to the Caliph'sharem. Arrived at Damascus,
one of them, who had attracted the Caliph's gaze,
declared l~erselfun~vortliy of his attention, owing t o
her l ~ a v i n gbeen dislionoured by ICasirn. In obedience to th; royal mandate Rasirn mas executed in
Sindh, and his body senrn up in a raw hide and
sent to the Caliph. When the body arrived a t
Damascus thc Princess admitted lier falsehood, but
gloried in having thus avenged her father's death.
I t may be doubted whether this legend is strictly
true; but it is certain that, by ICasim's death or
recall, the M~iliammadanpower in ~ i n d hmas much
weakened, and, after a titne, lsecame a mere tradition. Caliph Ilnroun-al-Raschid (to adopt the
traditional orthography) died i n A.D. 806, and the
A r a b Caliphate was not long in dissol\ring.
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Ichorasan and Trans-Oxiana bccamc independent
under the Taliirites, or successors of Tal~ir,who h a d
successfully hcadecl a rebellion.
T o them succeedecl the Sofnridcs, in h.n. 872 ; t h c
founder of this short-lived dynasty being Yaliiib, a
brazier of Seistan. Thcse gave way to the Samanis,
ill A.D. 903, a d y ~ ~ a swhich
ty
continued to exist ill
Centml Asia for 1 2 0 years.
Tile fifth prince, Abdul-Malik, possessed a Turki
slave tlalnecl Alptagin, to whom lie had comtnitted
the 11igl1 office of governor of ICl~orasan. 111 A.D.
961 11e liad to flee from the suspicious nilger of his
patron's successor OII the throne, and having escaped
with a few follo~versto Gliazni, ail outlying province
t o the south-cast!vard, flanked by the Suliman
Mountains, he lnade hi~nseifindependent, by the aid
clliefly of the rude Afghan population of that region.
to the claim which
W e have alluded elsc~vl~ere
Afglian chroniclers have set up to a J e ~ v i s ldescant.
~
Apart from this traclition, the earliest accoutit lvc
have of t l ~ eAfghans is their establishment in t h c
east of the table-land, where they wcre found
eficient allies by Alptagin. Thc son of Alptagin,
who succeeded to the ne~vly-erccted throne OF
Ghazni on his father's death in I\.D. 976, died
(according to Farisl~ta,the Persia11 historian) in less
than two years without issue, and Sabaktagin, who,
like Alptagin, liad been a slave, but had riscn t o

I

j

1

.

I,

%A

Ear-& Ayghnn Historj,.

1

I09

i

su$i favour a s to be admitted to an alliance with
the daughter of Alptagin, was elected to succeed
the latter's son.
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gird, tlie last of the Persian Iciogs. His talent in
warlike enterprise, chiefly against the Indian tribes
on tlie Indus, liad com~ne~ided
him to notice, and
gained him the throne.
H e was not long in subduing Cat~daliar,~vhiclihe
annexed to his small kingdom of Ghazni, and then
set his face towards India. I-Ie invaded the Faniab.
. .
took forts, built mosques, and carried OR a large
booty, thereby setting the example which other
invade~sof India never failed to imitate.
This was not suffered to pass without an attempt
at revenge, and we soon find a n immense armythe best of the Aryan chivalrj7-led
by the Icings
of Lahore, Delhi, Ajmir, ICalinga, and Icananj,
assembled t o resist the aggressive Ghaznavites.
Twice did a great Rindu army march across the
Indus. T h e first time a furious storm so disheartened
the superstitious Hindus that they sued for terms
instead of giving battle. On t h e second occasion
the Muhammadans were victo~ious,and took possession of the Valley of Pcsharvar, their first permanent
occupation of Indian territory.
Sabal'tagin d ~ dnot renew~hisattaclts on India,
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and died in A.D. 997. His illegitimate son, Malimud
or Gtlazni, first tlcreated his legitiinatc brother,
Ismail, nlio had bccii ilominated s;iccessor, and then
obtailicd the mliolc lcingdom, ~vliichhc clilarged to a
greater extent than 11nd been done by Sabalctagiii.
During his reign of thirty-thrce years, lie made ten
great iiivasio~is of India, tlic Iast being directed
against the sacred temple of Somnatli, to dcsti-oy
\vl~icliscemed an act of great virtue to the zealous
Muhammadan Siiltati, for he had assumcd this title.
The Brahmins offered an irnmcnse sum i T lic would
mare the sacred t e m ~ l.e ,but he replied that h e
wished to be known t o posterity as "Malimi~d the
Idol-breakel;" and not as the " Idol-seller." I-Ie himself strock off the ~ i o s cof the idol, which was nine
feet high, and was re~varcledfor his religious zeal b y
fincling in its inside precious stories aiicl peal-1s of a
value far exceeclingr what had beeii offercd, and the
other wealth of tlie temple was immensc. Invaders
it1 all ages have bee11 rarely afflicted with twinges of
conscieiice in the matter of spoiliiig the temples and
palaces of the countries they honour wit11 their
presence. The almies of even sucll civilised nations
as France and Ellgland follnd it impossible to resist
the temptation to plunder the royal p l a c e s of Pelcin.
We are aware that there are alrvays cxcelleiit reasons
fortl~comingto defend such acts in modern times,
and we veil tlie realmotive of sudi cleeds-the love
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of plunder-by alleging the necessity of" reading the
barbarians a salutary lesson ;""striking awe into the
of Ghazni troubled himself to make any such hypocritical excuses for his very natural corlduct. I t is
said to his credit, howevcr, that if he plundered
temples and murdered priests ill tlie name of religion,
he committed no reveligefi~l massacres or wanton
executions upon the people generally, or his prisoners.
"Tried by the slandcrs of his timcs," says the inoclern
historian, " Mahmud must bc considered, 011 tlie
whole, humane, and his unquenchable thirst f o ~
pliinder is the wont feature ofhis character." At his
death, liis dominions extended as far as Ispahan,
mcstward, and a gxeat part of India owned liis
supremacy. Altogether, he invaded India thirteen
times, but ten only of these iilroads were of consequence.
Mahmud's dynasty lasted till A D . " $ 9 , and was
succeecled by the house of Ghor, which reigned in
Afghanistan till the death of Shahabuddin, in 1206.
For the events of this period, which are of the most
thrilling interest to the student of early A f ~ l i a nand
India11liistoty, we must refer tlie reader to the worlcs of
Elpliinstone and other historians. We can hcre talke
but a very cursory view of the period. After Shahabuddin's death, liis successor, Maltmud, resigned Iudia
to I<utb-ud-din, originally a slave, but subsequently a
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great general, to whom the late inonarcll chiefly owed
his conquests in India. I11 1215, Tajuddin E l d ~ l z ,
the successor or Mal~mudon the throne of Ghazlli,
attcrnptcd to regain his Indian dominions, but railed,
a i d was taken prisoner.
Meankhile, in A.D. 1217, the first echoes of t h e
name of Jengis IChan, the Muglial conqueror, alterwards s o dreaded tliroughout Western Asia, were
heard. H e invaded the dominion of the Sultan o f
I<harizm, overran the country, and peiretrated a s
far as Ghaz~ii. IIis career of conquest did not,
however, extend to India. W e cannot attempt t o
follow in detail the course of Mughal conquest
during the next two c e n t ~ ~ r i e s .In A.D. I 398, T i m u r
or Tamerlanc, himself a Tartar, headed the most
famous, though by no means the first, Mugha! invasion or India, and was proclaimed Emperor of India.
H e only remained, however, firtcen days in Delhi,
and then returned home, aRer a gelieral and indiscriminate massacre of t l ~ cpeople.
From 1478 to 1526, an Afghan dynasty (Lodi)
reigned over Northern India, simultarreously with t h e
rule or the Mughals, descetldants of Timur, a t
Cabul, although their capital was a t Samarcand.
The most celebrated of these last, Babal; s i x t h i n
descent from Timur, invaded India in 1526, a t t h e
invitation of a member of the Afgllan family t h a t
rtlled a t Delhi, and founded the Muglial dynasty of
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Illdin. On the death of Babar, Afghanistan, and the
whole of the Panjab, became a separate kit~gdorn,
under his son Icarnran. The history of Afghanistan
for the next two centuries is allnost iilextricably
mixcd up with that of Persia and I-Iinclostan, the
plains of Afghanistan being divided more or less
equally between these empires. To those, however,
who rejected a foreign yoke the mountains aKorded
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1111720, the Afghan tribes threw OFT their allegial~ce
to Persia, and, advancing illto the countrj: tool:
Ispahan. In 1728, they were co~npelled t o retrace
their steps b y Nadir Shah, the celebratetl usurper,
who follolved up his advantage b y occupying the
wl~ole of Afghanistan, the ~vester~iprovinces of
~vhichwere still a nominal dependency of the Delhi
kings.
'.Then follo~ved Nadir Shah's invnsio~lof India,
illto the causes of which we cannot now enter.
Sufice. it to say, that the Persian king surpassed
former invaders in the booty he obtained, carrying
off treasure valued. a t from~g,ooo,oooto &3o,ooo,ooo
sterling, besides the celebrated peacock-throne, which
Tavernier valued a t ~6,0oo,ooo, but which othcr
aothorities tnaltc t o l ~ a v ebeen wort11 only ~ z , w o , o o o .
The Icing's share was Lr$,ooo,ooo. On leaving
Delhi, Nadir Shah presented Muha~nrnaclShah, the
conquered Emperor of India, with his crown, and

Afxhnuirtnn.
seated him o n his throne ; but he annexed to his
own dominions all the western provinces of the

officer, of the Durani or Abdali tribe, who had
obtained a high cornmand in Naclir Shah's army,
united the Afghan tribes into a monarchy under
himself. H e was young, ambitious, and capable;
and, mindful of the rich spoil India had recently
fi~rnished,t ~ ~ r n ehis
d attention to that empire. I-Iis
invasiol~swere continuecl till the famous Battlc of
Panipat, fought on January 7th, 1761, when thc
Mahratta forces were completely defeated. Ahmad
Shah did not assume the government of Inclin, but
contented himself with 11is Afghan kingdom and thc
Panjab. It may be noted that Clive had broken the .
power of the Muhammadan ruler of l3e11gal at the
Battle of Plassy, on June zznd, 1757, thrce a l ~ dahalf years before the victory of the Afghan king over
the Mahrattas at Panipat. The foo~ldation of thc
British Empire in Inclia may justly be dated from
Clive's famous victo~y.
Ahmad Shah died in 1773, and was succeeded by
an indolcnt and despotic son, Timur Shah, who lcft
his throne l o his two sons, I-lumayiin and Z;~rnan
Shah. In the conflict for 1111divided rule which
followed, Zaman Sliall was victorious.

Ear[y Afghan Niitory.
In 1798, Zaman Shah wrote to the GovernorGeneral of India, Lord Mornington, announcing his
intention of invading Hinclostan, and claiming thc
assistance of the English. A t the same time Tippu
to advance and join him in a crusade against all
infidels. Tippu was also in league with the French
Government, from whom he looked for assistance
against the English. Napoleon had landed in Egypt,
and Tippu looked forward to liis rapid conquest of
that country, and anticipated a t r i ~ ~ m p l a t ' i n a r cof
li
the French conqueror across Asia into India, following thc precedent of the great "Sclcatidar," as
Alexander the Great is designated in India.
But we have now carried our ncccssarily brief and
imperfect review of Afghan history to the point
where Afghan politics come into contact with those
of t11c nations of Western Europe, and it will be
convenient to continue the narrative in another
chapter.

CI-IAPTER VI.
AFGHAN HlSTORY FAOM ZAMAN SN/IH TO T J I E
EVE O F THE I;IAST AFGfI.4N WAR.
Zamnn Sbnh Advnncer lo L n h o r c P n n i e In Rriiish Illdin-Rcvica o r
Situation-Nsllvc I;eelillg in Indin-Ineidcna of I;onner InvwionrAlarm nt lirsncll Inlrigoer-First
Symplams of " Rurropbobin"Eneronehrnenr of Russia an Pcl~sinSeI~emc
of Join1 Rilrrinn nncl
I'rcneh Invasion of India-Sir Joiln ICnye on tl>c l\m Clnsscs ot
GovcrnorGenernl-Lor& Minlo ancl tVellericy Conrpnrad villa Lonl
Lylton-Thc Rise or lllc Sikhs-Illilisil nlld RIISS~B~C
Ad\m~lce C o w
par~d-Wiriian to tbe S i l : h ~ b n h Sujn-Rirc of lllc nm-ml~mlrSbnh Sujnnn Exile-AiTn.ir.,irs iu Afgl~anirlnnbefore tl>e Firit Argllnn
Wnr-Mission olCaplain Burner nnd Siegeof IIerat-1Zidrr.d Poninger
-Dost M u h n ~ o m n d S i k i ~Gnin
s
Pcshnwn1.-llarrin Invndcr PcrriaNcxv Ruiaa.Pcriinn bu#ldnry-Urillsh Policy.

ZAMANSIIAH,Icing of the Afghans, the grandson
of Alimad Shah, cherislled, as we have said, designs
of Indian conquest similar to t l l o s e that Iiad i i n p e l l e d
his grandfather to tlie invasion of the I ' a i i j a h .
We
liave seen that i n 1798 lie had involred the assistance
'of the English Governor-General against tlic Mahrattas, >v11o had cstablislled tl~crnselves virtually as
tlie most polverful State in N o r t l i c r l i India, although
thc Mughal Emperor at Dcll~ir e m a i i i e c l n o i n i n a l l y
supreme. The Afghan Icing Iiad advanced as far as

Lahore, with the avowed object of extending the
Durani Empire (as it was called after its consolidation by Ahmad Slmh) to the Ganges. But he was
co~npelledprecipitately to return to resist an invasion
of IChorasan by the Persian troops. I n the previous
year lie hacl been similarly recalled to put down a
rebellion headed by his brother Mahmud. For years
aiterwards the threat of an Aighan invasion kept the.
British Indian Empire in a chronic state of alarm,
and Lord Wellesley, immediately on his accessio~ito
the ofice o i Governor-General, had augmented the
native army on this account.
However ridict~lous now this constant panic may
seein to us, it must be remembered that at the
beginning.of the century the Englisl~in India Itnew
little of the resources of the Durani Empire, and less
of the people, and their monarch's unfitness for a
great enterprise. Nor were the fears entertained so
groutidlcss as may appear at first sight. The
numerous enemies of the English in India looked to
Cabul for deliverance from their encroaclii~~g
empire
with, says ICaye, "malicious expectancy." From
tllc rocky defiles of that ro~nantic country they
expected to see swarms of the Faithful hasten to
save Islam from the yolce of the usurping Feringhees.
All the Muhammadan princcs from Tippli in Mysore
to Vazir Ali in Oudh, had promised money and men,
and even I-Iindu rajahs had avowed their sympathy
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with the cause. What Sir John I b y e says of his
ow11 day (1857) reads rather strangely now, w1ie11 w e
are told that thoughts of an invasion of India a g a i n
agitate tlie breasts of some among Sliere A l i ' s
advisers. H e writes : "We, wlio in these t i i n e s
trustingly contemplate the settled tranquillity of t h e
north-westem provinces of India, a n d remember
Zaman Shah only as tlie old, blind pensioner of
Ludliiana, can hardly estimate aright the real importance of thc threatened tnovement."
If the English in India felt such a t ~ x i e t ya t t h e
, ..prospect
of an Afghan
invasion, how are w e to
picture to ourselves the feeli~lgsof t h e u ~ ~ p r o t e c t e d
myriads wlio ltnew by tradition what were the t c n d o r
mercies they might expect from b a l - b a r o ~ ~hso r d e s
such as those that swooped do~v11itpo~lthe plains of
India ~vithTamerlalie the Tartar, Nadir S h a h t h e
Persian, and Alimad Sliah the Durani. T h e historian tells, u s that whet1 Tamerlatie (or T i m u r )
invaded India, his army pillaged tlie Panjab u p to
Delhi, taking vast nutnbcrs of captives. F i n d i n g i t
troublesoine to carry these along with him, he
ordered a11 of them above tlie age of fifteen-to
the number, says Farishta, of ~oo,ooo-to b e p u t to
death i n cold blood.
Tlie refusal of the people of Dellii to pay
a heavy contributiot~ brought up011 them a general
and indiscriminate massacre and plunder, d u r i n g

. .

-

.

-....i...

~~~

_ ____

fi-ovz Za7tzn1t Shah to Dosd 1Ki~lrharir~1tad.I 19

-

\vl~ich the monarch gavc a great entellainment to
11is o6cers.
Again, i n 1738, Nadir Shah gave orders at DeIl~i
for a general massacre; and wheo his soldiers had
feasted on blood thcy gave themselves up for fiftyciglll days to plunder, which they sought from the
Emperor's palace to thc lorvest hovcls of the poor.
I n 1755, Ahinad Shah proceeded to Delhi, and
extorted R vast sum of money from the people by
torture and massacre. I-Ie then attacked the rich
c i t y of Mathura, whilc a religious festival was being
held ; and tllousands of Hindu worshippers were
slauqhtered without mcrcy by the Alghans.
Alter t h e Battle or Panipat, ill 1761, referred to
belore, betwee11 Ahtnacl Shah and the Mahrattas,
which ended in the victory of the Afghans, wc read
that, "Of all that mere taken in the [Indian] camp,
woInea and children became slaves, and next lnoriiiug
.
t h e males were cruelly butchered in cold blood."
Such are some of thc gentle lnemories which the
barbarians west of the Suliman and Hindu I<osh
Mountains liave left wit11 the people of the plains
of Northern India. What wonder that, in 179&,
x v h e ~another
~
attack was threatened from the same
quarter, t h c English, xvl~oonly ecl~oedthe sentiments
of their nativc subjects, sliould.havc viewed iC with
alarm.
I t was not, howcver, simply the Durani Icing

who was dreaded. T h e French Emperor was credited with designs of almost universal conquest. T h e
French were known to be eager for an alliance with
Persia, and what was Inore probablc to the minds of
the rulers of firitis11 India then than that an ofEensive
alliance between France, Persia, and Cabul sliould
make those dangers, that once merely seemed to
threaten them from tlie north-west, oiily too real atid
imminent.
The great object then appeared to be to gain the
friendship of Persia, so that by this means French intrizue migllt be baffled in Central Asia. I11 that case,
also, Zaman Shah would have in Persia a Britisli ally
bcliind him, ready to avail lierself of his absence
011 the Indian frontier to invade and reclaim some
of the provilices of Afglianistan that had once
belonged to her. T o bring about so favourable
a condition of afEairs, Lord Wellesley, therefore, s c ~ i t
Captain Malcol~n as Envoy of the Britisli. Indian
Government to Persia.
I t is not possible in these pages to trace tlie
history of the negotiations that followed, in ~vliicl~
the rare spectacle was seen of an English Arnbassador Trom the Court of S t , James, acting in almost
open liostility. to the British Indian Government.
Tlic cncl to be sought was to keep Persia friendly
to ourselves, atid prevent Frencli inflile~icegaining
any ground.
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T o understand t h e politics of that day allother
power h a s to be talcen into account, and that Pomer
is R u s s i a . That formidable northern State had been
e x t e n d i n g its conquests eastwards for years, before
the S h a h of Persia, i n 1805, addressed a letter to
Napoleon, whose fortunes were then at their highest
point, requesting a i d from the Western " Rustam "
to s t e m the tide of Russian aggressiotl. " Before,"
says S i r John Icaye, "the English trader had begun
t o organise armies in I-Iindostan, and to swallow up
ancient principalities, the grand idea of f o u ~ ~ d i ~anl g
E a s t e r n Empire had been grasped by t h s capacious
m i n d of Peter the Great." The policy he i n a ~ ~ g u rated was zealously followed by his successors for
Inore than a c e n t u ~ y . Espccially had Russian
ambition becn directed to acquiring the country
between the Blaclc Sea and the Caspian. A small
p a r t o f it, hcld b y a race of sturdy, brave mountaineers, still declines to bow to the rule of tlie Czar,
and, from time to time, when efforts to subjugate
t h c m a r e made, t h e natural difficulties of the country
to t h e invaders aids the people in disposing of their
assailants. But Georgia had been conquered from
the Persialls bcfore the beginning of the century,
after a succession of wars notorious for'their cruel
and barbarous incidents. Thus Russia and Persia
had, in 1800, become conterminous, and perpetual
struggles between the great Russian frontier officers

(.

and the Persians marked the early years of t h e
century. Treachery nncl crilclty mark thc annals of
this. period. The Russian general had received
mders to extelicl thc Russian rronticr to the river
Aras, ancl nothing short of that bounclary would
satisfy him.
I t was wher~ irratters sccrned a t
their blackest that tlie Persian Court applied t o
Napoleon.
The French emissaries, who sooti after found
their way to Tehcran, not: only p e r s ~ ~ a d c dt h e
Persians that England was an effete nation, d o o ~ n e d
to call before Napoleon, and, therefore, not of value
as a friend, but iiegotiations .were on foot for a
France-Persian treaty for tlie joint invasion of India
by a Frencli ancl Persian army.
I t is believed that a treaty to this cffect was
actually sent home for the approval of Napoleon.
But any hopes. Persia may have cntertai~ieclof
French aid against Russia in ret~lrli101. her services
against the English in India were cloorncd to disappointment by the peaceful meeting of the Emperor Alexander and Napoleon Uuonaparte ~ ~ p o ~ i
tlie river Breitlen, near Tilsit, in hly,1807. when a
bloocly campaign was enclecl by a scene, in which
tile two Emperors "einb~~accdlilrc
Lrothcrs." Among
thc joint scl~cmesor conqucst tlic two E ~ n p e r o r s
cliscuss'ed, one was an invasio~i of India by n confederate army uniting on thc plail~s of Persia.
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Lucien Buonaparte, the brother of Napoleon, was
scnt to Teheran on a missio~lto prepare the way for
a hostile demonstration against firitis11 India ill thc
spring.
T h e " non-intervention " policy of the English
Government was now regarded as out of placc.
Lord Minto was Governor-General, and felt that
action was callcd for. Sir John I h y e ~nakcsa
remark conccrning this c~isis, which we cannot
refrain from quoting, as its application at tlle present
juncture of Indian affairs to tlic supposed rival
policies of Lord Lytton and Lord Lawrence, the
former an cx-diplomatist, and thc Iattel. one who
rose from the rauks of the East India Company's
service, cannot but bc acl~nowledged.
H e says :-" I t is observable thatstatesmen trained
in the Cabincts and Courts of Europe have evcr
been lnorc sensitivcly alivc to thc dangers of invasion from the North than thosc wl~oseexperience
has been gati~ercclin the fields of Indian diplomacy.
Lord Wellcsley and Lord Minto werc ever tremulous with intense apprehension of dangcr from
without, whilst Sir John Shore and Sir George
Barlow posscsscd tl~cmselves in comparative confidence and tranquillity, and if they werc not wholly
blind to t l ~ cperil, at ;\I1 events did not exaggerate it.
Thcrc is a sensc of security cngerldered by long
Jlabit alld familiarity wit11 apparent danger, which

renders a man mistrustrill of t l ~ ereality of tliat
wl~ichhas so often been shown to be a countcrfcit.
The ioexperienee of English statesmen sudclcnly
transplanted to a ncw spllere of action oftcn sccs i n
the most ordinary politicaI plle~~omena
strangc a ~ ~ d
alarming portents."
Wc, of course, call afford to s~nilcnow at the rcars
excited by French aggrcssioii ; but loolii~igat what
Napolcon and his marslials had done, and rcmcmbcring the apparent ease of Alexander's conquests in
Asia, tlie prcscncc 01 a grancl Frcnch army 011 tllc
Gaiiges did not scem an altogcther impossible or
improbable prospect.
T h e alliance between Russia and France, instead,
howevcl; 01 increasing tlic danger to British rule in
the East, added to its security, by thromiog Pcrsin,
whose whole hatred was directed agai~istRussia lor
lier encroacllil~gpolicy on the Caspian, into the arais
of England. England's riglit policy a t that time
seems clearer to us now than it dicl to thc I-Io~ncor
British India11 Gover~unent. Our formcr policy hnd
been to liold Pcrsia as a buffer against our Europcnn
enemics, the French, on tlie west, and to have licr as
a usclul ally against Afgllaoistan on ha. eastern
fionticr. During the sevcn or eight years, howcva,
sirlce tile last threat of Afghan invasion iiacl been
maclc, thc Afghan Power liad ccased t o l e formidallc,
owing to intestine quarrels. A t tlic samc time a new
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Power-that of the.Si1chs-was rising on our northern
borders out of a dismc~nberedprovince (the Panjab)
of the once formidable Duraui Empire. The Sikhs
hated-and still hate-the Muhammadans, and hence
the desirability of enlisting them on our side against
the Frcnch and Persia11 confederacy, which was still
believed to exist.
W e have alluded already to the rival missions of
Captain Malcolm and Sir Harford Jones, the one
despatched by the British Indian, and the othcr by
the English Government to the Court of Persia.
The incidents of these missio~~s
are of interest at the
present time, as they throw much light on the attitude which would be naturally talcen by Persia at any
time if England found herself-which God forbid !at war with Russia. Captain Malcolm advanced
very specious arguments for the occr~pation by England of the island of I<aralc, in the Persian Gulf. He
urged that with an established footing there, which
would soon become an emporium of our trade, we
should be able to exclude other European Powers,
and carry on whatever military operations we deemed
consistent with and necessary to our llonour and
security. But British India then belonged to a
trading company, and did not aclcnowledge an
Empress as its ruler. Whether British l~onourand
security have suffered by the neglect of Malcolm's
advice will, of course, be a~lswered differently by

I

Afghanistan.
people holding different views on E~igland'sforeign
In pursuance of tlie new policy, which consisted in
an endeavour to unite the States of Afghanistan and
t11e Palljab against thc supposed Franco-Persian
allianccfor it had not yet been seen that that
alliance must fall to the ground on the reconciliation
of Russia, Persia's enemy, to France-tnissions were
sent to Cabul and Lahom,in September and October,
1808. I t is thus just seventy years since Mr. Elphinstone set out ill obedience to tlie then GovernorGeneral, Lord Minto, to do at Cabul very much
what Sir Neville Cl~amberlainwould have tried to do
for Lord Lytton, only ill the former case the danger
anticipated was from France, not Russia.
The necessity of including tlie Sikh ruler ill the
alliance that was desired no longer complicates ihe
Indian Viceroy's policy. There is no " Lion of the
Panjab" to be conrted atid conciliated now. British
legions liave swept away his magnificc~it Ichalsa
army, tlie modcrn representatives of liis soldiers
forming the finest of the Imperial troops ; while his
exiled descendant lives as at1 English nobleman on
an estate in Norfolk, and is proud of being a frieticl
of the Heir to the British Throne. Ranjit Sinli's
provinces have long been admitiisterecl by English
commissioners and English magistrates, and could
lie revisit his capital, he would find an English

!
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-~ientetiant-Governor and a Cl~icf-Court in passession.
I t is a s well to rcflect now and then on tlie advance
of England, as wcll as on that of Russia,, if only to
enable ourselves to sce that an advancin:: Empire
m a y not ncccssarily bc wilfitlly aggrcsslve, but may
be forcccl by irresistible influences t o extc~id its
boundnrics, and absorb scmi-civiliscd and barbaroils
States on its borders, without this being any valid
ground for apprehension on the part of a grcat
European Powcr that [nay bc cloi~lgthc very same
thing, undcr cxactly tlic same impulses, clsewherc.
CVIicn it comes, of coursc, t o such a pass that both
t h c Powcrs arc standing with open jaws ready to
swallow tlic last remaining indcpendent State that
lies betwecu thcir immcnse territories, wc get a condition o l thitigs for which it is dificult to find a
precccle~lt. I n tlic abscnce of a "leacIi!?g casc," the
partics that now divide ~ t , g l i s h opinion on the
' l Afglian Qucstion " would s c a n to thin%-the
one
that England should liastcn to forestall her ncighbour, a n d sccurc thc by no rncans tcmpting morscl,
and t h c othcr that thcrc is tio nccd for either Power
t o dcvour it, but that cach can quitc comfortably d o
with w h a t it has already swallowed nrld is scarcely
able to cligcst. This may bc a rather vulgar way
of pulting it, snvouring of lhc silnilcs wvc linvc latcly
seco drawn of a thief holding a Ioadcd pistol to a

ho~~seholderls
head, and of the housel~older snatch.
ing up a baby to place it between himself and the
thief; to which a reply was made, we believe,
how would the matter of right stand if the
thief held up a "loaded baby "-whether
then the
householder might strike it down without too dclicate an inqt~iryinto questions of intenlationnl law.
Much advantage can rarely, however, be gained
by far-fetched metaphorical arguments.
The Sikhs were still a Power in 1808-a young
alld rising Power-and
Lord Minto had much
dificulty to decide whcthcr the best policy requircd
him to curb the Sikhs, or to foster them a s useful
allies against the French. A midcllc course was
pursued, and Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Metcalfe
gained his spurs in diplomacy in carrying out this
temporising policy. I t was difficult, however, to
enlist the sympathy of Ranjit Sin11 for the danger
to the British Empire in India from French aggression, and at the same time deny him the right he
claimed of extending his nlle over neighbouring
States not in alliance with ourselves.
Shah Suja was now Icing of Afghanistan, having
succeeded his brother, Zaman Shah, who had been
dethroned and rendered blind by the Barakzai leader,
Fateli Ichan, in revenge for the death of the latterIs
father, which had been decreed by the Icing on the
discovery of a treasonable plot against himself and his
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Minister, in which Poinda IChao, the father or Fate11
IChan a n d chief of the Barakzais, was impliceted.
T h e rise of these Baralczais to power comtnenced
with t h i s ill-judged severity on the part of Zatnan
IChan, whose family belonged to a~iotherbranch-the
Sadduzai-or the great Durani clan, of which both
were branches.
T h e twenty-one sons of Poit~daIChan seemed for
a time t o live only t o avenge their father's deathrevenge being an Afghan's first duty. T h a t they
rose-some
a t least among them, notably Dost
Mullammad, the future Amir-was but an incidental
consequence of tlie pursuit of their main object. For
a full description of the varying fortunes of the
Bar,llrzai brothers we have not space a t our command.
S h a h S u j a for a time made head against them, but
in J u n e , 1809, was disastrously defeated, and bad to
withdraw beyond the frontier, barely, indeed, escaping
with h i s life. T h e wanderings of Shah Suja and his
inany misfortunes; his futile attempts to regain
his throne ; his imprisonment in Cashmere by
its governor, and afterwards in Lahore by Ranjit
Sinh, t o whom he lost the ICoh-i-nor by a stratagem,
the s t o r y of which has been often told,'-these
are

*

T h e trick was this: The Shah, for safety, carried the jewel
in his turban, and Ranjit Sil~h,having suggested an exchange
of turbans, the unfort~lnateprince was obliged, by the larv of
courtesy, to comply.
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recounted in Shah Suja's own autobiography, and
will be found in some detail in Sir John Icaye's ~vorli.
I-Ie found a-resting-place and a pension in Ludhiana,
ill British territory, in 1816, and .from that time until
1838, never ceased to entertain hopes of regaining his
ancestral throne. These hopes were clestiilecl to be fulfilled, but with fatal result to himself and his patrons.
Before coming to the causes' of the First Afghan
War, which had for its direct object the restoration of
Shah Suja to his throne, it is necessary to review the
course of affairs in Afghanistan itself, and also t h e
condition of things as they affected British Inclian
foreign policy.
Dost Muhammad, the most capable of the Barakzai
brothers, had established himself firmly at Cabul, but
Prince Icamran, of the old Saddozai family-the
legitimate line-reigned supreme a t Herat. SulLat~
Muhammad, a brother of Dost Muhammad, held
Peshawar, and other brothers held Candahar.
Thus mutilated, the Durani Empire secmcd t o
have lost all its former menacing attitude towards
India. On the contrary, however, in 1831, Peshawar
fell to the Silch ruler, Ranjit Sinh, alld remained in
his power until it passed with the rest of his
dominions into British occupation.
The anxiety of Dost Muhammad to regain this
province of Peshawar from the Sikhs bccame the
great ailn of his life, and he looked ~ o u n t lto sec on
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what allies 11e could trust for assistance: I l e roulld
t h e Persians and English most suitable for this
pose, and, i t is said, was willing, in 1837, to ally
himself with either if lie could be assured of aid
against the Sihks.
I n the autumn of 1837, however, rumot~rsof t,vo
great events were heard, which vaslly affected the
rt~tureof Dost Muhammad and of others besideshim.
These were-a
British envoy, Captain Bumes, catne
to Cabul as "commercial " resident, and Muliammacl
Shah, the Persian I<itlg, was laying siege to Herat.
Persia had been strrlgglilig against Russian aggression during the years intervening behveco 1810 and
1837 A period or outward observance of peace is
i~icludedin this length of time, viz., rrorn 1813 to
1826, but it was a hollow one, so011 to be brolccn, A
massacre or thc isolated Russian garrisons and out~
army,
posts in Gokchar bronght d o an~ avenging
and so low was Persia reduced that, in 1828, she was
compelled to cede Erivan and Nakhichevan, and
consetit to t11e Rt~ssiatisdrawing their frontier-line
considerably eastward. An inclcmnity to Russia of
eighty millions or roubles was also stipulated for.
Thus v a s Persia "delivered, bound hand a n d foot, to
t l ~ eCourt of St. Petersburg!'
T h e Englidl policy pursued a t this time has b,een
severely criticised, as we appear to have porchased a
release rrorn engagements which bound 11s to assist
9-2
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the Persia~is against Russia. The result was the
immense adva~iceof Russian influence at the Court
of Persia, the heir-apparent having, it is said, married
a Russian princess, and adopted the Christian faith.
Then began tliepolicy of tnaking Persia play Russia's
game. I t became the object of Russia to use the
resources of Persia in furtlierance of her own ends,
without overt action on her part, thereby avoiding a
collisioti with othcr European Powers, whose jealousy
it was her aim not to arouse. The first outcotne of
this new Russian move was a11 encroachment by
Persia on Ichorasan. I t became the conimoli talk of
the bazaars of Khorasan, Afghanistan, and even of
Bombay, that an allied Russian ancl Persian army
would tnarcli upon I-Icrat, Cabul, ancl India.
I n 1836, the Herat campaign commenced, and thc
story of the ~nemorablesiege of that city deserves to
be read by all who would knonc what is tlie value of
one brave English~nanin a cause upon which 11c had
sct his lieart.
I t may be safely alfir~nedthat I-Ierat would have
fallen to the Persian Icing if it had not beeti for the
courage and firmness of Eldred Pottingel; a young
English officer, who foulid his way to I-Iernt just as
the Persians began their attack.
On tlie 23rd November, 1837,the siegc of I-Ierat
actually began, and continued until the 9th of Scptcmber of thc following year.
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1 - ~ e r a is
t described a s surrounded by a fair expansc
of country, filled with cornfields, vineyards, and
; little fortified villagcs studded thc plain,
and t h e bright waters of small running streams
liglltened the pleasant landscape. The beauty of
H e r a t was, howevel-, without the ~snlls; within, a11
was dirt and desolation. Strongly fortified on cvery
side b y a wet ditch, a n d a solid outer wall, with five
gates, each defended' by a small outwork, the city
presented b u t few claims t o the admiration of the
traveller. H e r a t was divided into four quarters, consisting o f four l o n g- bazaars. roofed with arched brickworlc, meeting i n a small domed q~~adratlgle
in the
centre of t h e city. T h e total population is estimated
and caravanas h a v i n g been about 45,ooo. Mosq~~es
serais, public b a t h s and public reservoirs, varied the
wretched uniformity of the narrow, dirty streets, and
these were roofed across so as to be Iittle better than
dark tunnels, where every conceivable description
of d i r t collected and putcified. When wonder was
expressed b y A r t h u r Conolly that people could live
in s u c h filth, t h e reply was, " T h e climate is fine, and
if d i r t killed peopie, where would the Afghans be?"
T h e picture drawn by Icaye of the political and
moral condition of the people of Herat, forms a
fitting counterpart t o the description of the outward
imperfections of the city. Every kind of cruelty and
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to have been conckntrated here ; and if ever a clean
sweep of a city and its inhabitants seemed liliely t o
be a matter of small loss to the rest of the liumati
race, it might have appeared so in the case of Herat.
But high moral character and honesty are not
necessary concomitants of valour and martial prowess,
although even these qualities are not the worse for
being conjoined ~vitlithe former. One man, at least,
in Ilerat, possessed all these qualifications, and h e
saved Ilerat. I t mould be unfair, however, to leave
it to be supposed that the besieging army of the
-Persians was much, if a t all, supcrior to the Heratis
in those moral qualities in which the latter were s o
wanting. But the Persian Icing's troops were infi~iitelybetter soldiers, and quite as brave men as the
Afghans. Their non-success lvas the fault of their
leaders, while opposed to them was an English officer,
who showed himself worthy to rank with some of the
best generals of his country, but who had devotcd
himself to the cause of the besieged simply as a
valunteer.
Russian officers aided the Persians a t I-Ieral, and
Russian diplomatists urged them to the expedition.
I t was a natural co~iclusionthat, so encouraging and
so aiding Persia, Russia had ulterior designs not
wholly c~ncon~iectedwith thoughts of the British
Empire in India. I t is certain that such was the
feeling of the Englisli Ministry. But w11ei1 an ex-
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planation was desired by Lord Durham from tlie
Russian Minister of c o ~ ~ d u cso
t contrary to the
declarations of tlie Czar's Government, the reply was
t h a t if Count Simonich, the Russian Minister at the
Court of Persia, had encouraged the Persian Icing
t o proceed against I-Ierat, he liad acted in direct
violation of his instructions. This, however, was but
a n early example of that persistent course of encroachment io Central Asia which Russian generals
a n d diplomatists have carried out in direct contmvention of the instructions they are said t o have
received from St. Petersburg.
I
While the siege of Ilerat was in progress, Captain
Burnes liad been prosecuting his "commercial "
mission a t Cabul at the Court of Dost Muhammad,
r ruler of that part of Afghanistan. The
t h e A ~ n i or
Amir was believed, however, to be intriguing with
tlie Persians for their assistance in a projected war
against the Silchs to recover Peshawar. To the
English in India tlie security of the Anglo-Indian
Empire seemed in 1837-38,to be threatened both
from within and without. From Nepal to Burma
t h e N a t i v e States were evincing signs of feverish
interest in the advance of what they supposed was
a Muhammadan invasion from beyond the Afghan
frontier. Public seaurities declined in value, and the
rulnour spread from mouth to mouth .that the Com. .
pany's reign was nearly at an end.

T o tlie high officers of the British Indian Government matters appeared somewl~at differently, but
were sufficie~itlyblack. Herat was being besieged
by tlie Pcrsian Icing-of-I<ings, Russian officers were
directing tlie siege, the Barakzai Sirdars, including
Dost Muhammad, were intriguing with Persia. I t
seemed probable, therefore, that having taken Herat,
tlie Persian Icing would either push on his conquests
to Cabul and Candahnl; or render Dost Muhammad
the vassal of Persia by aiding liirn against the Sikhs,
and thereby make Afghanistan the basis of fi~ture
I operations to be undertaken not only
. by
. the Persians
the~nselves,but by them jointly with the Russians,
who were now their allies.
I t mas then tlie true policy of the Eritisli Government to keep Afghanistan independent, and to
cement a friendly alliance with its rolcr or ru1cl.s.
This, broadly, was the aim of Lord Auckland in all
tlie diplomacy that followed.
W e have now arrived a t the threshold of the First
Afghan War, which arose directly out of this policy,
the ostensible object of which was, it must be irrnembered, to make Afghanistan independent, if possible,
or as much as possible, but a t any rate friendly to
British interests-to prevent its falling illto the hands
of the Persians, and through them into that of
st
the Russians; to be used as a weapon a g a i ~ ~ the
British Empire in India.
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~ ~ t t cta r tbc Amir of Eoki~ncl--Brief Review of "The Arghar
T r a ~ ~ "d of
y 1838.4~-Story of Dr. Brydon's Er&%pe.

IT is easy to be wise after tlie event. I t is clear to
every one now that Lord Auclrland's mode or carrying o u t t h e policy of malring Afgl~anistana fi-ee a n d
independent State, to act as a buKer against Persia
a n d Russia, was not the wisest plan to elfect that
object, and did indeed result in malring that State
bitterly hostile and independellt, not througl~ our
aid, but, it may b e said, in spite of it. I n 1837,
however, matters were not so plain to the eyes of
statesmen, whose days and nights were made

.

anxious by the rumours of great preparations across
the frontier, while the internal sources of disquiet
were not few.
I t was believed, whether rightly or wrongly may
now be questioned, that Dost Muhammad was not
likely to be a sincere friend to the English, however
ostensibly sb he might appear. I n the words of the
Simla manifesto, he and his brothers were " ill-fitted,
under any circumstances; to be useful allies to the
British." Sir John ICaye has ably stated the case for
Dost Muhammad. I l e l ~ a sshown that that prince
really wished for the English alliance, and only
waited for some consideration to be shown to his
wishes with regard to Peshawar ; the restoration of
which province he claimed from the Silchs, and hoped
to regain by our intercession. It1 that case h e would
have abandoned Russia and Persia at oncc. I t did
not suit Lord Auckland's policy to alienate thc Silchs
by pressing Dost Muhammad's claims, cven if he had
believed in Dost Muhammad's sincerity. I t must be
remembered, too, that Dost Muhammad was in possession only of Cabul and Ghazni, Candahar and
Herat being in possession, the former of his brother,
and the latter of a Saddozai prince. T o have a
series of disjointed kingdoms or.chicftainships in
Afghanistan, involving a separate. consideration of
the interests of each, and all the trouble of conciliating
rival princes, scemed naturally enough less favourable
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to tlie policy Lord Auckland had adopted than
the consolidation of the whole under one ICing.
Some idea of Dost Muhammad's positio~l being that
of a ilstlrper doubtless contributed to tlle determination to inaugurate a policy which mas as startling as
it mas novel. This mas no other than to put forward
the exile, Shah Suja, the former legitimate Icing of
tlic Afghans, who had been driven out, as b ~ f o r e
explained, b y Dost Muhammad and his brothers,
in pursuance of a family feud that arosc from tlie
deaths of Poinda IClia~i and Fateh IChan, at tlie
hands of Zaman Shah and Prince ICamran respectivcly. T o restore Shah Suja, the rightful sovereign,
to the throne of his ancestors, did riot seem so
wro~igfula proceeding then as it does to uq now.
I t mas believed that the Afglians would ~velcome
their Icing if once the strength of the Barnlczai family
were brolzen. The Duranis had been terribly oppressed by Dost Muhammad, and it was supposed
they would floclc to Shah Suja's standard. But it
has been since learnt how little the Afglians regard
legitimacy and the hereditary rights of roynl houses.
Their notions of sovereignty have little in common
with refined Western ideas or it. The strongest is tlic
one whom they willingly aclcnowledge as ICing, A
fatal objeetion, too, to the restored monarch was tlic
fact that he had come baclc to them as a puppet in the
hands of thc infidels, and that his power rested on ,

h
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no lnore national basis than British bayonets and
British gold. I t would be tedious and of little use to
enter at length into all the workings of that policy
which we have briefly sl<etchedabove. A tripartite
treaty was signed between the British Inclian Government, Ranjit Sinh, the Sikh ruler of the Panjab, and
Shah Sr~ja. The Sikhs were to co-operate in the
restoratioo of Shah Suja to the throne of Cabul, and
theI<iog8seldest son was to march with a Sikh army
from Peshawar througl~the Icliaibar Pass, while Shah
Suja himself, with some levies of liis owti, but accompanied by an English army of mixed European and
Sepoy soldiers, on which the brunt of the campaign
would fall, marched through the Bolan Pass, to
Qucttah, and thcnce to Candahar. Sir John Iceane
(afterwards Lord Iceane of Ghazni) led the Bombay
column, and Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded
the Southern Army, called the Army of the
Indus, which set out from Firozpur, on the Indus, on
the 10th Decembcr, 1837. This army consisted of
about 9,500 men, and 38,ooo camp-followers. Thirtythousand baggage camels, well-laden, accompanied
them. On the 14th January the army entered
Sindh. I t was the 16th of Marc11 before it reached
Dadar, at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. I t had been
delayed by difficulties in Sindh, which was not the11
British territory. T h e A~nirsof that country required
a good deal of over-aweing belore they would grant a
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passage t o 0111' troops. The privations undergone by
the army in its march across the desert were extremc.
The distance from Shikarpl~rto Dadar is 146 miles.
I t was accomplished by the Bellgal column in sixteen
painful marches. Water and foragc were so scarce
that the cattle suffered terribly on the way. The
camels fell dead by scorcs on the desert, and further
on the Baluchi robbers carried them off with appalling dexterity. When they reached cultivated
land the green crops were used as forage for the
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Sir Tohu Iceane with the Bombay Armv had 1
landed a t Vilckur at the end of Novembel; but was
compelled, from the hostility of the Sindh rulers, to
remain inactive till December 24th. On the 4th of
of the
April h e reached Quettah, to take coln~na~icl
expedition now increased by the Bombay column,
which had made a long and difficult march tl~rougll
Sindh. As the expedition had for its object thc
restoration of a Icing and the pacificntio~~
of his
coantry, it was deemed desirable to send with it a
civil officer, as representative of the GovernorGeneral of India. The choice of Lord Auckland fell
upon Mr. W. 13. (afterwards Sir William) Macnaghten, then Foreign Secretary with the Governlnent of ~ n d i a a, Inan of great abilities, ao eminent
Oriental scholar, and withal fully imbued ~viththe
spirit of Lord Aucklantl with regard to the a f i i r in

/
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I~and; unless, as some tl~it~l;,it lvci-c niorc correct to
say that he 11ad infi~sed his spirit and sentiments
into Lorcl AucLla~~d.
D c s ~ ~ itlic
t c dihiculties in tlic way of supplies, aiid
tllc loss of beasts of burden, the army rcachcd
Cnndaliar without serious opposition, altlioi~gli a
sniall but resolutc band of tlic enemy might liavc
barrccl tlicir way a t tlic Bo1a11 l'ass, and pcrhaps
cffcctually rcpcllcd the l~ivadirigforccs with disaster.
Thcrc is no d o i ~ b tthat E ~ ~ g l i smoney
li
was largely
~ ~ s ctod buv off tlic arllicrcnts of tlic 13arakzais. Tlie
Afglians dincovcrcd that the gold of the I'criiigliccs
was as scrviccablc as otlicr gold, and Afghan ;lllegla~iccwas p ~ ~ r c l ~ a stoc da large cxtcnt. Tliesystc~n
of conuptio~itlius co~n~ncnccd
could not but involvc
tlic invaders ill dificulty afterwards, wlicn the
trcasurc-clicst hecntnc cxliaiistcd.
Sliali Suja's cntralicc illto Candaliar was morc
rcinnrkablc for thc curiosity than lor tlic cntbasiasm
clisplayccl. Maciiaglitcn ii~tcrprctcdtlic dcmonstratiori ill tlie most favourable light, and saw an
unclouded prospect of succcss in the futore. And
so for a time it secrncd. Gl~azniwas takc~iby assault,
lvitli at1 ease that sccmed rnarvcllous to t l ~ cAfglia~is,
seeing that Sir Jo111i ICcane liad n o lieavy guns witli
11im. Trcaclier): liowever, 011 the part of tlic enemy
aided as much as British bayoricts. 011e of tlie
Barakzai nobles-tlie ~iepliewof Dost Muliatnmad-
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turned traitor, a n d gave information which enabled
S i r Johil Keane's engineers to blow up part of the
walls of G h a z n i by gunpowder, and so effect an
entrance, and tile captu1.e of the city. Shah Suja.
showed his c a p a c i t y for co~lciliatinghis subjects by.
ordering the s l a u g h t e r in cold blood of fifty Gliazis,
who were talcen pl.isoners. These fanatics court
death in battle, but the inassacre of them in cold
blood was in t h e highest degree impolitic, to say
nothing of t h e i n h u ~ n a n i tof
~ the deed. "That
martyrdom," s a y s Icaye, "was never forgottell. The
day of reckoning c a m e a t last; and when oor unholy
policy sanlc b u r i e d i n blood and ashes, thc shrill cry
of the Ghazis s o u n d e d as its funeral wail." H e refers,
of course, to t h a t terrible death-struggle some two
years later, o f t h e retreating army in the passes of
the IChurd-Cabul, xvl~enthe Ghazis rushed in, hungry
for t h e blood of the infidels, and completcd the
slaughter of t h e s u r v i v o r s .
A t Ghazni Brigadier Sale, who alterwards became
famous a t J a l a l a b a d , commanded the main column,
and greatly distinguished himself. .Although the
capture of t h i s c i t y was not marked by the worst
feature ofwar-for
the wornell were not ill-trcatedthe carnage w a s terrible. Upwards of $00 of the
garrison were buried b y the, besiegers, besides those
who fell b e y o n d t h e walls ; tbe victors losing only
seventeen killed a n d 165 wounded; 1,600 prisoners

I

!

:I

ij

1;

11iti'

:1,
,!

i~.~
I

--

1

J

-

--

wcrc talicn, a ~ ~ immensc
rl
stores of graiil, many
Iiorscs, and numerous arms.
After a futilc attempt a t negotiation, Dost Mullammad, scei~lg that resistance was hopeless-for his
own followers s e r e deserting him, or wcre lutewarin in their support-mounted
liis horse at
Urghandi, a few miles to the west of Cabul, wl~itl~er
11c 11ad gonc out to dispute the progress of tlic
ii~vadcrs,and, with a few followers, turned his face
to!vards the regions of the I-Iindu ICush.
On the and of Aueust
fled, and
- Dost Mul~a~ninad
on the following day thc British army, which mas
marclling upon Cab111,heard the news, and a party
of horse~iicnset out in pursoit. Haji ICl~anICalcar,
a man of ineail origi!i, who 11ad risen to he an
Afgl~ailchief, olfcrccl to lead the pursuit. I-Ie was
ill treasonable com.espondence
all the tvl~ilc,l,o~vc~~er,
with Dost Muliammacl, and did all lie could to misdirect the English oficers. T h e pursuit failed, the
Amir cscapcd beyond tlic mouotains, and Haji ICIian
sul~cicl.ccIfor. 11is trcacl~eryby banislimmt as a State
prisoner to Chunal:
On thc 7th of August Shah Snja and a British
artny entercd Cabul, the for~ner,after an absence of
thirty years, the latter for the first time. H e had
bcen restored to liis throne by the money-bags and
t l ~ ebayonets of thc British; but it was a hopeless
task t o attempt to keep him o n it. He had fallen
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once miserably, and not even English soldiers and
Indian rupees coulcl set him up permanently again.
H e might have succeeded without the assistance of
the hated infidels, but the lcnowleclge that they, atid
they only, supported him on his tottering throne
alienated even those who would naturally favour the
lincal descendant of the famous Ahmad Shah.
I t was n o part of the original programme that an
English army sl~ouldremain in occupation of the
Afglian capital and country ; but it soon became
manifest that the puppet we had set up would not
be able to retain his throne without extraneous aid.
S o Macnaghten remained as British Envoy, and the
Bellgal c o l u m ~remained
~
as wcll.
O n the 18th of September the Bombay troops
commenced their return march to India through the
ICojak a n d the Bolan Passes. Those who stayed
b e l ~ i ~were
l d disappointed, for, says ICaye, "a country,
in which wine was selling at the price ol 300 rupees
(L30) a dozen, and cigars at a rupee (2s.) a-piece,
was not one in which the officers o l the army were
likely t o desire to pitch their tents for a sojourn of
any long continuance." A small detachment, howcvel; of the Bengal troops afterwards returned to
India, under Sir John ICeaue, leaving the rest under
Sir Willoughby Cotton in occupation of Afghanistan.
T h c n began the system of planting small detachmcnts of British troops in isolatecl positions throughI0

out t l ~ ccoontry ; which was, in the opinion of some,
one of the grcat errors that marlied our sojourn in

- - I

Thc unpopularity of Shah Siija grew daily more
manifest, but thc pcoplc sccmccl to have settled down
into son~cthinglilzc quiescence under the reign of
Engiisl~gold, for cupidity is
of their strongest
passions. They hatccl thc Fcritighces, but did not rcfuse thcir gold. The old csperic~~cc,
which we had
scen so often in our relations with thc States of
India, bcgan to be fclt, British bayoncts .were
cmploycd to executc thc ordcrs of the Shah and his
oficcrs. Boulid by trcxty not to il~tcrferewit11 the
intcrtlnl affairs of thc country, they hacl to permit,
and cvctl aid ~ I I enforcing, 1nucl1 that mas unjust.
Says Sir John Icaye, " I t would have bec11 a miracle
if sucl~a systcln had not soon broken dow11with a
clcsolaling crash, and buried its xutliors i ~ i t l ~
ruins."
e
T h c lnorc we surrounded Shall Suja ~\ritllour authority the less firmly was he seated on the throne.
I\lcanwhile, the successes of the recent campaig~i
brought Ilotlours to the cllicf actors. Lord Auckland
was creatccl an cad; Sir John Iceane became Baron
Iceanc of Ghazni; Mr. Macnaghten was made a
baronct ; Colonel Wade (who had led the force
tl~roughtile Ichaibar) a knight ; and brevets and
Bath l~otlourswerc numerous.
The extent to which our success in Afghanistan
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had e r ~ c o u r a g e ddesigns of further interfcrcncc
the p o w e r s to tile west of Cabul can bc understood
only by a reference to the correspondence of Sir W,
~ a c l l a g i l t e n ,and other higll Anglo-Indian officers,
during the bricf occupation of Afghan territory by a
~ r i t i s harmy. Not only did Macnaghtcn advise an
upon Herat, which was "giving trouble," alld
its a n n e x a t i o n to Shah Suja's dominions, but
sio~is were sent to Bokhara, I<holcand, and I<llivn.
C o l o ~ l e lStoddart, indeed, had been at Dokhara ever
since t h e close of 1838, having been sent by the
Ellglish Minister.at the Court of Persia to obtain the
release of some Russians lvlio mere in captivity thcrc,
alld a l s o t o conclude a friendly treaty with thc Amir
of Bokhara. T h e s t a y is well knowl~of Stoddart's
imprisonment, in violation of all the laws that regulate international intercourse-but what do barbarous
I<hans a n d Amirs know of such ?-of the gross and
w a n t o n cruelties practised upon him, and of his final
atrocious murder. Arthur Conolly farcd no better.
H e s t a r t e d from Cabul in the autumn of 1840, ostensibly 011 a mission to IChiva and I<holcand. Thence,
on an invitation of the Amir of Bokhara, he proceeded to that city, where he found Stoddart in a
s t a t e of captivity, but more honourable and less
than that which h e had bee11 condemned to
suffer during part of tlie preceding years. One of
.Conolly's reasons for visiting Dolchara mas, i t is said,
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t o i~iduceStoddart to recant tlie profession of MuIiammada~iism he had made. H e found, on llis
arrival, tliat poor Stoddart's conversio~i had been
effected by sucli gentle meatis as i~icarceration in a
pit full ol vermin and filtli. I-Iis grave, too, was dug,
with tlie tlireat that unless h e professed the faith of
Islam lie would be buried alive in it. Conolly fou~id
h e liad only bee11 decoyed into a trap lo undergo
similar trentmcot, and was in the end subjected to
the satne fate as Stoddart suKcred. I t is believed
tliat botli died by tlie l ~ a ~ of
i d tlic public executioner,
but tlie precise period of tlieir death is doubtfill.
Native accounts malie it the 17th of Junc, 1842 .; a ~ ~ d
lnaliuscripts written by Arthur Conolly himself and
dcspatclicd to Cabul bring up the sad narrative of his
sufferings to tlie 24th of May ol that year. O n the
28th of May Stoddart clespatcl~edan official letter to
tlie Indian Government, which was forwarded with
Conolly's journals. T h e neglcct of the Government
they served so faithfully embittered the hard fate of
these officers. I t was after their death that Lord
Ellenborougl~wrote a letter t o the Amir of Bokhara,
in which h e described them a s "in~iocenttravellers,"
a n d as sucli reqiicsted their release. ICaye rightly
says that 11ad tlicy been then living, such a repudiation of their official cliaractcr would have sealed tlieir
fate, as it practically proclaimed them to be spics.
L e t us hope this is no precedent to be followed in
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the case of other officers of Government wlio may
fall into the clutches of barbarous rulers, wlieii
serving their country. Icaye describes the fate of
these officers as " a painful episode in the epic of the
Afglian \var." I t was so, truly.
T h e Afghan tragedy is conveniently divided into
three periods, the first of wliicli ends witli tlic
restoration of Sliah Suja to thc thronc of Cabul on
tlic 7th August, 1839. Tlic second period embraces
those two years of Shah Suja's short reign, during
which lie was kept on his throne only by British
bayonets and British gold ; tlie evetits which led to
the insu~.rection of tlie Afghan tribes against the
Fcringliee infidels, as they callcd the English; the
subsequc~itdifficulties arising, it is now believed,
Inore from the dividcd authority and incapable commanders of tlie British than from tlic strength of tlic
enemy ; and the crow~iiiigdisasters of tlie retreat
from Cabul and massacre of tlie whole Cabul division
of tlie British army and its camp-followers, with the
exceptioii of about a hundred prisoners and oue man,
D r . Brydon, wlio effected his escape, in a coiiditioii
more dead than alive, to Jalalabad, which lie reached
on 13th January, 1842. T h e third and last period is
occupied wit11 tlie march of tlie avenging army that
was slowly collected and despatched under General
Pollock from Peshawar to effect a junction witli
General Nott's division, which had been shut up in

Candaliar during the winter, but which now comlne~icecl that extraordinary "witlidmwal " to t h c
plains of India vid Gliazni, Cabul, Jalalabad, and
Peshawal; \vhich looked so remarkably like an
advance, that Kayc has riglitly designated it as a
retirement "unparalleled, perhaps, in the political
liistory of thc ~vorld." The punishment inflicted
upon tliose deemed guilty of ally participation in the
previous disasters t o tlie Britisli arms, more cspccially upon tlie tribes co~icerned in the massacre of

not so011 forget. The English prisoners, too, ~vlio
liad almost co~iclucledthat tlicy liad been abandoucd
by tlic Government to their fate, were recovered after
adventores Inore tlirilling atid cscapes more wonclerful than a~iytliiiigto be found in fiction. The policy
of ~vitliclra~valwas eve~iti~allycarried out, and
Afghanistan left to its own people in December
1842, after more than four years of deep anxiety
caused by our wilful intcrfercnce with its rude politics.
To give anything approaching to an cxliaustive
account of these evezits would far excced our present
intctition, and Sir John Icaye's masterly work on tlie
Afghan W a r renders it unnecessary to do so. In liis
pages the student of Indian history will never cease
to find delight, for the clear and incisive judgment
which lie has brought to bear upon the difficult ques-
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tions of policy that then arose leaves little to be
desired. The Afghans could have wished no fairer
or more impartial chronicler, while the present
generation of E n g l i s h r n e t ~ ~ nthank
a ~ him For llaving
cleared up what was dubious, evenwhere it involved
proving, as in so Inany instances it did, that our o v n
actioii was indefensible.
A correspondent of t l ~ eBniiy &ws, subscribing
himself " II.J.R.L.," sent the following interesting
account of the escape of Dr. Brydon, the sole survivor of the Cab~ll forc6, who found his rvay to
Jalalabacl, to tell, the sad stoly of its fate.
" H.J .R.L.'s " account agrees substantially with
that givc~iby Sir John ICaye. I3e says :" Dr. Drydon rvas the doctor of my old regiment.
~ d
figure always inadc it
His pleasant face a ~ rotund
the more dimcult to vealise that he was the only
survivor of that terrible retreat, af which hc was
most relucta~ltto speak. It was towards the a ~ d
of the Cabul Pass that a few survivors had struggled. Among the111 lvas the nativc doctor of
.Brydon's then regiment. Calling Urydon to Ilim,
he said, ' Doctor Sahib, I cannot possibly escape ;
I am dying from cold and hunger. Take my pony,
and do the best you can for yourself.' Drydon tried
to encourage tbc poor man, but, seeing illat hc wvas
indeed dying, lie took tlie pony, and tlirougli the
confusion forced his way to the front. There he
'

~
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found a small group of mounted oficers, who, knowing they were just at tlie end of the Pass, where it
ol~ensout on the plain on ~vhicliJalalabad stands,
had determined to m a l e a push for life. Seeing
Brydon on this wretched, half-starved pony, they
declared they could not possibly wait for him, as
any delay miglit cause their utter destruction. On
they went, leaving Brydon slowly toiling after
them. The Afghans saw this group approaching,
lnet and slew every man ; then, thinking 110 one else
was cominc. went back to the liills. Just then
" A t Jalalabad the greatest anxiety prevailed as
to the ~vliereaboutsof General Elphinstotie's force,
no news having come through the Pass, though it
was known lie was retreating, when one evening a
man, slowly riding a worn-out pony, was descried
at the entrance of the Pass. Some cavalry were
sent to bring him in. I t was Brydon, the only survivor, A s lle entered the gate he fell senseless
from fatigue. When he came to himself his first
question was about t h i pony that had saved his life.
I t was dead.
"When B~.ydon told me the story v e were
walking home one night from mess, under the
solemn calm of an Indian night. He bade me
put my finger into the mark left by an Afghan
sabre, which, glancing from a boolc he had put
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into liis forage cap, had sliced a piece of the skull
clean out.
" Brydon took part in the defence of Jalalabad
as one of tlie 'illustrious garrison,' and, strangely
enough, lived to take part in the defence of Luclcnow."
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Al;CfIillNAFFilIRRT AFTER T H E W A R OF 1838-42.
Tim Itcnl Cnaro of lhc Dnlnnge to England's Parilian in Ccnlml Arln
Irom lllo Cnbul Disarlcr-Lard
Ellenborough's Policy in 18~12Nnlivc Vicws on thc Evncunlion of Algl1nnlslnn-Ro~r~Iinso11~~
Opinion 01 thc r\lglnnnr ns Saldiers-Englnnrl " The Dumt Child."
nnrl Alghnnisan "Tile 1:ire"-Internnl
Allilrr or Algbnnislnn
bclwccn l l ~ c I<elrenl 01 Genornl Elphinrlane null thc i\dvnncc of
(;cnernl l'allack-hiul~nrn~nnd Sllaln I<hnn n Noble Eseeption l o tho
Gcnernlily 01 llle Alxllnnr-hlurdcr 01 Shnh Sujn, tile I'appel-l<illg
--Acecrrian of I'nlill Jnng-r\kbnr I<bnn Illlrigllcs lor Power-I'nll
01 1:alill Jnng-l'roraclomnlion
of ShuI>par-Lo1.d Hllenborough's
"Song 01 TrIs1ap11"-l'olicy
will, Kcgnrd lo Dort Mul~rmmnd
IChn11-Englnndb i\lghall I'oiicy iram 18.12 lo 1852-Origiin of lllc
I'er5i.m War 01 1856-Hem1 nnd Treaty 01 I'nrir or i857-Vil~r~ml
Dismgard 01 l'renly lby I'enin-Dorr
hlul~ammncl's Neutrality In
1856.58 I'urchnred-Policy
01 Suhrldies Diroorred-Cost of Algl,nn
Wnr-Tile lllood I'ead bcl$\~ccntho i\lghsar nnd lhe Englisb-Sir
John 1,o.lwrence's Tvenlies will^ Dort hlal~nmmnrl-Eslenl of Dost
hlt!l~nmmnd'r Don~inio~>r-I-lcSnbduer Candabnr nnrl lleral-His
Denlll-Subrcqucnl Aonrehy in Alghnnislnn-Rlvnl Clain~nntrlo tile
" h1nmod"-Sberc
All. Lhc Designnlcd Successor-His Son. Ynkub
I<Ih111, is Alndc Governo~~
of Hent-Aleul I<hnn Obtnins Parrersion
01 Cnhul, rind is I'radnimed Amir-Shcrc
All's Defenl-Ynkub
Khna's Gallnnl Aei~icveme~~ls-Sherci\li Rertarod in 1868-IIe
Sllrj'ecls Ynkub I<hnn 01 'I'rcnchery-Ynkub
Dcmnllde lo bc Aeknomlctlgcd Iidr Applrcnt-Ova
Quarci l3elmcca the Amir and
Ynkub-Ynkub's l i l I g h l - R ~ c o ~ ~ ~ i l i n ~nnd
io~~
I~l~prirot~ment-OLhor
CLiaolla lo the Succession.
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IT was not so much our retirement from Afghanistan, in 1842, as the co~lditionsunder which it was
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carried out that injured British P~estige and dis-.
England's position in all Central Asia. IT,
aTter recovering the prisoners, our officers had
remained for another year in the country ; and tlleo,
in a n orderly and honourable manner, after a
suitable arrangement with the native authorities
into whose hands wc inight have thought it fitting
t o resign the government, we had withdrawn from
Afghan soil, the eKects of our previous disasters
would have been mitigated, if not entirely removed.
But Lord Elle~~boro~igli
was too anxious to rescue
the artnics of Generals Pollock and Nott fxom what
he cotlsidcred to be their critical position in an
intensely hostile country, hardly capable of furnishing supplies, always a t their wits' end for carriage,
a n d oppressed with the recollection of the fate that
had so recci~tly befallen their predecessors, t o let
delicate coilsideration of the honour of the English
name weigh wit11 him against the terrible dangers
his imagination saw in a further occupation of
Afghanistan.
Indeed, it was a t one time possible-nay, so probable as to bc deemed by some almost certain-that
t h e rears of the Governor-Gencral would so Tar
paralyse llis j ~ ~ d g i n e nthat
t a distinct refusal would
be given to I'olloclc to advance on Cabul " to assist
the retreat of the Canclallar force" as it was the
fashion officially to style that \vonderful " retirement

Cabul, a11d
o n thc plains oT India ~ ~ i t ? Ghazni,
Peslia!var," to which we Ilavc alrcady referred.
What really llappcllcd ill the cnd, as tllc result of
Lord Bllc~~boroogI~'s
policy, was that aftcr rcadirlg
t l ~ c natives ccrtain u l ~ s s o n s " the British army
retired precipitately from Afghan tcrritory !vithout
any undcntaodil~ghaving been colnc to with thc
Durani chiefs, and pursued, indced, by an implacable
foe-generally, but ]lot nlways, at n respectful
distance-dow11 to the last pass debouching on thc
plaios. Tll~lsno doubt can be entertained that the
previoi~sill..cflects on our reputation were considerably cnlianced ; thc general native idca being, both
in India and in Central Asia, that we wcre in
reality driven from the mountains. Nor has the
belief been uncommon alnollg our own otiicen that
in rctiring from Afghanistao we yielded to superior
strength ; whereas, in troth, never was the coutitry
morc thoroughly in our power durillg the whole
pcl.iocl from thc commencement of [lie Afghan War
than a t the moment of our retreat.
I t l ~ a sbeen assclted on the highest anthority,
that, except during the fatal minter of 1841-42, !vlien
by a concurrc~~ce
of the most unforeseen events, our
forces a t Cabul had become utterly dernoralised, the
Afg11a11swcre never able lo make a successful stand,
even for a n hour, against either British soldiers o r
Indian Sepoys. Sir Henry IXawlinson declared in
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1875 that no officer wllo served throug.11 the Afghan
W a r ~vould hesitate to meet the whole assc~nbled
forces of Cabul a n d . Candahar combined with a
single brigade of British troops; and even in mountain warfare, where the Afghaa marksman with his

substitution of the breechloading rifle has now
redeemed our only wealcness. Whether Sir I-Ienry
Ralvlinson would be willing to co~ninithimself to
such a statement in the fall of 1878, after the recent
i~lforn~ation
we have received of thc state of the
Amir's army, drilled, it is alleged, in part at Icast, by
1Eussian officers, and with the arsenals of Russia, a s
it is also asserted, to select from, we have no means
We opine from the much l a r-~ e rforces
of deciding.
which it has been dcemed necessary to assemble on
t h e north-west f r ~ n t i e rthat it is not the opinion of
high military authorities in India that the Afghans
a r e such contemptible enemies as Sir Henry Rawlinson, in 1875 a t least, supposed. The object, we
s11ould observe, ~vhich Sir Henry Rawlinson had in
malting the above observatiot~was not to encourage
t h e idea of our again ascencling 'the passes, but
rather to correct the erroneous impression which h e
believed to be generally entertained of the military
strength of Afghanistan, and the consequent ovcrestimate that might be made of the difficulties which

1.

~voold lie in t11c way of a Russian advance upon
India from any opposition tlic Afglia~istliemselves
coulcl intcrposc.
W e propose in this and the succeeding chapters of
this booli to trace vcry i;?pidly, but ~vithas much
succii~ctncss as may be, the relatio~ls betweeri
Afghanistan and the British Illdial1 Govcrnment
from the evacuatio~lof that cou~ltryin 1842 to the
prcsent time. This will enable 11s to consider with
more advantage, perhaps, the causes that may have
led,to tlie present complications, and to cstimate the
value, from various standpoints, of tlic vcry opposite
opinions that have been cnllcd forth opo~i~vliat~vill
now talcc its place in history as " thc Afghan question of 1878," u~ilcss a deeper significance slioold
accrue to it, demanding a Inore comprehensive and
far-reaching title.
F o r a nomber of years after the Afghan War xve
imitated the "burnt cliild," and sturliously avoided
all intercourse with the country that lind beell the
sccne of our disastcrs.
TIie tlirec independent Governmetits of Cabul,
Candaliar, arid I-Icrat, that had been it1 existence
before our advent, agai11 assertccl their rule. Persia
11ad too much occupntio~ia t home to interfere with
11~1.
eastern iieighbour.
S i r Jolin Icaye, ill his admirable work on the
Afghan War, has collectcd from various sources all
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that is known of the internal affairs of Afghanistan
aRer the departure of the ill-fated Cabul .column,
1v11ich marched forth to destructio~~
ut~derGeneral
Elphinstolle on the 6th of January, 1842,and bcfore
tlle arrival of General Pollocl~with the avenging
army. Of the wretched puppet-King we had set u p
in the place of the really capable Dost Muhammad,
we know that he remained for a time nominal ruler
of Cabul, to the astonishmet~tilldeed of those
believed that the insurrection ~vhicbhad caused the
expulsion of the English had been as much dircctcd
against Shall Suja as against his Ferillgllec patrons.
The fact was that t h e chiefs dreaded thc vengeance
of the English for the fearful injuries dealt to them,
andfelt that Shah Suja was the only o l ~ cthat was
ever likely to, stand bct~vccn them aud that vcngeance. Of Shah Suja's conduct 'various opinio~ls
have bcen held, some believing that IIC was t h e
original fomenter of the insurrection, but that 11e
intended it only to attain such dimensions as would
compel his English patrons to remain and support .
him against his enemies ; while others suppose that
he was sincesely friendly to the English, but !veal<
and incapable to the last degree. There is n o
doubt, however, that one Afghan Prince, Muhammad
Zaman Khan, mas a noble exception to the mass of
his countrymen ; for while the i~~depcllde~lcc
of h i s
country, was d e a r t o him,. he never stained h i s
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patriotism witli those foul crimes in whicli others
delighted; and it is recorded of 11im that nothing
could exceed the kindness of this old mall to the
English hostages, who fouiid a sanctuary in his
house. I-Ie even raised and paid from his limited
resources a force of 3,000 men, chiefly for the protection of his E~iglishgucsts, or (as they were really)
prisoners.
This Nawab had bee11 made Vazir or
Mi~iistcrof Shah Suja ; but soon disse~isions brolcc
out among tlie rival factions, and mutual distrust
prevented concerted action. Shah Suja was murdcrcd by tlie son of the Nawab, against the wish, and
notwithstanding tlie effo~ts, of the old niali to save
him ; and tlie body of tlie wretched l<ing,after it
had bee11 stripped of its royal apparel and ornatncnts, was flung illto a ditch. His death was the
consumniation of tlie fierce strife that had bee11
mging between Slial~Suja and tlie Baraiczai princes
for forty years.
Tile second son of Slial~Suja, Fatih Jang, was
liorv raised to the tkiroiie, a ~ i dhe condolied the
murder of his father on the ground that it was no
time for avenging private family wrongs when all
ought to make common cause against the infidels.
But tlie Barakzais were not likely with patience to
see the son of their hatcd rival seated oil the throne.
Civil war soon raged in the city ; and ABbar ICIian,
~ 1 1 0had remained a t a distance witli tlie majority
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o f the Enzlisb prisoners still in his possession,
waiting to see how matters went at the capital, IIOIV
tnarched 011 Cabul. Akbar Khan, it mill be remernbered, was the son of Dosl: Muhammad, and is
known to history as the murderer of the E ~ ~ g l i s l l
Envoy, Sir Willialn Macnaghten, at a conference
held near the ~valls of the cantonments a t Cabul,
just previous to their evacuation. This prince,
1v110se character seems to have been a strange
mixture of ferocity and sensibility, besieged Fatih
Jang, the unfortunate young Icillg, i n tile Uala
Hissar, or citadel of Cabul, and when, at last, t h e
place was taken, began himself to exercise regal
power by the usual Arghan device of keeping t h c
nominal sovereign as a puppet. He fo1111dit convenient to support, as titular prince, this Saddozai youth, Fatih Jang, because the Nalvab,
Muhammad Zamao IChan, of his own (Barakzai)
tribe, also claimed to be Icing of the Afghans. T h e
good Nawab, xvllo had so nobly protected the
English captives, was defeated in battle, owing t o
t h e desertion of liis followers, and was made most
reluctantly to give up'his prisoners, whom he had
treated as guests, to the High Priest, Mir Haji.
F r o m his custody they were soon transferred-sold,
~ v eshould rather say-to Alcbar IClian, who thus
obtained possession of thepersons of all the English
who had been taken captive before and after the
I1
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massacre. His object io doing this was to lllake
good terms for Ililnself on the returll of the Ellglisl1
with an avengiog army-an event he fully expected.
Fatill Jnng was driven fr01n l l i ~tllron~by Alcbar
Ichan as soon as the latter had possessed himself
of the trensure,' to which Fatill Iclla~l had SUCceedcd on Shall Suja's dcnth-treasure
~vliich liad
bee11 amassed from the subsidies drawn from the
Indian Governme~rt. I.'atih Jnng lrad escaped i n
rags and tatters to thc camp of General Pollock,
as that officcr, with the army of vengeance, was
approaching Cabul. Following General Pollock to
t h c capital, lie was reinstalled on his throne, but was
cmpl~aticallytold that the English liad liad enough
of supporting poppet-Icings a t Cabul, and he must
now shift for liimself. When he learnt this, he
peremptorily refused to wear the crown, and begged
to bc allowed to accompany Pollock's camp to India,
a request which was granted both to him and the
olcl blind Icing, Zamao Shah, who had now a second
tinle to hod refuge in British territory. Another
Icing, nn~ncdShahpul., of t h c same unluchy Sadclozai fiunily, was l~roclaimed OII the day Pollocl<
\\'as leaving Cabul, but it was a mere mockery, for
h c was dethroned again beforc the British forces
reached Inclia.
After Lord Ellenborougl~ had proclailned the
* About ~200,ow.

I

I1

victory o l thc English troops it1 his famous proclamation or tlte Gates, called by tlie Dukc o l Wellington
a "Song of T ~ i u m p h"-than
which no document
that evcr emanated from the bureau or a statesman
has bee11 more ridiculecl and cetlsured Tor its bombosity and folly-it becarnc necessary to decide what
should be done with Dost Muhammad IChan, ~ v h o
was, it ~ v ~be
l l ~crnembered,a prisoner along with his
family in our il~ands. Wc had decrced and carried
out his dethronement ; and, deserted by his followers,
and rceling how liopcless was his resistance Lo British
might, h e , had surrendered himselr to Sir W.
Macnaghten, by whom lie was l~onourablytrcated,
a n d ronvarded as a State prisoner to Calcutta. I t is
annecessary here . t o detail the irtl-rigues which lollowed the first departure of the Eoglish from Cabul.
Suffice i t t o say tliat when Dost Muhammad round
his way back to.his capital, lle was not long in regaining his former authority as Amir, and Akbar
I<han becatnc 11is Vazir, or C h i d Minister. From
that time to 1852 we carerully avoided arty interference with Afghan affairs. In that year, howcvcr,
,died Yar Muhammad I<linrt, tlie notorious FvIi~tister
of Shah I<amran of Herat, wl~ohad, with tlie aid of
Eldred ~ o t t i n g e rsuccessfully
,
co~tductedthc siege of
that city against the I'ersia~t host in 1837-38
Persia would gladly have taken advantage of the
confusion tliat rollowed upon the Vazir's death to
11-0
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again attempt the reduction of Herat. This, however
g
diplomatic
wc prcvcntcd by t l ~ r c a t e ~ l ito~ ~suspelld
relations, a ~ s~o dco~~~pcllccl
the S l ~ a into
l ~ a convention b y which he bound l~imselfnot to make ally
future attack upon Afghan territory, This committed
us, doubtless, to l~ostiliticswith Persia in the event of
her b r c a k i ~ ~the
g col~vention,but it was deemed impcrntivc to prevellt I-lerat falling into her hat~ds,
chicfly bccausc it was [cared she miglit exchange
that city wit11 l<ussia for Erivan, or some other place.
This doctri~~e-tliat Herat must be indepeodent of
Russia and Persia-l~as bee11 a political maxim with
most English states~neucvcr since.
111 1856 tlie cootingcncy whicli had been foreseen
occurrec1,and Pc~siatitroops wcrc sent to occupy Herat,
ancl did succccd temporarily ill cloi~igso. The war
wit11 l~nglancl~ollowecl11po11this action-there were
otl~ercauses,bot this was tl~clnostimportant--during
t l ~ ccourse of ~vhich Persia t l ~ o u g l ~itt prudetit to
abal~donits conquest ; and a t the Peace of Paris, concluclecl in 1857, special provisions regarding Herat were
inserted in the Treaty-an evidence of our traditio~~al
drcad of Russia. T h e wisdom of t l ~ eprovision whicIi
burclenecl us wit11 the liability to attack Persia the
m o ~ n e l she
~ t ma~.checleastrvanl has been mucli questioned. Still more has the barren stipulation against
the Shall's interference with tlie Government of Herat
been adversely criticiscd. T h a t this latter one was
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futile soon became evident, for Sultan Ahmad IChan,
a ilepllew of Dost Mul~ammad,who was a refugee at
Tcheran when the Treaty o l Paris was concluded,
was sent by tlie Persian Shall to assume the reins of
Government immediately up011the ~vithdrawalof the
Persia~lgarriso~i
from I-Ierat, and he remained for the
next five years in undisguised dependence upon
Persia, althougli llis independence was proclaimed, in
delercnce to their obligations, by botli the Britisll
Gover~l~ncntand t h e Shah. A Russian mission,
undcr M. IChan~likof,ivhich visited I-lerat in 18q8,.
succeeded in compIcLing the dependency ol Sultan
Alimad upon I'ersia. I n 1857 the great importance
was secn of sccuring the neutrality of the A ~ n i r
Dosl hIullammad during the Persian War aild the
Indian Mutinics,when the fate of our India11 Empire
seemed trembling in t l ~ cbalance. We, thererore, for
once steppcd aside from the policy of non-intcrfercncc which had been pursued for fifteen years, and
sent a lricnclly mission to Alghanistan under Major
Lumsdc~l. Our officers proceeded only to Candahar,
but succeeded in purchasing the Amir's goodwill lor
a subsidy of a lakb of rupees (f;~o,ooo)per mensem,
t o be continued as long a s his selvices migllt be of
advantage t o us.
O l thc morality of this bargain, Sir Henry
Rawlinson remarks that it may appear questionable,
and of the tcnns, 11e admits that they lnay seem
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exorbitant to English politicians, but, lie adds, " when
worl; is to bc dolle, subsidies are still tlie rule in t h e
East, and experience has cver sltown that true
economy co~isistsin paying wcll, o r not a t all." I n
tliis case tlic "work" stipulntecl for in retor11 for
British gold and artiis was in rcnlity sometliil~gwhicll
it is very clificult to buy-viz.,
friendship. W e
watitecl-it may safcly be statcd that we still want
-a friendly I'owcr to be cstablisliecl it1 Afgliatlistan.
We liad spcnt sevcntccn millions of Et~glislimoney
and sacrificed ninny tliousands of English and Indiati
lives, in the endeavour to makc for ourselves a Icing
of the Affiltatis wllo should be t o our liking, atid
wllom a sc~rsco l ctcrnal gratitude for the recovcry
of his erowll would bind t o us cotnplctcly. W c liad
failed miserably. T h c very Icing ~ v c liad made
turticd to plotting against 11s ; tlie peoplc rosc,
and with one great cffort swcpt away our legions,
burying them in the clnrl; defiles of tlicir moutttains.
Tlie m a n me had Iiuntrcl from ltis tliro~ic,and itnprisotied for no fault, but becallse it suited tlic policy
of Lhc Govertimcnt of tlie d a y to d o so,.liad regained
liis thronc in spitc of us, and wc espccted to malcc
him o u r very good fricnd by a payment oftnoney.
And for a time this tnodc of secul.ing tlie friendship
of the Afgllan Icing succeeded, or a t least appeared
to succeed. Whether wc are tiow, in the time of liis
successor, about to reap the fruits o f tliis subsidising
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policy, the effcct of which has been to strengthen a
traditional enemy, to stiffen his neck wit11 pride, and,
perhaps, i~istilinto him the notion that, after all, we
havc sometlling to fear from his wrath, we leave to
others to decidc. 111 ail £26o,ooo was paid to the
then Amir of Cabul during thc years 1856-58, the
subsidy being continued for fonrtecn months after
the war with Pcrsia 11ad ceascd. Thc chief reason
for thc continuance of the subsidy scarcely needs to
be stated. We wcre locked in a death-struggle with
our own mutinous Indian anny, and it was of the
utmost importance that Dost Muhammad should
refrain from attaclii~~g
us, and should rcstrain his
ficrcc suhjccts from a general Afghan invasion of the
Panjab. And so Dost Muhammad-our former prisoner, whom \vc had so shabbily treated in 1838-40
-was now courtccl by an Englisll Envoy, and his
l~eutralitypurchased at tlte price above mentioned.
T h e spectacle was one not v c ~ creditable,
;~
perhaps,
t o a dignificcl Government ; and 110 wonder AngloIndians havc fclt sore about it, and made apologies,
on the ground of necessity and expediency, such a s
that abovc quotcd. Unfortunately this was not the
last occasion on lvl~icll an Afghan Prince receivcd
English arms and gold in thc vain effort t o kcep
11i1n" friendly." A time can~c-not long ago-when.
in haogl~tydisdain Sherc Ali flung back the ~ r o f fcred rupees, and lias bidcd his time to avow ihc
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liostility that has all along only bccti latc~it. Barbarous natioiis dcliglit in blood-feuds ; and if ever
t l ~ c r ewcrc grounds for a blood-fcud bctwcen two
nations, tlicy exist in tlic case of tlie Afghans and
ourselves.
I t is tlie duty, lion.evcr, of a natioti calling itself
civiliscd, not to say Cliristix~~,
to restrain to the
utmost tliose savage instil~ctsmliicli, in the case of
individuals, are readily condetn~ied,but in the case
o r natiotis arc too oltcn uncliccl~cd,ir not actually
fostcrcd, by false ideas of patriotism.
Ijeforc passing 011to more recent events, we should
not omit to mention that Sir Jolin (now Lord)
Lan~rcncc, on bclialr of the Indian Govcr~iment,
signcd a treaty in 1855 with tlie Amir Dost
Rluliammad I<lia~i,in which we agreed t o respect t h e
tcrritorics of tlie Amir and his heirs, and tlie Amir,
for liimself and liis heirs, agreed to respect the territories then it1 the possession or the East I n d i a
Company, whicli liave sitice devolved upon tlie
Crown. Mr. Me~iryRichard, MI'., in some letters
publislicd recently in tlic Cll~islintr World, d r a w s
espccial attention to this treaty in connection wit11
the proposed "rcctilication" of our frontier. T h e
only derence, nfe think, of ~vliiclian infringement by
us or the second article or this short treaty is a t all
capable is, that this second articlc may be held to
have been cancelled by Shcre Ali's violation of t h e
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first articlc, which declares that there shall be peace
atid friendship between the parties and their heirs.
Shere Ali has apparently given his friendship to
Russia. In January, 1 8 5 7 , Sir John Lawrence made
a secontl agreement with Dost Muhammad, under
, ~
which thc latter received the subsidy of L I O per
mclisem (in addition to a previous present of
~ ; ~ O , O O O )to
, which rcfcrence has already been made.
For many years after his restoration Dost
Muhammad's possessions were much curtailed, when
compared with those that for~nerlyo~vnedthe sway of
the Durani monarchs before Shall Suja. Shah Suja
himself had grumbled greatly ivlien we replaced him
on his throne a t the diminished area of his kingdom,
from which Herat, Cashmere, Pesliawar, and Sindli
had been lopped off. Dost Muhammad had little
beyond the Cabul valley in his possession. His
brothcrs a t Candahar, atid his nephew a t Herat, were
independent of hirn. When Icohandil Khan, of
Candahar, liowcver, died, Dost Muhammad overran
tlic Western Afghan province, and so011 aftenvards
commenced a . contcst \vith his nephew, Sultan
Ahmad, for the possession of I-Ierat. Persia
naturally rescnted this attack on her virtual dependent, and we remonstrated with Dost Muhammad.
ill his designs, and the
I-Ie pcrscvcrcd, IIOWCVC~,
climax was reached in the su~iirnerof 1863, without
our liaving intcrfcrcd furlher in tlic affair-by a triple

/

and sin~ultaiicouscatastro~,lic, tllc death of Sultan
Alinind by apoplexy, illc [all of Herat to tlic Cabul
army, aotl the crowning misfortt~tieor the death 01
Dost i\lulia~ii~ii:~d
liiniself.
On t l ~ ccleatli of tile great U;~ralizaichief, nllo llad
passed LIirough so lnatly vicissitudes or fortulle, and
\vhosc nilme !!'ill go down to future gc~~erations,
coupled \!sit11 thc history of the most calamitous
pcriod in our own history, Afghanistan relapsccl into
tclnporary anarcliy amid tlic slruggles that cnsued
for the succession. Dost Rlu11amm;icl had nominated
Shcrc Ali, n youligcr son by a ravouritc wifc, to.
succcccl l ~ i m ,passing over l ~ i smany other sons, of
whom filuhnm~iiadA h a l and h~ulia~iirnacl
Azim, by
an eldcr vile, wcrc tlic most notable. Four pretcnrlcrs j r ~ diKcrc~ltparts or the collntry collected
'Tollonscrs wit11 :I vicw to asserting Ll~eircl;~imsto the
', ~nasnacl," or, ;IS wc should say, "throne ;" but the
lxcsent rulers of Arghanistan ;ivoid the title of
" Sltall " 01.Iiilig.
Sllcre Ali for a sllort time made
Itis aull~orityrecog~~iscd,
but alienated many of the
chicfs by placing o11c of his youngest sons, a youth,
of sixtcclt, named Y n l a ~ bIChan, ill ilic gover~lorsliip
of Herat. T l ~ estandard of revolt was raised all over
tllc cou~itrya t almost the same moment, ; u ~ dShere
Ali nrxs compcllcd to bend to thc storm. I-Iis clder
brother, Afzal Icllan, succeeded in getting possession
of Cabul, and was there proclaimed A ~ n i r .of
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Afghanistan, altliough Herat still held out against
him f o r some time under Yakub I<han, who sl~onecl
hitnsclf even a t that youthful age, a leader of no
mean capacity. He had indeed discovered a conspiracy in the interests of one or liis uncles in E-Icrat
itself, alid had suppressed it with firmness and complete success.
A {C\V montlis after Sherc Ali's defeat, which
11a~)penccl in 18&, Yaliub was obliged to seek
safety in flight, and Herat was Captured by Afzal
Khan. Yaliltb and liis fatlier became exiles, and
the former ineffectually endeavoured to obtain assislance from tlie Persians. As they declined, however,
t o talce part with Sliere Ali, yakub,'nothing daunted
by t h e failurc of his negotiations, collected a small,
band of followers, and, after several smaller engagemelits roulid Hcrat, took that placc by a vigorous
a t t a c k nt the liead of 5,000 men. Many were
attracted by Yakub's gallant achievements to his
fath'er's standard, and i n 1868 11c rcgalncd Candaliar.
L a t e r 011 h e rendcrcd material assistance in the
recapture of Cabul, wlicn Shcre Ali succeeded in
driving out Azirn, who iiad s e i x d the Government
on Afzal's death, ill October, 1867. It was'in September, 1868, that Slicre Ali regaiticd the thronc,
a n d it was allnost directly afterrvards that tlie fa~nous
quarl.cl broke out bctwcen him and his bravc son,
Yakub I<lian, to whosc valiant arm it may bc said
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11c owcd 11is rcstoratio~r. Tlrc Amir appcars t o
linvc bccomc suspiciol~sof Iris son, fearing probably
that his military c;lpncity and reputation might
rcndcr him a daligcroos rival. A t thc same timc
Ynkub discovcrcd tlrat Abdulla Jan's ~notlicrwas
intrigui~rgto sccurc the succcssion to her son, a boy
of tc~ldcr years, but wliosc place in his father's
rcaard wtrs shown b v liis a ~ l ~ o i n t m c nto
t the
Govcrnorsliip of Candaliar, Accordingly Yalcub also
rcsortcd to ilrtriguc with thc vicw of keeping his
hold upon Ilcrat as Covcrnor, and a t t l ~ esame timc

4
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I-Icir-apparent. Slicrc Ali gnvc lli~n no dircct
ansnrcr, anlid Yal;ub Followcd up liis d c ~ n a ~ by
i d others
morc s\vcepi~ig,tnoet of them rclnling to an cnlargcd
share in thc admillistration of t l ~ ccou~itry. I-Iis
fatlicr tcmporiscd by 1na1;ing partial concessions,
which gnvc Yal;ub a voice in thc govcrlrment of the
capital, but nt tlic same time lie stlrrounded liiln with
adhcrcnts of Iris favouritc son, tlrc boy Abdalla Jan.
Undcr tlicsc circutnsta~ices thc position of tlrc bold
a ~ r dambitious Yakub becamc ontenablc. I-Ie perccivcd that ~ ~ o t l i i l l\vo~lld
g
prevent Abdulla Jan's
nomination as l~cir-npparcnt; and in 1870 he fled
fiom Cabul, acco~ripanied by his full brothcr Ayub,
a boy of tliirtcen or fourteen years. Yakub tried
lrard to provol<c a rcbellion against liis father, but
Shcrc Ali's influence ]lad n o n beco~nctoo strong for
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all that his sons could do against it. Yalcub and
his f e w adherents were beaten off from Cal~dahar,
Ghazni, a n d Girishk, and once more he took refuge
i n Persia. I n t h e spring of 1871-this time with
s o m e Persian assistance-Yalcub again laid siege to
Herat, a n d it fell into his hands. Through the
influence of Lord Mayo, father and son became
reconciled. Yalcub presented hi~nselfat Cabul and
t
in September ol 1871
declared llilnsell p e ~ ~ i t e ;n and
h e w a s made Governor of Herat, but with a strong
b o d y of Shere Ali's adherents around him. Yalcub
a n d S h e r e Ali's nominees were never in accord,
Y a k u b endeavouring to keep them from any real
s h a r e iri tlic administration, and they reporting to
C a b u l everything that might turn to Yakub's disa d v a n t a g e . There can be little doubt that Yakub
justified their reports, especially alter the formal
nomitiation ol Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent in 1873.
I-Ie intrigued with the Persians and the Turkoma~ls;
and it is believed that he also asked help of tile
R u s s i a n s to assist 11i1n against his father; but he
failed all round. T h e Amir declined his request to
hold t h e governorship of FIerat in perpetuity, free
f r o m Cabul influence, and in the autumn of
1874 summoncd him to Cabul. Yalcub suspected
treachery, and de~nalideda sale conduct, which was
g r a n t e d . No sooncr, however, liad the young man
arrived in t l ~ ccapital than his lather put him under
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arrest, and lie has been in confinement ever sitlce.
The Indian Goverli~ncntiliterceded with tlie Amir
to spare his life, and to treat hitn well ; but the first
rcquest only was grantcd. Yakub's imprisonment has
been, according to tlie best accoutits, very rigorous ;
and tlie story lias filtered from Cabul into India that
his ir~tellecthas been serioosly affccted by tlie harshness of his tncnttnetlt. YaLub was a tnan of rare
encrgy ant1 tale~lt, but IIC sulfered from tlie disadvantage of ltavi~tg a mother of lo\v birth-a
circutnstancc ~vliicliwill seriorlsly affect liis cliances of
coming to the throne, if cvcn it be i~titruethat lie is
tnsalle, and supposing it possible for Shere Ali to
become reconciletl to him. Captain R~arsli'sinterview
with I'akub at Herat in 1873 1,evealeda not unfriendly
disposition on Yakub's part towards England, and
tlic traveller discovered that Yakub lvas one of tllc
few Afglians rvlio cot~ldspeak English.
We lnay liere shortly notice tlie other sons a ~ l d
nepltews of Slierc Ali, of whom, probably, one will
have to be ~iominatedto succeed tlie deceased youth,
Abdulla J a n , as heir-apparent,
Ayilb I<han, the full brother of Yakub, took no
part in public affairs till he fled wit11 Yakub from
Cabul ill 1870. Tlle two lived togetlier at I3erat till
Yakub set out a n his l~aplcssjourney to Sliere Ali
in 1874; and nheu Ayub heard of his brother's
arrcst, lie endeavoitred to prepare I-Ierat far r e s i s t a t ~ ~ e
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against his father, and to fotnetit a rebelliol~in the
neiglibourliood, a project which failed. A few
months altcrwal~cls lie fled illto Persian territory,
where, meeting one ol tlie Afglia~igenerals who had
bee11 treacher~ousto Yakub's cause, lie endeavoured
to put him to death. Tlie Persians prevented this.
With Yakub's cxample belore him, Ayub declined
Slicre Ali's invitation to return to Cabul, and
we believe that Ayub has cver since livcd in exile.
I-Ie marricd a dauglitcr of Sl~ereAli's half-brother
Aslam, lor whose ~nurder Shere Ali was rnai~ily
responsible.
Atiother claimant to the throne of Cabul is Abdul
Rahman, tlie son o l Sliere Ali's eldest brother Afzal.
Rahman took a very active part in his father's cause
against Slicre Ali, and in the earlier stages o l the
war bctwecn Shere Ali and liis brothers, he displayed
as much military skill as his cousin Yalcnb. I n tlie
end, however, Sliere Ali deleatcd him, atid h e took
r e l ~ ~ gact Tasltkend. For the past five years the
Russians havc given this man £3,000 a year as a
subsidy, so that they may have a nominee o l their
own at hand i l disputes again arise in the Alglian
s~~cccssion,Abdul Ralimati has been to St. Petersburg ; Ile is Lhorougl~lyRussianiscd, is coiisidered a
very ablc man, and Sherc Ali is said to be grcatly in
in the district ol Dalkh.
fear ol liis i~ifli~e~ice
I n nddilion to thcsc Llirec, Yaltub, Ayub, and

1

tliro~icwho does not lie under the clisadvantagc of
having incurred the Amir's l~ostility. This is Alimacl
Ali, a youtl~of scvcntcen, the son of Slicrc Ali's
cldcst son, wlio fell i i ~battle at tlie head of liis father's
army, in 1865,in a hand-to-hand encounter wit11 liis
father's t~nclc,wlio was also left dead on the field.
This young inan has always been in favour with thc
Amir, and would probably havc been proclaimed heirapparent it~stcadof the late Abclulla J a n but lor the
iofluc~~cc
ol the mother o l that prince, 1-Ie is now
consiclcrecl to have the best cliancc of being no~ni~iated
as Slicre Ali's succcssor, Abdulla Jan having died quite
rcccntly, since, indccd, Ll~e project of an English
Mission to Cabul was a i ~ ~ ~ o u ~ ~ c c c l .
Abdul Ral~man'sonly hope is in Russiai~influence.
Even if Yalcob be relcnsed, and found in full possession
of liis laculties after liis long and severe imprisonme~~t,
it is doobtf~~l
wl~etl~cr
the Alghan t~obleswould give
liirn moc11 cordial support, as liis low birth on his
mother's sidc stands it1 the way of liis pop~ilarity
wit11 thc haughty Afghan cliiefs. He is by t l ~ clatest
acco~ll~ts,
however, still i l l prison. I t is 'col~sidercd
unlikely that tlie English Government !vould hcartiIy
support Yalmb, because lie is believed to llave
intrigued with Russia during Iiis latter clays at Hcrat.
We have continued our account of the domestic
affairs of Alghanistan down to the present time.
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Thcre is mucll of importance still to be said of the
foreign relations of the Amir towards Russia and
England, and Lhesc will be considered in the next
and concluding chapters.
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Sllcrc Ali's relations wit11 his Russian and Englis11
~,eighbours for con side ratio^^ alo~lg with tllc widcr
subject of what is called the Central Asian question.
Sir H c ~ l r yRawlinson and other able mctl havc lo).
years been labouring to vender this difficult subjcct
illteiligible to the English rcader. There is naturally
3 fascination about it for Anglo-Indians wllicll lcads
them OII tbrougl~ l o ~ ~and
g too oftell dreary pagcs
crammed TLIII of Oriental names o l mcll and placcs
clressed in such fa~ltastic guises that t h y bccolnc
frequently insoluble pnazles to tl~oscwho arc versed
in Oriental la~lguages,and must bc the most bopc.
lees enigmas to tile ordinary E11glis11madcr.
T l ~ eextremely tecl~nicalnature a t most discourses
011 the Ce11tra1 Asian question llas probably had
mucll to d o wit11 the indiKerence with ivl~icl~
the
Englisl~ people have treated it. They cannot bc
cxpccted to care m~rchabout matters wvi~ich even
experts d o not always seem to unde~stand,and so
tile n e w from India that a new page in the llistory
of h f g l ~ a n foreign politics had bccn opened excitcd
about as mi~cll general interest as if it had bccn
at~nol~ncedthat thc Snltan of Tit~.lreyhad been
deposed and another appointed in his placc.
Those, llowever, \vl~o called to mi~lcl that. Ihc
p r e s e ~ ~ cofe a Russian agent (Viktevitcll) a t Cabul
had bcen one of the proximate causes of our interference in Afghan politics in 1838, :lnd of our

.

. .

sllbsequent disasters, nttncl~cd more imp0l.tnllce to
tile news that General Abramoff had been sent to
Cnbr~lby Gci~clal I<nufin~a~~rl,
a t present 12ussian
Governor-Gcocml of Tashkend, but better lcnown
pcrl~npsas the successful commander in the cxpedition against l<hiva. We have since learnt that the
oficcr scnt in charge of this so-called " commercial"
missioll was General Stolieteff, not Abramoif. We
naturally credited t l ~ cRussians with as much I~ollesty
in s t y l i ~ ~their
g
missioll a "commercial" one as we
ourselves exercised when we scnt Captain (afterwards
Sir Alexa~lder)Uurnes, in 1837, to Dose Muhammad's
Court wit11 n view to gai~li~lghim over as all
ally against 1:usso-l'crsinn ag~ression. We called
Ilurncs's missiorl " coo~mercial," altl~ougl~
i t was
political fronl the lint, and had an object very fim
from fric~~dly
to liussia. BFKO,
we supposed Russia
ruen~ltGc~~ernI
Stolietelf to exercise otller than mere
" co~n~nercial
" functioos a t Cabul. The closing hours
of tlie lost Session of Parliament wcsc harassed by
questions from anxious members as to the truth of
rrports from India wlticl~ spoke of t l ~ eprojected
despatch of an English mission to Catrol to counterof the Russiao envoy. The news
act t l ~ einllue~~cc
of the latter's arrival at Cabul reached us on the r re11
of August. We heard a t the same time that Lord
Lytton had, on tflc 2 ~ 1 l dJuly preceding that,
acldressed letters t o the Amir. T l ~ cRussian mission,
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we now laiow, 11ad rcnclled Cabul it1 June, alter (it is
alleged) Sliere Ali had sllo\v~igreat disinclination to
receivc it. Once, liowcvcr, i n his capital, lie appears
t o have treatcd his unbidden guests well, to have
given tlieln a royal salute, to have llcld a rcview of
his troops in their lionour, and to have sent a mission
of his own to Gcncral I<auKmann iii return. Part oT
tile Russian mission rcmained behind a t Cabul, and
tile rest returned to Tashkcnd with the Afghan
officcrs of thc Amir. W e have lieard plenty of
rumours since of caravans of Russian arms and
ammunition having reached Cabul, and oT Russian
officers swarming into AFgIianistan to drill the Afghan
troops arter tlic most approved European methods.
OT xvlivhnt lias actually passed between thc Amir
and his IZussian visitors we krrow hardly anything,
and we can only conjecture from his c o ~ i d ~ lsince
ct
their arrival whether lie has given ear to their
counsels or not.
T h e rcadcr will scarcely now need to be told that
Tor years past it has been an axiom with most AngloIndian politicinl~s that any interference by Russia
with Afghanistan o u g l ~ tto bc made a subject of
remonstrance and, if necessary, o l war. T h e reason Tor
this state of reeling 118s becn obviously the dread
that if Russia were pcr~niltedto establish hcrselT in
Arglianistan, shc would thcreby be enablccl t o consolidate her poavcr ill Ccl!tral Asia, 1.0 corr~pleteher
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long line or communication with llcr E~lropcnll
provinces, not only through the difficult tracts of
desert and stcppc that now separate Orenburgh from
T a s h k c ~ ~but
d , tliroufi.11the territories of Persia, OVcr
wliich Alcsander thc Great marchcd with so much
apparent ease to India, and so tbreateti our Indian
frontier ill a way that can hardly norv be realised.
Tlic c o ~ ~ s e q u c of
~ ~ Russia's
cc
possession of Afghanistan would, it is believed, bc to put British India in
perpetual clrcad of Russian invasion ; and as Our
Indian fe~~datories
and fellow-subjects are supposed
to bc particularly sensitive to Russophobia, and many
of them, indeed, have beell even credited with a
willingness to gct rid of our yolce altogether a t the
risk of only changing their mnsters, the onc certain
resl~ltof sucli an event would be that a iarge army of
observation would bc requircd to guard OIII. existing
frontier. Thosc who think ~ v care not justified in
extenrlil~gour frontier, even by peaceful negotiation
-bclicving that a still more advanced frootier moi~ld
be still more costly to dcfend-do not deny that if
Russian influence wcre to becolne paramount in
Akhnnistan, IVC should havc to lceep up a larger
European al.my that1 at present in J~idia,
Pew persoils are aware how large a proportion of
tile revclilles of India arc already expended for
military purposes. Tlic Indian army charges for the
current year are estimated a t ~r,$,8oo,ooo,
wliile the
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who\e revellue derivcd from Excise, Custorns, salt
duties, stamps, and land revenue, is rather less than
~;~S,OW,OOO
WC
. tl~i~
sce
s that in India n e a ~ l yonehalf of. tllc taxes arc spent for mllitary purposes ;
w]lile in England, wllich is as rich as India is poor,
tile arrny expenses for tllc currcntycar are estimated
a t ~ 1 ~ , 5 9 5 ; 8or
mless
, than one-fourth of the rever~uc
derived from Customs, Excise, stamps, lst~cl tax,
income tax, and house duty, ~vhiohainounts to abollt
f;66,5oo,ooo. Again, if the results of the army expenditure in England and India are compared, it nrill
be Seen t h a t while the expenditure lor both services
is allnost identical, the strength OF tbc English service
is-regular
army, 128,037 ; army rcserve (first and
second .class), 4 3 , ~ ~nilitia
;
and ~nilitiareserve,
1 ~ 6 , 7 7 ;8and voluutcers and yeomanry, 254,734-0ra
total of 562,545,men. On the other hand, the It~dian
a r m y ~iumbetsonly 62,G~oEuropeat~ and rzj,ooo
nativetroops, or a total of about 188,030 mc~i. T l ~ c
excessive cost of the Indian army-two-thirds of
which is co~nposed of native forces-as compared
rvith t h a t o l England, seems to demand attention,
with a view to a decrease, if possible, lather tllal~an
ai~gmentation.
,
Thus, if we once grant the assumption that Russia
intends, if left alone, to advance her tronticr practically t o the Stilirna~~
'Mollntains and the I<haibnl.
Pass, we cannot avoid the conclusio~~
that such a

proceeditig on her part will involve us in heavy expenditure.

!,

!

If our present frontier were u~iiversallyconsidered
deFensible, 110 one could reaso~iablyhope to persuade
E l ~ g l n ~ ito
d go to war with Russia in order to keep
lier out of Afghanistan. W e d o not ourselves want
that country for its own sake; but the utmost concern
~ v ecould feel with regard to it is that it should either
be independent and friendly, or so under our control as
us by Russia.
i to be prevented From being
- used against
~ h i s en l ~ o regard our preserlt rrofltiel. a s a
sufficiently strong one, or as capable of being made
so, or, a t least, that itis better to put up witli it than
advance it any Ct~rther,object witli great veliemence
to the recent policy of Lord Lytton and the Conse~vativeGovernment as ~~eedlessly
involving us in
complications that may lead to a w a r whicl~tiley tlii~ilc
woulcl l~aveno adequate cause. T o this scliool
belong soell liigl~ a ~ ~ t l ~ o r i t ias
e s Lord Lawrence,
General Sir John Adye, Lords Mayo, Northbrook,
and Napier, and Sir Henry Norman. T o these, Mr.
Fawcett adds t l ~ e Dulce of Wellington, 1,ord
Hardinge, Lord Sandl~urst,Sir I-Ierbert Eclwarcles,
Geueral Nicl~olson, General Ueecher, and General
Reynell Taylor. 011 the other side are ranged S i r
Bartie Frere, the late Governor of Bombay, and,
apparently, the present military advisers of Lord
L y t t o t ~and the Premier.
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k v e have spoken of " the Afghan question " hitherto
if i t were merely one concert~ingthe rectification
of o u r Indian frontier. In doing so we have followed
the l i n e taken by Lord Beaconsfield it1 his speech at
the RIansion Housc on November 9th. Our readers
,"ill remember that on that occasion the Pretniec
:-" S o far as the invasion of India in that
q u a r t e r [meaning on tlic north-westcr~i frontier] is
concerned, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Governm e n t that it is Ilardly practicable. T h e base of
o p e r a t i ~ ~ lof
s any possible foe is so remote, the
communications are so difficult, the aspect of the
c o u n t r y so forbidding, that we have long arrived at
an o p i n i o n that an invasion of our Empire by passing
t h e mountains which form our north-western frontier
is one ~vhichwc need not dread. But it is a fact
t h a t t h a t frontier i s a haphazard, and not a scientific
f r o n t i e r ; and it is possible that it is in the power of
a n y f o e so to embarrass and disturb our dominion
t h a t w e should, under tile circumstances, be obliged
to m a i n t a i n a great military force in that quarter, and,
consequently, entail upon this coootry and upon
I n d i a a greatly increased expenditure. These are
evils n o t to be despised, and, a s I venture to observe,
t h e y have for some time, under various Viceroys and
u n d e r direretltAdtni~~istrations,
occupied the attention
of our statcsrncn. 13ut while our attention was
n a t u r a l l y drawn also to this subject, some peculiar
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circ~~~nstances
occurrctl in t l ~ a t part of the world
wllich i.et~dc~.cd
it absolutely neccssary that wc sl~oulcl
give our immeciiate and carllcst a t t c ~ ~ t i oto
n tllc
sobjcct, and sce \vl~cthcrit was not possible to tcrl n i ~ ~ n t tlmt
c
. absolute inconvenience and possible
illjury, wliicl~ must or would accrue if thc prcsent
stntc of aff;lirs wcrc not touched and considered by
tllc Govcrnmctrt or the Queen. With thesc views we
have taken SIICII mcasorcs as wc tl~inlcwill cf(cct tllc
object mc rcqairc. W ~ C I tl~cse
I
arran~cmcntsarc
n~adc-and I cannot suppose that any co~~sidcrable
time will clapsc bcfore t l ~ c yarc consun~mated-our
north-\vcsteru [rolltier will I I O Iongcr bc a source o f
a n s i c t y to the Englisl~ people. Wc sllall live, I
I~opc,ott gooil terms wit11 our i~nrncdiatc~lcighbours~
and pcpllnl~snot on bad tcrlns wit11 somc neighLours that arc rnorc retnote. B u t , in ~nalcing
t l ~ c s c rc~narks I sl~oulcl be sorry Tor it to be
bclicved that it was t l ~ copinion of I-Icr Majesty's
Govcr~i~ncntthat an invasion of India was impossible or impracticable. On tllc contrary, if Asia
M i n o r and t l ~ e . V a l l e yof tllc Eupllratcs wcrc i n
tllc posscssion of R very weak or of a very powcrf~~l
State, an ailcquate force might nlnrcl~through the
passes or the Asian mountains, througli' Persia, and
a b s o l ~ ~ t cmenace
ly
the empire of the Queen. Wcll,
we hnve foreseen that possibility, and have provided
for ~vllatwe believc will secure its non-occurrence.
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a n d t h e chief mocle by ~vhichwc have providccl Tor
t h a t result is that convention with Turkey or which
yo11 h a v e heard so much, By that convention we
]lave secured that tile regions in qucstiorl sIialI bc in
the ponsession of an ally, and a t thc same time, if IIC
fulfils, a s w e do not doubt he mill fi~lfil,the conditiol~s
of t h a t agrcemcnt, thcy will be in the possession of
an ally supported by subjects whose prosperity every
year will render his ai~tlloritymore firm and valid,
I
e r e c t i n g this result wc ]lave occtlpiecl tile i l a n d '
of Cyprus, in order to encourage 2nd strengthen and
aid tllc Silltall." W e ]lave quoted the wliole pnssngc
rererring t o Afghan affairs, a s it contained tllc most
at1tllo1-itative statement we ]lad l ~ a dgivcn to us up to
that d a t e of the state of our r e l a t i o ~ ~with
s thc Amir.
I t was a n ,important disclosure which infor~neclus
that " t h e A f g h a n question" was one mainly of "a
rectilicatioil of frontier," and not, as t l ~ cEnglisl~
public for some time believed, a quesLioi~of upholcling
the honour of England agninst insult.
W i t h o u t discussing further here the merits and
clcmerits of the rival frontier politics, we continue
our brief review of the negotiationsthat have passed
between t h e -Indian Governrne~~t
and the Amir of
Afghanistan since the dcatl~of Dost Muhammad in
1863. St will be remembered that we 11acl collcluded
a treaty with Dost Muhammad in 1855, by \r'l~icl~
each p a r t y bound himself to respect the integrity of

tllc otl~cr's territories, a treaty wbicli \\,as follo\ved
b y a subsidy or £ro,ooo a lnotith during our war
wit11 Pcrsia, and u11ti1 wc put donzn tllc India11
mutiny. T l ~ cvirtuc clisplaycd by Do'st Mullalnmad
ill abstaining iroln all ilivasiol~ of Norther11 I l ~ d i a
during the mutiny ,of 1857 llas been so loudly Cxtolled of lntc that it is clcsirablc to poilit out to tllose
who ~vouldattril~otcit to cxccssivc gcilerosity on his
part that thcrc werc two very good rcasons why 11c
did not avail himself of tlie opporttinity to stl.ikc a

~vllateasc tile Englisl~liad dctl~rol~cd
him ill 1839,
and lio\v crfect~~ally
wc had avenged our subscquci~t
disasters. Lord Nortl~brool~
has especially rcferred
to Dost hlu11amm;td's rorbcarancc as proof or the
good resolts of col~ciliation. This latter reflection
may l~aveliad quite as lnucl~to do wit11 keeping
him stao~ichas m y fccling of generosity, a sentimc~it
wl~icli hc could hardly bc expccted to ei~tertail~
towards tllc 13ritisli Power.
From tlie dcatl~of Dost Rluhnmlnad to thc year
1868 Arghanistan was t l ~ csccne of interoecioc wars,
a sllort sutnmary of wl~iclihas been given ill the last
chapter. Lord Lawrence was Governor-General
during that period, and as one o f l ~ i ssuccessors in
tile Viceroyalty (Lord Northbrook) said of his policy
the other day, "tnost wisely abstained from all

,

yioudy wit
ai~hhim.
Lord No[
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saying that whoever became ruler of the country
~ v o i ~ be
l d recognised as such by the il~.itisliGovernment." I t was to this abstention on tlie part of
Lord La~vre~ice
from interfelrnce in tlie affairs of
Afghanistan tliat the late Mr. Wyllie, an Indian
civilian whom Lord Northbrook described as "very
able," applied the term "masterly inactivity,"
which so much has been made sioce. The phrase,
however, of masterly inactivity in no ivay applied to
the policy pursued since that day. Indeed, blr.
\Vyllie himself, who liad written the articlc lieaded
" Masterly Inactivity " in the Foufni~ht& Rcvime,
wrote another called "Miscliievous Activity," and
gave the reasons Ire liad to advance against tlie
policy afterwards pursued b y Lords Laxvreiice and
Mayo after the civil war i n Afghanistan had come to
an end. This later policy consisted in cxtcnding to
Shcre Ali, rvho had got the upper hand of his
brothers, that moral support which liad been previously withheld, and o l entering into closer relations
~irithhim. With regard to both these lines of policy
Lord Nortltbrook has recently' given his opinion
tliat they ivere wisely adopted. W l e o the resolve
to recognise Shere Ali was made, Lord Beaconsfield
was Premier and S i r Stafford Northcote Secretary of State for India. Lord Lawrence, however,
resigned office to Lord Mnyo in January, 1869,

before the ncw progralnliic liad beet] carried out.
W c 1;11ow that it included onc of thosc gorgcotls
Statc ccrcmonics ill whicli the Orictitals and Conservative I'rcmicrs arc said to dclight. Lord Mnyo
met Slicre Ali at Alnballa in Rlarel~, and 11ad a
conlerc~iccwith him, surrounded by all the palnp
\rfliicl~attends those viceregal assemblies, and, alter
hearing all tliat Shere Ali wanted, lie decided wliat
he \\'auld give liim, and wliat 11c did not reel it consistcnt wit11 British interests to give Iiiln, and, a s
Lord Mayo lias been cl~allengerla good deal by t h e
IJrcss as to wliat he did, it is o ~ i l yrair to lliln to use
his own words as to w l ~ a the intended to give and
\\,\.hat lic did give on that occasion. H c said on the
1st o r July, r8Gg:-"Whilc
we distit~ctlyintimatcd
lo tile Amir that lll~derIIO circumsta~~ces
should a
British soldier ever cross liis rrontier to assist liim in
cocrcing liis rcbcllious subjects ; tliat 110 European
oficers sl~ouldbe placetl as rcsidcl~tsin 11is cities ;
that no fixed subsidy or money allowance should be
given for any named period ; that no promises of
a s s i s t a ~ ~ cillc otl~erways sl~ould bc made; that IIO
trcaty ~vould bc cntcred into obliging us under a n y
circumstances to recognisc liim and liis descendants
as rulers in Afgl~anistati,wc wcre prcparcd by the
most open and absolute present recognitioo, and b y
cvcry public cvidenee or friendly disposition, of respcct for his cliaractcr, a11rl interest in his fortunes, t o
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a i v e all the moral support in our power, and, in
addition, we were willing to assist l ~ i ~
with
n money,
arms, alnmunition, and native artificers, and in other
ways, whenever we deem it possible or desirable
t o d o so;"
T h r e e mattersin. this declaration specially deserve
notice. First, 1.ord' Mayo promised that no Euro.
pcan oficer sliould be placed it1 Shere Ali's territory
without liis consent. This was o ~ i l yfollowing the
l.equest of Dost filuliammad, who Jlad said, in 1856,
t o Lord Lawrence, "If xve are to be friends, do not
lorce British officers up011 me." The sound policy
of this promise, rvliicl~seemed like a concession, lias
been questioned, but a later Viceroy lias approved of
it, For t h e apparently very good reason that " ~ ~ n l e s s
British officers wcre to be there on good relations,
t h e y would be of no usewhatever." I t most not be
s~rpposed either, that because we were not to have
European officers accredited to Sllcre Ali's Court,
t h e Viceroy would be unrepresented. A native
Envoy has, until the present rupture in our relations with him, ~~ninterruptedlyresided at the
Amir's Court.
Thesecond matter to be observed is the rejection
of a proposal for a treaty guaranteeing liis dominions unconditionally from without.
T h e third point is the refusal of a promise to supp o r t any one 'at liis death ~vliom lie ~niglit have

Rz

Afghrrnistm.
nominatccl Ileir. To liave guaranteed liis dominions
~~nconditionallywould have been to ellcourage
him to attack his i~eiglibor~rs
; a ~ i dto have given
tlic promise to support his tiolninee in obtaini n g tllc "~nasnad" alter liis death would have
beel) to commit ourselves to interrere i n the
do~nesticpolicy of Afghanistan, and against such
interfcre~se~ v chad liad suficient warning in former
ycars.
T o counter-balance our refusal of' tl~cse requests
practical assistance in the shape of motley and war
a
matcrials" was oKered to tlie extent of 12 lalrhs
of rupees (A1 ,200,ooo) in all, besides arms, gons, and
a m m ~ ~ l ~ i t i o rTlie
i , only return wliicl~ the Govcr~iorGcncral expectcCl for this being "abiding confidence,
sincerity, and goodwill."
S i r I-Ic~~ry
Rarvli~iso~~
remarlcs upon this transaction, that Lord Clarendon mayhave bcen"justificd
-in
so (ar as he possessed any lcnoivledge of the
intentions or tlie Indinn Governrncnt-in assuring
Prince Gortscliakoff at I-Ieidelberg that Sir John
Lar1,rencc's policy in assisting Shcre Ali Khan ' liad
no relerencc to tile advances of Russia in Central
Asia ; ' but no onc convc*,sant wit11 tlie negotiations
rvliich preceded the Arnballa Con(ere11ce can doubt
that thcse advances did exercise a very important
influence on the feelings and conduct of the Amir of
~abcl."
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But, however clear and u~lqualified the refusal of
L o r d Mayo to the proposed guarantee and prolnise
of future Support may appear to us now, it is not
certain that, in 1869, Shere Ali did not believe be
h a d been granted more than in fact was conceded.
F o r Lord Mayo did give a written declaration that
t h e British Government "would view wit11 severe
displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to
disturb his position." Coupli~lgthis with Sir John
Lawrence's promise of "practical assistance in the
s h a p e of money and materials of war," to be fur~ ~ i s l l etod him ill the future " at the discretion of the
h e a d of the administration in India," and Lord
Mayo's confirmatory declarations that "any representation he might make would always be treated
w i t h consideration and respect," it is believed Shere
Ali went away understanding these expressions of
general interest in a more liberal sense than they
w e r e meant to convey.
I t is thought, says Sir
H e n r y Ra~vlinson,that he considered "the threat of
' severe displeasure ' to be equivalent to an assurance
of armed support against his allies, while the promised consideration of his iuture demands amounted
in his view, to an almost unlimited credit on the
I n d i a n Exchequer."
Two views of Lord Mayo's proceedings were taken
b y t h e authorities in England. The bolder spirits
would have preferred a bolder policy, to the extent
I3
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of accepting the liability of an armed intervcntion by
giving t l ~ cAmir a direct guarantee of protectioll
against insorsectiot~ and also invasion, talzing dire
advantagc or the favourable positions me should then
have obtaincd to secure tlie Afghan frontiers, and to
estnblisi~our influence permanently in the country.
The Inore cautious statesmen ivitll ~110111the dccision restcd wcre, on tile contrary, of opinion that
Lord hlayo had already gone too fat; the thrcat
of "severe displeasure" against Shere Ali's internal
enemies havine
- .probably committed us to a more
active interference in Afghan politics than had been
contemplated, or suitcd tile interests of India.
Lord Mayo cxpiaincd that, without risking tile
f ~ i l o r eof the wllole sciieme, he could not avoid using
the languagc objecled to, and pointed to the results,
in Shere Ali's strengthened position a t Cabul, as the
best justilication of his policy.
0 1 1 the very day of tlie U ~ n b a l l aConference a
very important correspondence on Central Asian
affairs was cotnmenced between Lord Clareudon, the
British Porcign Minister, and the Russian Government. This had for its object the demarcation of
rvl~athas been calicd " a neutral zone" of territoly
between the frontier of ut~doubted British and
Russian dolninions. T h e suggestions for laying
clow~ls o c l ~a zone sprang from the anxiety to allay
the.increasing disquietude of the Native States along
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tlle north-west .frontier of India, ~vlvhicl~
was caused by
tllc persistent approaches of Russia. The Govern1,ent of Lord M a y o regarded the proposal allnost as
attack on t h e i r independent action; but Lord
Claendon seems to have really tlvhougl~t it desirable
in the interests of both Governments to have a
lleutral zone. T l l e great objection to suc11 an
arrangement would b e that it would make either
power responsible t o the other for its dealings with
tile peoples inhabiting theirfrontiers, many of whom
chastiselneht for marauding attacks on
. oftell require
.
the subjects of t h e great Powers. The correspondence dragged its slow length along, cl~aracterised
by some geographical errors not creditabie to our
Foreign Office, u n t i l 1872, when Her Majesty's
Government notified t o Russia the extent of territory which Shere A l i claimed on the Upper Oxus,
and to which they were prepared to recognise his
right. I n expressing t h e boundaries native authority
had to be followed, for we lcnew little or nothing of
the bend of the river Oxus to the i~orth\vard,.or of
the upper feeders from Pamir. Thus it was not
defined which of the feeders was the main stream of
the Oxus, and so f o r a time i t seemed that part of
\Vakhan had been abandoned to Russia. Subsev e n t inquiries seem t o show that the feeder entitled
to be considered the main stream really forms the
110,rthernbollndary of that province. The territories
13-2
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tllus indicated as belonging to Afghanistan wcrc t11e11
fortnally dcclarcd by Prince GortclialcoCI to bc " complctely outside tllc spllere withiu whicl~ Russia
might be callcd to cxercise her influcnce." The
Russian bou~ldary line is tllcrefore that of her
depcndcncics, ICllokarid and 13okhara, and is contcrminous with the frontiers of Dadaklishan and
\Vakhan, whicll were concedcd by Russia to bclo~lg
to tltc Amir. We !nay liere briefly refer to the
Russian conquest of IChiva in 1 8 7 3 This cxpeditior], says Rawli~lson,"affords an apt illustration of
tlte ~~orrnal
course of Russian progrcss in the East!'
I t resulted in the anncsation of a large cxtcnt of
tcrritory to the Russian E~npirc,and reduced I<hiva
to n pericct state of vasselagc, and tl~usfillally
sccured acccss to tliosc strategic lines across the
Stcl~pe,Ivliich were cssc~ltial to Russia's furthcr
progress, ancl whicl~ had beco, in rack, t l ~ cprimary
object of tlie expedition.
Dut the importance to 111dia of tlie Kl~ivaucampaign, and its results, pcrlrnps, chiefly lics in thc
remarkable light thrown by them up011 Russian
diplomacy. More notable instances of repudiation of promises could scarcely be found in modern
history than those given by Prince Gortchakoff ill
tlie course of the representations that passcd between
him and the British Foreign Oflice.
I<lliva had been mentioned during the earlier

1 : : : ~ 5 j . l l t /I
. . . ..

--">'it:.,.lj
,-.
;:, 1
t
.:: ...:z:t. cf l < g : ~ - i . ~ n
.
: :I :
~ 11;11
.
:
- I>CZ.lU!
. i
. 1 . 1 lie!
1.:
K-~+si.xv.tt,.tfcl t11f
...
:. r.!:r fc.r < x i I r . ~
..
,
:; : I t ! 1:ll~Il
:>,:fi>:of the L-z<>r
..-....,,
; .;,.. .' b,.lt . t ~ l < I ~
.r.. :-. 1 \$-<>::I,lvcly (
:
.::\..kxd
c,h:.iY~lcd Y
-.
.~.
.
/.-.shoulcl
..-.--,>-.
.. . . < r the Ul)l>cr(
. , b.2 p>25<<l.t3
cf I
i11tc1
,. . . x , i a ckfir~itcs'
,
.
.c
at S t .
.:,.,:'llL.o:l ,?!I t h e
..,-: 5.: RKI:.
:i:ui Gw
:1
n~ilitaq
. .
,.,,.
:--<.!, l:.;<.rco\rcr,
:.., f.:tl:;r c s t e ~ l s i o
.;<:.c (.;GI tc113ko:
-:t:c,-.
e:<cIain~c
.. ..
':,; .-,
tllc $
i . . :.:-.:
thzt a n
. ..
:.: .J, I :!1311 ' 2 n d ~

.

.

.

>

.

.,..,

...-

-then
zon1llssia
Thc
her
conand
:long
the
pedi)n of
:ast!'
It of
Zhiva
~lally
r the
rtlier
mary
camI thc
lssian
tudia3dcm
>ff in

Rftssin?~Adnnnce Enshun&.

'97

negotiatiolls in 1869 that aimed at making the Oxus
the limit of Itussian influence. T h e Russian Ambassador in Locidon had objected to that river being
the boundary, because it would include a portio~l
of IChiva which lies to thc south of the OXUS,
and Russia woulcl then be dcbarrcd from p u ~ ~ i s l ~ i n g
tlic ruler for outragcs on Russian subjects. Lord
Clarcnclon, Lhc English Foreign Minister, admitted
tlic right of thc Czar to punish thelChan "on his owl1
territory," but added this important proviso :-"That
England would rely on thc honour of Russia, as soon
as shc had obtaincd reparation, again to revert to the
armngelncnt, should shc have assented to it, and
considcr thc Uppcr Oxus as the boundary which was
]lot to bc passed." Shortly after that convcrsation
rumours of an intcl~dcd expedition against IChiva
nssunicd n dcflnitc shape, and Sir A. Buchanan, our
Ambassador a t St. Pctersburg, questiocled Prince
~ o r t c l i a l ~ o fOII
f the subjcct. T h c Chancellor denied
Illat tllc 12ussia11Govcrnmcnt had any intention " to
dcspatcll a niilitaly expedition to Khiva." H e
rleclnrcd, inorcover, that " hc would never consent to
any fllrthcr cslcnsion of the territory of the empire."
11 I'rince
Cortcl~akoWslanguage was so apparently
sincere," csclnimcd Sir A, I3uclianan, "that, notwit\istanrling ihc strong grounds which exist for
I,elicving t11:lt an cspedition is preparing agaillst
I<lliva, I sl~nllcndcavour " to believe evcl-y word the

Russian Cl~a~lcellor
has said. I n the course of some
il~rtlierconversation on the ICIiivan qiiestion in June;
1870, Prince Gortchalcoff assured tlie English
Ambassador that " lZussia neither required nor
desired to possess the khanates." Ichokand atld
Bokhara, he said, were ready to act according to her
wishes, but Khiva was still disposed to be hostile.
Nevertheless, a t the same moment, Russia was
secretly preparit~gan expcclition to I<liiva ; while as
to Bokliam, within hvo months of the last-mentioned
date Russia toolc the important Bokliarian fortress
of Shahr-i-subz (August 24, 1870). But the promises
about Ichiva still vent on.
I n June, 1871, it was admitted that an expedition
llad been thought of, but we mere assured that it
would not take place. I n March, 1872, tlie Director
of tlie Asiatic Departmcnt at St. Petersburg (M.
StremooukoK) admitted that reconnaissances had
been already made against I<hiva, and that the
Russian generals had found "tlie occupation of the
place would offer no strategical difficulties." In
summing up the result of his conversation with M.
StremooukofC, Lord Augustus Loftus wrote :-" I
have gained the conviction that an expedition
soon as the weather and circumstances permit."
S i x or seven months later the Russian papers
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announced that the expedition had been prepared,
but M. Westmann denied (in September) that
measures had advanced to s ~ ~ cal istage. He, however, practically admitted that if the IChan interfered
with commerce, and refused to give up the Russian
prisoners, the Russian Government would punish
him. A s the winter advanced evidence increased of
thc Russian intention to send a force against I<biva.
Tlie subject came up, as we have already described, in
tlie celebrated intcrview between Cottnt SchouvaloK
and Lord Granville. Tlie Russian representative
admitted that an. expedition was dccidcd upon for
the spring, but declared that both its composition
and its objects would be insignificant. The force
would consist of " but four-and-a-half battalions,"
and its objects would be " t o punish acts of
brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, aiid to
teach tlie I<han that such conduct on his part c o ~ ~ l d
not be continued. Not only," continued Count
Schouvaloff, "was it far from tlie intention of the
Emperor to take possession of Ichiva, but positive
orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditiotls imposed should be
such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged
occupancy of I<liiva." I t was not long before the
departure of tlie expedition gave an opportunity for
testing the veracity of one of Coulit Schouvaloff's
bromises. The insignificant force of four-and-a.half
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battalions grew into three columns, which altogether
numbered about ~ o , o o omen, and was accompanied
by forty guns. On June 10, 1873, Ichiva fell, and
the time came for fi~lfillingthe second of Count
Schouvaloff's engagements. The treaty which was
imposed upon the Khan, in face of the Russian
promise to make no territorial accessions, bestowed
on Russia the whole of the Ichivan territory on the
right banli of the Oxus. Besides thus taking possessioil of a large extent of country, the treaty
prepared the way for the entire absorption of the
khanate, if Russia were so minded. I t imposed an
enormous indemrrity, the payment of which extended over nineteen years ; it extorted a declaration
from the Ichan of Russian suzeraitlty, and a renunciation of thc right to maintain dipIomatic relations
or enter into treaties with the rulers of neighbouring
khanates. Russia also obtained excIusive control of
the navigation of the Oxus, and the right to estabIish
cominercial buildings on the left banli of the river.
Lord Granville, when the treaty was communicated
to him in January, 1874, merely replied, in cold and
measured terms, that " Her Majesty's Government
saw no practical advantage in examining too
minutely how far the Khivan arrangements were
i n strict accordance with the assurances given by
Count Schouvaloff as to the intentions with which
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rebuke," says Sir Henry Rawlinson, " seems to have
ranltled somewhat in the hearts of the Russian
statesmen, who, however, did not coildescend to any
apology or explanation further than by calling their
acquisition of territory on the right bank of the
Oxus ' sterile and onerous,' and contrastiilg its disadvantages with the brilliant position they might
have gained had they yielded to the pressing invitation of the IChail that they should place a garrison
in the town of I<hiva." Lord Granville, however,
proposed another arrangement. He declared the
necessity of " a clcar and franlc understanding"
as to the relative position of British and Russian
interests in Asia, but suggested no definite plan
for the attainment of that object further than
t o reco~nmend another pledge from Russia not to
take Merv nor interfere with the independence of the
Amir of Afghanistan. Lord Granville's moderation
proved very agreeable to the Government of St.
Petersburg.
Prince Gortchaltoff expressed his
" entire satisfaction" at the "just view which Lord
Granville had talten." " In my opinion," he exclaimed, " the understanding is complete." All that
was required, according to his opinion, for the future
agrecmcnt of the two Governments was a spirit of
mutual goodwill and conciliation. The understandillg between thc two Powers rested " not only upon
the loyalty of thc two Governments, but up011 mutual
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political advantages." As a proof of this loyalty, he
repeated "the positive assurance that the Imperial
Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan as entirely
beyond its sphere of action." This was in January,
1874.
I t is necessary here to follow in some detail the
advances of Russia in Central Asia since the fall of
Khiva. The most important event, perhaps, in her
progress eastwards has been the subjugation of the
Yomdt and Goklan Turkomans. This has pushed
her frontier on towards Merv, a large city and a
strong strategical position, which was supposed to be
her next object. Shere Ali, alarmed at the reported
advance upon Merv, as well as by the example of the
Khivan Expedition, had sent his confidential agent
in September, 1873, to wait on the Viceroy (Lord
Northbroolr) at Siinla to discuss the general questioil
of the Indo-Afghan relations.
I n those negotiations it is curious to observe that
the Amir treatcd the safety of Afghanistan as essentially necessaly to the safety of India, and he proposed that the British Government should assist
him with money and arms. Money he had already
received to the extent of two lalrhs of rupees, and
lle was now pro~nisedten lalrhs in addition, as well
as ro,ooo Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles. But it
soon appeared that these large grants did not satisfy
the Amir's wants. H e evidently thought it the duty
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of ~ n g l a n dto supply him with whatever he deemed
necessary to malte Afghanistan secure from invasion.
He dreaded a liussian advance upon Merv, and he
wished to -make this country'responsible for protecting him against the consequences of that advance
being continued to Herat. The English Governm e n t showed no unwillingiiess to accept a considerable share of the duty which the Afghan ruler
desired to place upon them. I t was declared that
a i n the event of any aggression from without, the
~ r i t i s hGovernment would in all .probability afford
material assistance in repelling an invader," and
L o r d Derby stated in the House of Lords (May 8,
1874) that " i t was highly probable this country
would interfere" in tlle case of any attack upon the
independeilce of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the
negotiations with the Amir did not progress favourably. T h e chief obstacle to a definite course of
action arose from the refusal of Shere Ali to enter
i n t o reciprocal engagements. I l e declined to accept
a proposed survey by English officers of the frontier
which he considered to be exposed to Russian
attack ; and he was equally indisposed to permit the
presence of Residents at Cabul, Herat, or Candahar,
wbom the English Government desired to place there
i n order t o prevent this country from undertaking
a n y measures on behalf of Shere Ali without
knowing why. From that period we may date the
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defection of Shere Ali fi-om the English alliance.
Shortly after the Simla conference had revealed to
the Amir that England considered some return for
her responsibility necessary on his part, we find him
in communication with General Icaufmann. That
officer was wise enough t o express horror at the
rebellion of Yakub Ichan, which naturally pleased
the Amir better than our intercession in the young
Prince's behalf. But all the timc that Gpnprnl Tcauf----:re Ali, Prince
maim was thus coquettiilg with S11~
Gortcllaltoff was
1,:~ n v n c
y,u,nises to have
nothing to do with Afghanistan.
rr-l
For althougll the '.
last omcial
correspondence which
the Eilglish Governmel~thas thought: fit to publish
datcs as far back as January, 1874--when Prince
Gortchakoff replied to Lord Gramrille's reinonstrance about Khiva-we have r'
- - - - from time to
gediled
time through the Indian, Gcrma,., ,,,, Russian Prcss
some informatioil as to the cours-c o-'
--r events."
" Thus
in the summer of 1875, wllen it -was
1
- - 3-upposed
that a
Russian expedition directed against tll e Turlcomans
would seize Icizil Arvat, as a step towards Merv,
i t was also declared by an Indian nlewspaper that
Russia had pledged herself not t o extend. her terntory in the direction of the Atrelc river."t
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Within a few weeks of that engagement we had
news of a scientific exploring expedition, starting
from ICrasnovodsk to "the old bed of the Oxus."
Instead, however, of its having that innocent object,
it turilcd out to be a Cossack force from Chikisliar,
along the course of the Atrek, which succeeded in
obtaining thc submissioll of certain tribes in the
n c i g h b o u r h ~ ~of
d that river and the Simbar. This
was in 1875, and other expeditions followed in 1876
and 1877. All this time the Russian Government,
nccordi~~g
to their semi-official journals, were endeavouring to restrict General Lomakin's operations,
and it camc with surprise upon this country in 1876
that in thc course of that year a small Russian
expedition l ~ a dactually reached ICizil Arvat. That
demonstration, however, seems to have been no
more than a recoilnaissance ; but in the following
year a new expedition, consisting of 4,000 men,
marched in the same direction. Beyond the
ailnouncement that the force reached Icizil Arvat,
thc ltussiail newspapers threw no light upon its
operations. Current reports, which were probably
true, rcprcscnted that General Lomakin suffered a
severe defeat, and this was ultimately admitted by
aMucnts of that river, to the north of which the Simbar is one,
:~nd she also claimed the Yomuts inhabiting those valleys as
her su1)jects. Little regard, however, has been paid by Russia
to this claim, as she has established a military post on the
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the Rzrsskz' Mil.. The information supplied by the
Indian Press respecting these expeditions indicates
that the Russian endeavour t o advance towards Merv
was not overloolted by the Viceroy and his Council.
These were the days of Lord Salisbury's appeals to
large-scale maps, and he seems to have rejected all
proposals that may have been made by the Indian
Government for counteracting Russian enterprise
against the Turkomans and Merv. I t may be that
the Indian Secretary received some assurailces from
the Russian authorities that Merv was not to be
interfered with, and that 11is simple faith in Russia's
promises was undisturbed. Indeed, an Allahabad
paper recently announced that in 1876 Prince
Gortcllakoff added one Inore to the long series of
pledges "to regard Afghanistan as remaining outside t l ~ esphere of Russia's action."
Meanwhile, Russia's advance was being continued
in Bolchara and I(ho1cand. IChokand had become
Russian territory, and the last remnants of Bolthara's independence had been destroyed. Although
the Czar and his Chancellor had professed to regret
the conquest of the northern portion of Bokhara,
ancl had even promised to restore Samarkand to the
Amir of Bokhara, yet, in 1873, they compelled him
to enter into a treaty, b y which he virtually placed
his country in the possession of Russia.
The course of procedure wit11 regard to Khokand
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was exactly similar. I n that case also there were the
professed regrets at the cruel llecessity of annexing a
portion of the territory. There were the same promises that the terms of Russian advance in that:
region hacl been reached, and that what was left
should be independent. Nev~rtheless,on the 7th of
February, 1876, the portion of the country that had
been suffered to remain undcr the rule of I<hudayar
Khan was annexed, and received the name of Fergbana, its feudatory State of Icarateghin being alolle
left in a conditioil of semi-independence.
Russia has thus, by means of her recent conquests,
obtained the choice of three routes by which she can
advance upon the Afghan frontier from the Oxus.
These are-first,
from Charjui through Merv to
Herat ; second, from Icarshi to A~ldlthui;and,
third, by Ichoja Salih ferry to Ballch and the
Bamian Pass. She would then have the Oxus, with
its steamboat service to and from Lalte Aral, for
her base and source of supplies. I t is certain, also,
that she would be able to greatly strengthen her
position in Turltestan in the course of a few years, if
allowed to do so, by railways through Persia, connecting the Russian possessions on the Oxus directly
with the ports of the Blaclr. Sea. There are several
such schemes at present i?z ?zz~ljibv.s,but capable o f
development, if opportunity offers. The most feasible
of these seems to be the proposal to make a railway
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from Batoum on the Black Sea, wl~ichhas now become a Russian port, to Erivan, Tabriz, and Teheran,
thus passing through the eastern extremity of Armenia and the Persian provinces of Azerbijan, Ghilan,
and Mazanderan. This would have to be continued
through Khorasan for another seven or eight hundred miles, to connect Batoum with Herat.
The Russian system of railways ends at present at
Orenburg, and no scheme of continuing it through
Ichiva to Merv has been suggested but may be regarded as purely imaginary. But the expectations
that have been raised by mooting these schemes
are altogether extravagant. Persia is miserably
poor, and no railway such as the one suggested
would pay. It is doubtful, too, wllether Russia, after
the late exhausting war, has any means of raising
the enormous sums that such gigantic undertakings
would require. Her hold on the newly-conquered
provinces of Turlcestan will require to be further
strengthened, and her administration more fully
organised, before such schemes will commend themselves t o her own or foreign capitalists; even were
she to attempt to raise the necessary funds by
guaranteeing a remunerative rate of interest, after
the example set by the Indian Government.
That she is disposed to be inactive in Central
Asia is negatived by the recent events there. Long
before the Congress met a t Berlin, and while the
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,question of peace or war between Russia and England seemed to be trembling in the balance, preparations, we now Itnow, were being made to strike
a blow, or, at Icast, to create a diversion, in the
direction of India, England's most vulnerable
quarter. No sensible person cah blame Russia for
taking such a step in what she may have fairly
deemed to be her best interests, but nothing is surely
gained by denying that she had, or could have, any
hostile intentions towards England by any movelnents of troops in Asia. If, as is now fully believed,
an expedition was being concentrated, as early as
April, 1878, at I<rasnovodslt, on the Caspian, with
the ostensible object of attacking the Tekkeh Turltomans, and of seizing Merv, no one acquainted with
the importance attached by the Indian Government
to Merv as the last stage towards Herat, which is
regarded as " the Gate of India," can wonder that
this movement appeared to Anglo-Indian politicians
as intended to be a demonstration against India.
I<izil Arvat, which is the half-way house, so to
speak, to Merv, has been captured ; but we have
no intelligence whether the Krasnovodslt column
has advanced beyond that place. Some persons
are assured that it returned immediately after the
signature of the Berlin Treaty was known at St.
Petersburg. Other reports state, however, that on
the very day the Berlin Treaty was signed the
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Russian envoy was directed to advance to Cabul,
and that: the I<rasnovodslc column is still hovering
about Merv.
Accurate information is still wanting as to the real
movements of these troops, but it is stated that it
was a part of the Russia11 plan that the I<rasnovodsk
column sl~ould act in co-operation tvitll the army
whose movements accompanied the progress of the
Russian envoy to the Afghan capital. The Eastern
Turl~estanforces are said to have numbered about
~E;,ooomen. There were three columns, but only
one or two at the most reached tlie neigllbourhood
of the Upper Oxus. The Tz~rhesta~zGazette announced that Samarlcand was to b e tlie rendezvous
of the principal column. The right wing was to
conceiltrate at a fort: opposite Ichiva and march
to Charjui, to operate, no doubt, with the Icrasnovodsk column against Merv. The left wing was to
b e established in Ferghana. How far these three
columns advanced soutl~wardswe have no intelligence. Three months ago the statement was current
that the Ferghana column had suffered disaster. St.
Petersburg telegrams indicated that the central or
Samarlcand forces penetrated farther tllan either of
the otllel- two columns ; and there is strong reason
for believing that the main body of the army
reached Kal-shi, and that the advanced guard even
touched the Balkh fords of the Oxus. The intelli-
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gence of this rapid advance was followed by announcements in the St. Petersburg papers that the
Eastcrtl Turkestan army had been recalled, and
directly afterwards we had news of the reception of
a Russian mission at Cabul. We have no more
trustworthy ground for believing that the Russian
forces have been recalled in their march upon
the Oxus than paragraphs in the St. Petersburg
papers.
T11e news of the arrival at Cabul of a Russia11
Envoy seems, at last, to have roused the English
Cabinet to a sense of possible danger. The Russian
Foreign Office was, therefore, interrogated as to the
illtentions of General Icaufmann; and so recently as
July last, when General Stolieteff was already on
Afghan territory, when a part of the Turkestan army
was a few miles from the Afghan frontier, and the
Kras~lovodsk column was in full march on Kizil
Arvat, a specific pledge was given that Russia had
no intention to send an Envoy to Cabul, or to direct
an army against the Turkomans.
The story of Russian advance is not yet complete.
Her last annexation, as we have stated, was that of
Kholcand in 1876, but her most recent maps show a
yet further advance ; for she has absorbed a large
part of Icarateghin, and brought her frontier across
the Pamir steppe to within I50 miles of Cashmere.
This extension of territory is at present, probably,
I 4--2
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ollly on paper, but its importance, if effectually made,
is ilidicatcd best by stating that it is a direct advance
towards the valley of Chitral, from ivliicli the
Baroghil and other passes lead into Cashmere.
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CHAPTER X.
THE AFGHAN POLICY OF THE LAST TWO
VICERO YS.
Resum6 of Lord Northbrook's Negotiations with the Amir-Proposal to
Permit Sir D. Forsyth to Return througll Afghan Tcrritory Negatived
-The "Grievances " of Shere Ali-Sir Lewis Pelly's Conference with
the Afghan Agent in 1876-The
Occupation of Quettah-Lord
Lytton's Letters to Shere Ali-The Englisll Envoy at Ali MusjidRepulse of the Mission-False Account Sent to England-Question of
Peace or Wnr Reverts to Consideration of Neccssity of " Rectification " of Frontier-Is Refusal to Receive English Officers an Insult?Rawlinson's Opinion of England's Policy in the Presence of Russian
Agents nt Cabul-Policy of English Cabinet in Sending an Ullimatunz
to Shcre Ni-Lord Northbroolc on the Conduct of Russia and the
Amir-And on Sir James Stephen's View of the Amir's " International"
Rights.

WE have now considered a t some length the advances made by Russia since the Indian Mutiny in
the countries round the Oxus. It remains to bring
up the account of our relations with Shere Ali
Khan, Amir of Afghanistan, to the present time.
We have shown l~ow,in 1873, when the agent of
Shere Ali visited Lord Northbrook a t Simla, he
made what seemed then to be extravagant demands,
and declined to enter into reciprocal engagements.

We pointed out, too, that, shortly after the Simla
Conference, 1v11en lie found England wanted a p i d
p r o q7lo in return for the subsidies and protection she
was willing to give, that p z l i d p r o g ~ otaking the
form chiefly of the receptio~lof an English Envoy
a t Cabul, Shere Ali entered into a correspondence
1vit1i General Kaufmann, the Russian GovernorGenera1 of Tashkend
Lord Northbroolc, in his exposition of his own a n d
his predecessor's policy, at a public dinner at Winchester, on November rzth, 1878, gave the following
explanation of the refusal of Shere Ali to receive
English officers, and, as the point is important, we
quote his statement a t Ieagth. After disclaiming
any idea of discussi~lgmatters that the Governme~lt
might wish to lteep secret, lle co~ltiiluedas follows :" On one matter I may say a word without any indiscretion, and that is about European officers; a n d
here I would refer to Sir Douglas Forsyth and his
suggested return to India through Afghanistan. I
saw the Prime Minister of Sliere Ali in 1873, feeling
t
when it would b e
as I did that occasiolls ~ n i g h arise
of great advantage that English officers might b e
sent through Afghanistan, particularly as there were
some questions about the frontier which we desired
to have know11 in the interests of Afghanistan b y
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British officers. I desired the Foreign Secretary of
the Goveniment to consult with the Prime Minister

--

--rc

~f

_-------

.

Sbcrc nli t o a

t a receive ~ ~ ~ g

co,fidentia
Shere A
c~.,-<lead; ther

ZZ.I'.J a

-

ab:

iR.?yl-

t X 2 1 7 n ra
,

knoxVn .

*r~:e:Insir

.1

of (
r:fcrcnce
to
<a3xl, spealcir
ti:-- I;,itish Gov
>*_.i.;iGc
:n ir2rtai1l place
t::2 z\nlir 111igl
:::,,ppr~hellslo
t:-...: Afghans
....:~:d; ~ t lidea
U:,,.~y~ n prec
c;.i~r: \\.as a s
,\,xi,
enterin
s:ritisb Gover
:.>ctlrcr S i r C
t l a ~ i i ~ gAfgll
ll
regretted
. .
tlla
;:vIng as a re
8.

h'irionei M'D

1 AfgI1a11s
~
c;.xsiderable
dined h i m ti

5

Recent Afghna Policy.
the Simla
nted a quid
~tectionshe
taking the
lish Envoy
espoildence
Governor[is own and
ier at Winle following
to receive
:portant, we
disclaiming
;overnment
follows :t any indish e r s ; and
yth and his
lanistan. I
873, feeling
it would be
s might be
there were
we desired
hanistan by
Secretary of
ne Minister
'

t

\I

- ...

of Shere Ali to ascertain whether he would be likely
.
-.to recerve anglish ofhcers if he was asked to do so,
and a confidential cominunicatioll toolc placc accordingly. Shere Ali's Prime Minister of that time is
now dead; therefore I can see no impropriety in
making known his opinion. This is the opiilion of
the Amir of CabulJs Prime Minister in 1873, in
reference to the stationing of British officers in
Cabul. Spealciilg as a friend, and in the interest of
the British Government, he could not rccornmend a
specific request being made to station British officers
in certain places. Such a demand, however friendly
the Amir might be, would give rise to distrust and
misapprehension. The reasons he gave were that
the Afghans were deplorably ignorant, and entertained a n idea that a deputation of British agents is
always a precursor to annexation. H e also said
there was a strong party in Cabul opposed to the
Amir entering into intimate relations wit11 the
British Government. Soon after that. the question
whether Sir Douglas Forsyth should return to India
through Afghanistan, or not, came up, and the Amir
regretted that he could not be allowed to return;
giving as a rcason that shortly before a British officer,
Colonel MiDonald, had been shot on the frontier by
the Afghans-a circumstance which had occasioned
considerable inconvenience to the country, and ,inclined him to say that he could not be answerable

\

for the safety of any English officers. I felt I had
no right under the circumstances, and under the
assurances which had bcen given by Lord Nayo that
British officers should not be sent against the opinion
of the Amir, to consider that any offence had been
committed against the British Government."
There is no doubt, however, that Shere Ali sullted,
and refused, indeed, for a time to take the very 11andsomc subsidy of ~ 1 2 0 , 0 0 0and 15,ooo rifles which
were offered him.
The Amir's "grievances," which began with our
recognising his brother's before his own accessioil,
and were increased by our refusing in 1869 to guarailtee the succession to his domillion of Abdulla Jan,
his favourite son, received an addition in 1871 in the
result of an arbitration which the Indian Government
had uildertaItetl between Persia and Afghanistan concerning the boundary of Seistan. T h e result was a
compromise, which, as often happens, was satisfactory
to neither party, and Shere Ali resented it deeply as
an infringement of his sovereignty, which, as he
erroneously held, the Indian Government was bound
to preserve unimpaired. Again, in 1875, in return
for courtesies shown by the Ruler of Waltham, a
vassal of Shere Ali, towards the British Mission to
Yarkand, a .letter and gifts were sent by the Viceroy
without previous reference to the Amir. This
Shere Ali resented as another breach of his sove-
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reignty. But the supposed slight was manifestly
nothing worse thatl an oversight! and if our diplomatic relations with Cabul had been in a more satisfactory condition, it would never have occurred.
Sir Lewis Pelly's conference with Shere Ali's
agent at Peshawar in 1876 is the only other cominunication the Indian Governlneilt has had with the
Amir until the recent one with reference to Sir
Neville Chamberlain's intended mission. What
passed at the Peshawar Conference is not ltnown, the
British Government not having thought fit to malce
it ltnown yet to Parliament or the public. Mr. Gladstone, Lord Lawrence, and others, have complained
of the delay in doing so, as it prevents the possibility
of a sound opinion being formed on the merits or
demerits, the wisdom or unwisdom, of the recent
policy of the Indian Government."
But it is understood that Sir Lewis Pelly was
authorised b y the Viceroy (Lord Northbrook) to
offer to the Amir's envoy the treaty and guarantee
which Shere Ali had previously sought in 1869 and
1573, on the conditibn that British officers should
have access to points of the Amir's frontier exposed
to Russia. I t was not, however, proposed to establish
a British agent at Cabul, for it was already lcnown
that such a proposal would prove unacceptable to
the Amir. T h e conference proved abortive. Shere

* See Publishers' Note prefixed.
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Alils ellvoy recapitulated the grievances of wl~icllhis
sovereign complained, but suggested no way of
removing them, or of establishing better relations;
a t the same time, though he professed to have
no authority to conclude a definite treaty, he
declared that Shere Ali held the British Government pledged under any circumstances to protect
his territory. We must assume, however, that he was
left in no doubt, when the confereilce came to an
end, as to the view ~vllichthe Indian Government
tool\: of its own obligations towards Afgl~anistan.
The occupation of Quettah has been the last of
the Amir's " grievances " which we have caused to
exist. I t 11ad for years been contempIated as necessary to the security of our position in India that we
should com~nandthe entrance to the Bolan Pass.
Qucttah is not in Afghail territory, but is in Baluchistail, and.we occupied it in 1876 with t l ~ efull consent
of the IChan of Relat, to whom it belongs. T11e
Amir does not seem to have objected to our policy
of making Quettah an advanced military post before
it was accomplislied, but now heis said to have made
it a grouild of complaint.
All we need say here of Lord Lytton's most recent
action is that he sent letters to the Anlir aImost
directly after the news reached him of .the reception
of a Russian mission demanding that an English
mission should be also received. The death of Ab-
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dulla Jan, the heir-apparent, having occurred before
an answer was received, Lord Lytto1-1 despatched a
second letter, stating that the English mission would
be delayed till the days of inouriling were over. On
the z ~ s September,
t
no answer having been received
from Cabul, General Sir Neville Chamberlain advanced, according to orders from Simla, into the
Rhaibar Pass.
The followiilg account of what passed on that
occasion is talren from the Piolzeer,a newspaper
which is sometimes spoken of (with what truth we
cannot say) as the organ of the.Indian Goverment:
"On the afternoon of Friday, t l ~ ezoth, everything
having been rcady for a move for some days, i t was
announced that orders to march to Jamrud would
probably be issued about midnight. Accordiilgly at
I a.m. the word came ; tents were struck, camels and
mules loaded, and long before daybreak: the escort,
with the whole impedimenta of the Mission, saving
only the personal baggage of Sir Neville Chamberlain
and his staff; were on the move. Many of your
readers may Itnow the road from Peshawar to Jamrud, beyond which it has been given to few to pass.
For the first three or four miles it lies due west,
through rich cultivation and groves of young sissoo
trees, to Burj-i-Hari Singh, a tower where a picket
under ordinary circumstances warns peaceful travellers that if they venture further west it is at the risk

Afg/lnjtisi?zn.
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of their lives. Beyond Burj-i-Hari S i ~ i g ha bare,
gravelly desert stretches to the foot of the IChaiber
I-Iills, some seven or eight rniles off. Three miles
from tllc mouth of the Pass lies the half-ruined fort
of Jamrud, a somewhat picturesque structure, lying
just inside Uritish territory, and held for us by the
chief of a village in the neighbouring plain. Just to
the east of its cri~mbliligtowers our not very pretentious camp was pitched. The total nuinber of souls
with tlie Mission amounted to sotnething under a
thousand, of \vhom eleven were Britisli officers, four
native gentlemen, and 234 fighting men, natives of
the escort. Tlie rest were camp-followers, includillg
over 200 people, catnel-drivers and others, belonging
to tlie Commissariat, which carried nine days' rations
for man and beast. Tlie carriage consisted of 315
camels, about a50 mules, and 40 horses. The whole
would have formed a carf~ke
coilsiclerably over a mile
in length. Conflicting reports liad been b r o ~ ~ g htot
Pesha~varas to the intentions of the Amir's officials to
admit or refuse passage to the Mission ; and opinioils
differed as to tlie probability of our passing Ali
Musjid. The one thing certain was the presence
at that place for the last two days of the Mir
Alchol; the sourest old fanatic in Afghanistan, and
the bitterest enemy of the Rafir, English, or Russ.
I t was difficult to imagine any reason for his presence, except doubt on the Amir's part as to the
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firmness of the commandant of Ali Musjid, Faiz
Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, in excluding the Mission.
Under these circumstances Sir Neville Cha~nberlain
considered that it would be unwise to send the wbole
co~lvoyinto the Pass, where even the stoppage in
front, necessary during the pozlr pnf,Zer certain to
talte place under any circumstances, must necessarily
cause great co~lfusion; and where anything like an
immediate resource to their weapons to prevent the
passage of the Mission on the part of the garrison of
Ali Musjid would probably lead to a panic and possibly a disaster. His Excellency, therefore, ordered
Major Cavagnari to ride on towards Ali Musjid as
soon as possible after the arrival of the camp at
Jamrud, {aking with him only a small escort of the
Guides, and the heaclmen of our own frontier villages,
and of the friendly Ichaibaris. Thus attended he
was to proceed until met by armed resistance, or by
positive assurances on the part of the Amir's officials
that they would prevent the passage of the Mission
by force. A message was sent on some hours ahead
to inform Faiz Muhammad I<han of Major Cavagnari's approach. I t should be premised that the
Khaibaris on our side of the Pass, that is, between
Ali Musjid and the mouth, had promised that no
opposition on their part, or on that of their friends,
should deter the Mission, or its advanced guard, from
being brought face to face with the Amir's officials.
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This, of coursc, was a mattcr of the very highest
importance, as preventing tlie possibility of excuses
of non-responsibility.
"Somewhere about nine in the morning Major
Cavagnari left Jamrud ; with him were Colonel
Jenkins of the Guides, commandillg the escort,
Captain Wigram Battye, and twenty-four sowars.
Tliree miles from camp the little party entered the
Pass, and shortly afterwards met the messenger to
Faiz Muhammad returning with an answer, begging
them not to advance, &c. Of this, of course, no
notice was taken, and a ride of four or five miles
over the capital road made by Mackeson in 1840 and
still passable for heavy artillery, brought them in
sight of Ali Musjid, a picturesque little for( perched
on a precipitous hill overhanging the valley through
which flowed a little stream. From tlie lofty hills to
the right, two parallel spurs of half the height of the
fort abutted on the road; and on the nearest of
thcse Major Cavagnari and his party took their
stand, sending forward a messenger to annoL1nce
their arrival. Directly they were perceived, the walls
of the fort were manned; and shortly afterwards,
seeing that no advance was made, a number of the
garrison left its protection and lined the opposite
ridge. I t was tl~elievident that the reports that
had reached Peshawar about the substitution of
regular troops for the irregular levies usually forming
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the garrison were false, and that the warriors in front:
were only matcl~lockmen. The distance to the fort,
a mile or more down one hill and up anothel-, made
the exchange of messages tedious ; a couple of hours
~ a s s e dwithout any appearance of a satisfactory
result ; and Major Cavagnari was beginning t o
abandon any hope of meeting a responsible official
of the Amir face to face, and had begun t o prepare
an ultimatum, when a messenger arrived bearing the
welcome news that Faiz Muhamtnad I<han would
come out to meet Major Cavagnari and three others
at an indicated spot by the side of the stream halfway between the two ridges. Shortly afterwards he
mas seen approaching, and Major Cavagnari, takitlg
~ & hhim Colonel Jenkins and two of his men, went
down the hill to meet Faiz Mullammad, accompanied
by the headman of the tribes and of the Britisll
frontier villages, Captain Rattye and the rest: of the
Guides remaining on the ridge. 011 his way t11e
chief of one of the other Ichaibar tribes, friendly to,
or at least in the pay of, the Amir, made a show of
stopping him, saying that he had more than the
.stipulated three men ~vivitlzhim ; but Major Cavagnari
put him aside, saying that he had not come to
tall: with him, but with the Amir's pcople ; and
nothing further was said. On nearing each other
the two parties dismounted, Major Cavagnari and
Faiz Muhammad shool: hands, and the former
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rc~narkcd that the place appointed for the interview mas inconvcnicnt, and suggested a grove of
trees near a watermill close by. This was accepted,
and the two parties sat down, surrounded by a couple
of hundred or so of Faiz hIuhammadls ruffianly band.
The conversation, after the usual fricndly greetings,
was opened by Major Cavngnari, ~ v h osaid that Faiz
hluhammad and he were equally servants of their
respcctivc Governments, and therefore only carrying
out their orders. There mas thus no llecessity for
the discussion being carricd on in any but a friendly
spirit ; that he, Faiz RIuhamnlad must be aware of thc
prescr~ccand intended advance of the Mission ; and
that Sir Neville Cl~ambcrlain had sent the spealcer
on to ascertain from his own lips ~vhethcr11c had
orders to admit or stop thc Mission. If there were
any latitude in 11is orders, 11c felt sure that Fniz
hIuhammad mould be aware of tllc heavy responsibility he ~vould incur by preventing the advance of
the hlission, as his act in so doing would be talten as
that of the Amir himself. Faiz Muhammad replied
that lie himself was also actuated by friendly feelings
towards Major Cavagnari, wlvhom he had great plea-,
sure in meeting for the first time, in proof of which
he pointed out that he might, instead of coming
down to meet Major Cavagnari, have ordered his
men to fire on the party when it appeared. H e then
went on to say that he had been severely repri-
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manded for letting Nawab Gholan Husain (the Viceroy's native envoy) pass, and how, therefore, could be
risk the responsibility of permitting the advailce of the
Mission ? H e then begged that Sir Neville Chainberlain would halt a few days till he could communicate
with Cabul. This, Major Cavagnari replied, was not
only impossible but unnecessary, as the Cabul authorities had long been aware of the approacll of the
Mission. The conversation continued in this strain
for some little time, Major Cavagnari urging the
weight of the responsibility Faiz Mi~hammadwould
incur, and the latter repeating his inability to allow
the Mission to pass witllout direct orders from Cabul.
A t last, on the Englishmail again pointing out the
friendly character of the Mission, the Afghan, showing
for the first time some warmth, said :-' Is this
friendliness, to stir up dissellsion in the Amir's dominions by bribing his subjects to disobey his orders
by bringing you and others h e r e ? ' alluding to the
negotiations carried on with the Ichaibaris for the
first of the Nawab and afterwards of the
Mission. A t this an ambiguous murmur was heard
from the crowd, and Major Cavagnari turned the
subject by saying that was not a matter for suborclinates to discuss, .and that if His I-Sighness the
Amir hacl any complaint to make, no doubt the
British Government would give him a satisfactory
reply, He then aslced Faiz Muhammad for a final
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answer; wllether be was distinctly to understand
that the Mission mould be resisted by force should
it
thc next morning. To this Faiz Muhammad replied that he had no alterrlative but to use
force, if necessary. On tl~isMajor Cavagnari aslied
chiefs with hiin, if they considered this a sufficiently clear answer, to mliicl~ they replied that it
lvas so. Ilc then, thanking Faiz hluhammad for the
courteous and friendly spirit that he had showrl,
llopccl that they might meet under mose agreeable
circumstances, shoolc hands with him, and departed.
It should be noticcd that, tl~ouglithe Mir Aklior
did not show himself, his deputy was prcsent at
thc mecting, but witllout spealcing.
"Major Cavagnari and his party a t once came
back to the camp at Jutnrud, whence he rodc on to
l'cshawar to communicate the rcsult of his Mission
to the Envoy, who returncd with liitn to Jamrud
latc in the evening. A t day-brcak the n e s t mornirlg
orders nrcre issued for at1 immediate 1-etul-n to Pcshaivar.
Before leaving Sir Ncville Chamberlaitl
asscmblcd the frienclly Rhaibaris, and told them
that tlie stipulated rclvard would be paid them
exactly as if the Mission had passed through tbe
Rhaibar; and that he promised them in the nanle
of the Britisl~ Government, whose word they Irneiv
they co~tldtrust, that as long as there remained a
rupee in the treasury, or a sepoy in the army,
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they should be protected from any retaliation by
t h e Amir or his officers."
Thus ended the Cabul Mission.
I t is not too much to say that England was convulsed by a different version of the interview which
anneared in the letter 0 1

:I
1

it appear that the English officers had been insulted
and threatened. Later on, the true account came
to us, and calmer feeling prevailed. The question
then reverted to the older pliase of the policy, which
toolc the form of pushing forward (or " rectifying ")
our frontier, instead of the more urgent one of
having an insult to avenge ; unless, as some thinlc,
the reception of a Russian Mission renclers the refusal
to receive an Ei~glishone an insult. On this latter
point it is of interest to notice that Sir Henry
. Rawlinson, a s long ago as 1874, contemplated the
possibility of Russia sending an envoy to Cabul, and
discussed the probable policy England would pursue.
H e said (note on page 366 of "England and Russia in
the East "), speaking of Prince Gortchaltoff's official
intiination to Lord Granville, that it was unclesirable
that Russian agents should go t o Cabul, "It is quite
possible, howevel; in the sequel, if matters should
become a t all cornplicatcd, that this subject may be
revived, and Russia may wish to have a Mission at
Cabul. DipZumnticaZly, perhaps, we cuz~ld /zal$y
15-2
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Jlissioli lo Bohhnrn." The italics are ours. We do
not know yet what communications have passed
between the Russian Govenlmcnt and our own; nor
is it certain that the conflict, if there is to be one,
will be confined to a duel between British Inclia and
thc barbarous State on her frontiel; or will be
estendecl to embrace England and Russia, and thus
do tvhat has been so often t!lreatcned-light
up two
continellts with the torch of war.* T l ~ caction of the
English Cabinet in giving the Amir another opportunity of retreating from the perilous positi011 in
\\rhic11 his recent conduct has placed him has been
mucll criticised.
But the majority of peoplc will, in the end, we
think, a t least, commend the policy of sending a
final message-an ~1lti7rzntz~r11,
as it is termed-before
l~roceccling to hostilities, whatever may be the
opinion held as to thc original policy which has led
u p to the present situation. On the zGt11 of October
that message was sent by Lord Lytton-not
to
Cabul itself, as that would, it was thought, compromise the safety of a British subject-but to the fort
of Ali Musjid, in the IChaibar Pass, and was there
delivered to the Ainir's officer. Its purport is
geilerally believed to have been in effect a repetition
* See Publishe~s'Note prefixed. '
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of the terms offered by Sir Lewis Pelly, with the
intiination that an answer must be returned before
the 20th November, in order to avert a declaration of
war.
The following opinion 011 the conduct of Russia
and of Afghanistan, given by Lord Northbrook in the
speech before referred to, seetns to deserve attention.
H e said :-"It
would appear at first sight that b y
sending a Mission to Cabul they had distiilctIy
broken through the engagements they had made;
but we must be fair in this mattcr, and we must
recollect that it is not so long ago-towards the
spring of the year-that unfortunately we were on
the brink of a war with Russia. It was supposed
that Russia would not submit to the terms of the
Sat1 Stefano Treaty. We a11 lrnow that the British
Government took a decided line against Russia.
Assuming such an attitude, we sent troops to
Malta ; and in point of fact it was generally supposed that the question of peace and war hung at
that time on a thread. For my own part, I do not
hesitate to say that if we had the right, as I hold
that we had the right, to send native troops to
MaIta, the Russians had the right to take such steps
a s they thought necessary to protect Russian
territory in Asia. This is the explanation which I
give, and which I conceive to be the natural explanation of the movement of troops in the spring of

_C
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this year, and the sending of the Mission to Afghanistan. I have seen it mentioned in the ne~vspapers
that this Mission to Cabul was sent after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin, and that this sliows
the animosity of the Russian Government towards
us. That statement can a t a n y rate be disputed.
The Russian Mission arrived a t Cabul on the 22nd
July.
The road from Samarltand consists of
marches extending over a distance of 620 miles.
I t could not have been possible for the Russian
Mission t o march from Samarltand in lcss than a
month. I t was therefore i~npossiblethat a Mission
starting on the 13th of July could arrive on the ~ 2 n d
of July. That issue was disposed of b y the mere
q~icstion of distance. Now, it seems to me, with
regard to the question of Russia in this matter, to be
quite clear that the Government of this country had
a right, peace being declared, to enter into a diplomatic correspondence with Russia for the purpose
of aslting what were her intei~tions,and saying that
we should lilce to know now whether she would
adhere to the formal arrangements with respect to
interference with Afghanistan, or what her policy
was to be. That the Govcrn~nenthad a perfect
right to do, and m y own i~npressionis that that is
the course which the Government really has pursued. W e do not know all that. What we do
know is that papers were promised the day before
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Parliament separated, and I have no doubt that
those papers will soon be produced. So far, then,
as t o the conduct of Russia. Now as regards the
Amir of Afghanistan. Supposing that Shere Ali
had, when I was Governor-General of India,
received a Russian Mission at Cabul without first
consulting the British Government as t o whether
it should be received, I should say that that was
an unfair act, in consequeilce of our previous
arrangement with him ; but now we must look a t
the circumstances which went before the case. A s it
has actually arisen, it was impossible for the Ainir
to coinmunicate with the British Government, for,
rightly or wrongly, our agent at his Court had been
withdrawn. W e know, howevel; that he tried to
prevent the Russian Mission going to Cabul. That
has appeared several times in the .papers, and
through other impartial sources, and I believe it to
be the fact. W e cannot possibly have any evidence
that the Amir has entered into any hostile arrangement with the Russian Embassy after having received them. I have no fear of Russian intrigue in
Afghanistan. From all that I know or have ever
heard of that country, the real feeling of the Amir
of Cabul and Afghanistan is a feeling of independence, a dislike of any interference, either by
Englaild or b y Russia, in his affairs ; and I will say
this much, that when I left India, the Amir, though

Afghn7zisfa)z.
he would have disliked any interference on the part
of England, ~vould have resented any shown by
Russia to a far greater extent. Therefore, if Russia's
people be in the country they will only arouse more
feelings of independence, and the longer they remain
the more influence will they lose. But when we are
considering the conduct of Shere Ali in this matter,
I confess that I have observed with the greatest
regret opinions which have been expressed by the
Press with regard to it ; and what I regret more is,
that Sir James Stephen, a Liberal leadei-, has laid
down a principle with xvl~ichI can in no way agree.
Sir James Stephen has contended that the principles
of international law have no reference to our dealings
with Shere Ali. I l e says that there is no law by
which the case between Shere Ali and ourselves can
be tried. We are exceedingly po~verfuland highly
civilised. He is comparatively weak and half-barbarous. H e cannot be permitted to follow a course
of policy which inay expose us to danger, and we are
to be the judges of the cause, and we are to decide
according t o our ow11 interests. I have given you Sir
James Stephen's o ~ v nwords, as I do not wish to inisrepresent him. For where does the doctrine he lays
down go ? Why it goes this length, that any rlatioil
-any civilised nation it must be-in dealing with
another wealr nation, and one thcy conceive to bc
uncivilised, may act on no other principle than their
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might. This principle would j ~ ~ s t i fthe
y partition of
Poland, and would justify every act of Russia against
which this country has been crying O L I ~for some
time. I feel sure that Sir James Stephen cannot
know the meaning of what he has said, and that
such a doctrine as this must shock the moral sense
of all rightly-feeling people of this country. Sir
James Stephen has coilfounded the conventional
law of nations, and the law of nations which depends
on the practice of the Western States, with those
f~~ndamental
principles of the law of nations that are
founded 011 the first principles of morals, and are
derived from what Bacon calls the Fountains of
Justice, and which have been recogilised not only by
Christian lawyers and statesmen, but by heathen
lawyers and statesmen, from long time past."
Lord Northbrook further pointed out that such a
lax view of iilterilational law is especially dangerous
in India, where we have treaty engagements with
many semi-civilised States. H e protested strongly
against such doctrines, and expressed an opinion
that, if propounded in Parliament, they would be
instantly repudiated.
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APPENDIX A.
NEW ROUTE

TO INDIA.

TI-IEfollowing note on the proposed new route to
India may be of interest at this time :-

" Consul-General Nixon, sending to the Foreign
Office'the Bagdad trade returns for the Turlrish official
year ending in.March, 1878, observes that the country
is capable of unlimited development, and one of t l ~ e
first steps to this end would be the construction of a
railway between Bagdad and the foot of the Persian
hills, and another from Bagdad to Alexandretta vid
Mosul. This would give an alternative route to
India, and be more expeditious than viR the Suez
Canal. Swift steamers from ICurrachee would reach
Busre11 (1,547 miles) in six days ; from Busreh to
Bagdad river steamers would run with ease in 7 2
hours, and a t the outside another 60 hours by rail
would land passenger-s on the shores of the Mediterranean ; and this period of I I + days is capable of
acceleration. A railway from Busreh to Bagdad
might be an after consideration, as the river Tigris
affords a highway which, if traversed by steamers of
higher power than those now used, would much
reduce the time occupied in the transit. The Consul
considers that a railway from Bagdad to Alexandretta woGld pay exceedingly well, and British

Aflendtk A.

commerce mould benefit greatly, as Bagdad would
become tlle great mart, and drive Russian goods out
of the Pcrsian and Southcrn Asian markets, owing
to the expeilsive land carriage those goods would
have to defray. The cost of a railway from Busreh,
at the head of the Persian Gulf, to Alexandretta on
the Mediterranean has been estimated at £7,z25,0001
but this is at tbc rate of f;8,500 per mile, a high rate
considering that there is water carriage from London
to Bagdad for railway material. Deductii-lg the
distance from Uusreh to Bagdad, which is 250 miles
as the crow flies, the first espenditure would be
reduced to £~,roo,oooon tlie Goo miles from Bagdad
to Alexandretta. The country between Bagdad and
Mosul is a dead level. The expenditure on bridges
would be inconsiderable. Bridging the Tigris,
indeed, rniglit be avoided, if the terminus were made
on the right bank of the river at Bagdad, and from
thence ran straight to Aleppo, the line being flanked
on one side by the Tigris and on the other by the
Euphrates, and ilcarly the wlzole route a flat. Tlze
Consul suggests that the civilisiilg influences which
a railway tlu-ough Arabia would initiate are considerable, and that the developmeilt of the country, with
its vast resources and its eilormous ancient system of
canal irrigation, is well worthy the attention of
statesmen. The privilege of navigating the Tigris
from Busre11 to Bagdad would have to be acquired
from the Turltish Government ; at present they have
a few steamers of their own on the river, and are
jealous of other nations entering into competition."
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APPENDIX B.
RUSSIA AlVD ENGLAND IN ASIA.

THEfollowing estimate of the relative positiolls of
Russia and England in the East is from the pen of
Major-General Sir John Adye, in a reply to a letter
by Sir James Stephen, and a better exposition of
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"First, as to the general position of Russia in
Central Asia. Sir James Stephen in his re~narlcs
cornpares it with that which we held in India
in 1803 under Lord Wellesley, and, although he
does not ignore the isolated and precarious position of the Russian troops in the Central Asian
deserts, h e still appears to thinlc that by i.aising
arrnies and by forming alliances they may gradually
develop into a great Power there, and thus become a
danger to us in India. But the circumstances are
alrnost entirely different. India and Central Asia do
not compare with each other. T h e former is a
fertile country, and rich in military resources-that
is, in warlike races, in food, forage, fuel, and, nowadays, in its roads and cominunications. I t contains
about 200,000,000 people, of different races and
religions, of which the il4uhammadans are a minority.
By conquering India we have, in short, obtained a
magnificent empire ; one which under our rule is

1

Ajjcr~di-r3,
daily rising in prosperity. Civil government is firmly
cstnblishcd, and the nlilitary position is far stronger
illan cver. Our troops, both English and Native, are
n ~ l larmed and trained ; the arscnals are fixed a t
stratcgical points ; while our intcr~lal communications by river, road, and rail are comparatively easy,

--

the three great Principalities of Rhiva, Bol;hara, and
1Chol;and. This is not very difficult, as their forces
arc mere armed rabble, and if the power of Russia
in that part of the world were measured by mere
gcograpl~ical extent, it would be formidable ; but, in
truth, this very exlent is the cause of great wealrness.
There is a general deficiency tliroughout the wllole
vast region of food, water, fi:el, forage, and roads.
The few rivers arc dificult of navigation, and the
transport is almost entirely carried on by means of
This latter point at once indicates the
desert nature of the country, and greatly aggravates
the clificulty of massing troops and stores a t their
outposts. T h e wholc population of Central Asia in
Russian possession does not, it is said, exceed four
lnillions and a-half, consisting chiefly of predatory
tribes thinly scattered over a vast area. They are
fanatical Muhanln~adans,and bitterly hostile, and I
have never heard that Russia has ventured to raise a
single battalion on the spot. Civil goverllment is in
its infancy, and financially the country is a perpet~~al
drain. T h e nearest sailway-station is a t Orenburg,
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about 1,000 miles from Samarkand, and the country
between the Caspian and Tashlrend is for the most
part a hopeless desert. I t is possible that Russia
may in time, to some extent, consolidate her conquests, but the geographical features and permanent
condition of the couiitry are against her.
" I call see no analogy betwceiz the precarious
position of General Kaufmann, amid barren steppes,
and that of Lord Wellesley in 1803, standing in the
fertile plains of Bengal. A consicleratioi~of all the
circumstances would appear to prove that the present
position of Russia in Central Asia is not one calculatcd to afford her a favourable base of operations
against our dominion in Iizdia. I t is very iinportaiit
to have a clear conception on these vital points of
the comparative power of Russia and Englaiid in
the East.
" F o r many years past that policy has beell consistent, and may be described as one of conciliation,
of mediation, and of subsidies. Aclcnowledging the
strategical importance of Afghanjstan, our object
has been to gain the coilfidence and friendship of
the Afghan and Belooch rulers, and also of the
independent fi-ontier tribes, in tlie hope that s11ouId
external danger ever arise they would be on our side,
and be ready to become the joint defenders with us
of their mouiitain ranges. I always contemplate
the possibility of our having to enter the country for
our own defence, and it should be prepared for by
conciliating and not by attaclcing our neighbours.
Masterly inactivity ' is the expression commonly

.--

--
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used to denote the policy ~ v l ~ i cfor
l ~ many years has
prevailed. I t is a misleading term, as it coilveys
the idea that we have washed our hands of our
neighbours' concerns, whereas the real circurnsta~lces
are very different. I t is true we have refrained from
interference in their internal feuds and battles.
Unless invited to mediate, we have left them to
scttlc their own affairs, being only anxious to see
strong and quiet Governments established 011 our
borders. With half-savage, fanatical people like the
Afghans and Beloochcs, great clifficulties have
naturally arisen, but on the whole we have bee11
successful. For instance, so long ago as January,
1857, Sir John, now Lord, Lawrence, made a treaty
with Dost Muhammad, Shere Ali's fathel; and by a
large subsidy and present of ~nuslcetsiilduced Ilim to
drive the Persians from H e ~ x t ;b u t another result
illdirectly followcd from this successful effort at conciliation. T h e great Mutiny broke out in May, 1857;
but altllough we were in dire extremity, and
altllough the Punjab was considerably denuded of
troops for the siege of Delhi, Dost Muhammad, though
much pressed by his people, refused to allow a
single Afghan to attack US in our hour of danger.
That, to illy judgment, is a very pregnant instance
that conciliation and lrindness are as likely to be
s~~ccessfulwith Afghans as with other people.
Again, i11 1869, the late Lord Mayo received Sllere
Ali with l~oilourat Umballa, and by gifts of money
and arms gave practical proofs of our friendship ;
a i d although Sllere Ali may not be as reliable or as

great a ma
t h a t Lord
successf~~l
correspond
t o accept
Afghanis tc
secured to
o u r friendl,
spondence
t h a t Shere
a n d bey0118
t h e BeIoo~
general po
with consi
its length .
Occasiollal
as matters
Afghan t r
service, an(
of trust, ar
tnaintain t
g r e a t mea.
to the obje
a n d forbe
become pa
to discuss
o u r recent
military OF
m a i n diffic
the supplie
fi-ontier PI

great a man as his father, thereis no reason to believe
t h a t Lord Mayo's policy was other than prudent and
successful. Again, in 1873, after a long cIiplomatic
con-espondence, Lord Granville iilduced the Russians
t o accept our view of the northern boundaries of
Afghanistan, b y which Radakshan and IVakhan were
secured to Shere Ali. This was a f ~ ~ r t h eproof
r
of
our friendly intervention, and throughout the correspondence Prince Gortchakoff fully acknowledged
t h a t ,'Shere Ali was legitimately under our influence,
a n d beyond that of Russia. I n all our dealings ~vitli
t h e ~ i l o o c h and Afghan frontier tribes, the same
general policy has been followed for years past, and
with considerable success. T h e border thro~igl~out
its length is far quieter now than in years gone by.
Occasional acts of outrage and robbery are treated
as matters of police. Many of the men of the
Afghan tribes beyond the border now enter our
service, and do their duty well. Some hold positions
of trust, ancl settle inside our territory. . Therefore I
maintain that a conci1iatoi-y policy has been in a
great measure successful, and was leading straight
t o the object we had in view, although time, patience,
a n d forbearance are required before the results
become palpable and confirmed. I do not propose
t o discuss the exceptional causes which have led to
o u r recent rupture with Shere Ali. A s regards the
military operations which now appear imminent, the
m a i n difficulties lie in the necessity for collecting
t h e supplies of food, munitions, and transport at our
frontier posts before we can enter the country.
I6
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Whether ~ v cadvance by the Ichaibar or the Bolan,
our lines of communication will lie through rocky
defiles, and over stony, desert tracts, deficient in food,
forage, fuel, and often in water. Sir John Iceane, in
1838, is said to have lost 20,000 camels between the
Indus and Candahar, although his march mas virtually unopposcd. Lookii~ga t the flceting nature of
Afghan internal politics, to thc perpetual discords
which arise between the ruler a t Cabul and his
insubordinate chiefs, I think it very possible that
Shere Ali may find he is not baclrcd b y his people,
and that 11e may still make such concessions as will
save him from the incvitable ruin which his prcsent
C O I I ~ I I Cwill
~
othenvise bring upoil him. S110111dwe,
however, be co~npcllcd to advance in force, and
enter on a campaign, its cost will be excessive, and
the worst feature is that our chief clificqlties will
arise when xve find ourselves in possession of the
country with the feelings of thc people roused
against us."
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APPENDIX C.
!-

RUSSIA'S ADVANCE COMPARED WlTH THAT
O F ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

TI-IEfollo~vingis a n extract from a letter by General

..

I

M.McMurdo in the Tines of November 5 th :" Although 2,000 years have passccl since

the
Macedoiliail Greeks brolce through the passes of
Afghanistan and overthrew POI-us on the Jelum, the
operations of war are not less practicablc under the
conditions of the nineteenth century than they were
in the days of the Phalanx. I do not mean for one
lnomeilt to assert that Russia would meet with the
same ultimate success as the Greeks ; what I desire
t o show is, that u p to a certain point she has already
gained the same strategical advantages as her predecessor. T h e progress of the Greelcs through Asia
was, as that of a regular ariny, perfect in its administration and drill, and talcing along with them the
highest civilisatioil and culture, long afterwards
maintained b y their colonies. I have no boolcs here,
but I am satisfied that Arrian gives ample cvidence
of the principles on wl~ichtheir advance was conducted. Thus (as an examplc of administration) a t
Babylon, where the army rested on the coilclusion of
the operations that succeeded the victory of Arbela,

f,
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Alexander sent home (by Aleppo, I think) the men
whose tcrm of service hacl expired, and the officcrs
who conducted them brought back, in due caul-sc,
the recruits to replace them. Babylon became, in
short, a secondaiy base for his furtller advance ; and
thus, by a systcm of successive dephts, some of whicll
became colonies, he effected his ultimate object of
reaching India. Thc last of these dep6t-colonies
was in India itself. T h e site of ancicnt Taxila was
determi~led some years ago to be about I4 miles
north-west of Rawul Pindce ; and these is still a
small racc or clan (now dying out) in the neigl~bouring hills that claims descent from these Greelcs, and
whose priclc on this accouilt revolts a t service of any
"Now, the Russian advance through Asia has
bccn conductcd llitllerto upon similar principles, the
chief (and perhaps only) difference being in the time
occupied. There are several sufficient reasons for
the more deliberate action of Russia, with ~vhichI
will not occupy your space; but as Earl Grcy
challenges her capability of advancing because of the
difficulties of transport and supplies, I may state
briefly that thcse doubtless formed one of the chief
reasons. T h e difference in thc itjlpccli?)ze7zta of a.
modern army in Asia compared with the Greelcs
under Xenophon or Alexander coiisists in tlle trains
of artillery and ammunition. Russia had, therefore,
good reason to wait till modern science in the form
of a railway would compensate for that difference. I
believe I have said sufficient to show that tvitll
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a m p l y furnished magazines at Tashlcend and Sarnarkand (atld, it s e e m s probable, Merv also), the strate-
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good a s was t h a t of the Greeks previous to their
a t t a c k on the p a s s e s of Afgl~anistan. But if Greelc
had met Greek in t h e Khaibal; history might possibly
have told a different tale. With this observation,
therefore, the p a r a l l e l necessarily terminates."
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succinctly his view of the justness, or otlierw~sc,a l
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APPENDIX D.

OB T H E IIAILY NEWS.

" SII*,-I~ tlic lctter signcd 'Pacc Tua,' which
a p 1 ~ w c din tllc iPil12cs of tllc aGtll inst., will bc
found this passage :-'I vcnture to dmw attcntio~i
to circumstances ~vhichp o i ~ to
~ t thc probability that
tlic Amir's l~ostilityis by no means of such recclll:
datc as that ascribed to it by Lord Lawrcncc, but
can bc traccd a t lcast as far back as tllc datc of tlic
U~uballah Conlerencc, when t l ~ cAinir sought in
vain for an assurallcc from the Indian Govcmmcnt
that it would gaarantee thc independence of Afgllanistnn, and Tor thc aclanowlcclgnient of tlic son as his
successor whom lle had sclectctl as his heir; wllilc
tlie paymcnt of the annual donation of money a l ~ d
arms whicli Lord Lawrence had u i ~ f o r t u n a t e coml~
mc~lcedwas a t the same time discontinued.' That
a change of policy sucli as is hcre indicated was
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then made has more than once been asserted 011the
o n e hand, and d e ~ ~ i eon
d the other. I mill endea"our to show that in point of fact no suci~change
then took place, and that the p a l change i n the cond u c t of the Government of India towards the Amir,
i n all essential poit~ts,dates back so far as April,
1876, when Lord Nortllbrook resig~ieclthe Governm e n t illto thc hands of the present Viceroy. I
would not a t this time press the consideration of the
change of policy on the poblic, except that on a
d u e appreciatio~lof it depends whether the people
of Englalld are in a position to form a just cstimate of the conduct of Shere Ali in refusing
to receive Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission. If
xvc wait until it plcases the Ministry to give the
pnblic all the information which they can slipply
o n all points connected ~vith the rebuK we have
received, we ]nay wait, as I have formerly
said, until it can be of no practical value to
obtain it.
I' I
desire to prevent war between England and
Afghanistall, and I can have no hope of doing so
unless I can show to the minds of impartial lnen
t h a t such a war ~vould be unjust ; and this I have
n o hope of doing unless thcse papers are produced.
In the meantime, I am restricted to arguing 011 the
probabilities of the case. To refer, then, to the
statements of 'Pace Tua,' above quoted. I reply
that though the Amir may have bee11 disappointed
i n regard to a refusal to comply with these proposals, 11e could not have anticipated success, for he

must 11avc been well aware tliat so far baclc a s
1854-55, when our treaty wit11 the .4fgliao Government was signed by his full brother, Sirdar Hydur
ICIian, and myself, the Government of India had
rcruscd to make an offensive and defensive treaty
wit11 Argl~anistan.
" I n the secolld place, Atnir Shere Ali may possibly 11ave bclicvcd that we should givc him a formal
guarantee recognising liis ravouritc son as ltis successor. I know not what actually took placc a t the
Durbar a t Umballah in 1869; but, a s s u m i ~ ~that
g
Lord Mayo did rcfusc to gual.autce tlic succcssiot~,11e
did so no doubt by authority rcccivccl from England;
o i ~ g l ~tot
ancl that there was reason ill sucl~a rcf~~sal
be obvious to every man conversant wit11 Oriental
customs and habits of thougllt. Evcn to recognise,
let alone to guarantee, tlie s~icccssionof a particular
soti is, in tlic eyes of at1 Asiatic ruler, to bind a
Government to maintain that wl~ich tllcy have recognisecl. Thus we should in this case have been
compelled, if necessary, to sustain tlic ant1101-ityof
tlic Amir's son by forcc of arlns ; ancl we \\-oulcl not
have clone this witliout being prepared to act against
the wishes of tlic majority of the people of Afghanistan-a line of policy ~ v l ~ i the
c l ~Amir linew well we
l ~ a dsound reasons for not pursuing, and wl~icli]>is
own fatl~cr11ad dcprecatctl in earnest terms 'o ine in
1857. There still rctnains tlic qocstion whetlier
Lord Mayo's r e f ~ ~ s aof
l liis request caused serious
oKence Lo tlie Atnir. I do not tl~ililc so ; first,
bccause I belicvc-I
writc under correction-that
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he never expressed an opinion of this kind, and
assuredly 1 1 is
~ a chief ivho is not particularly reticent
by natllrc; and, secondly, because a t the time lle
left Umballah to vctur~ito Cabul, the newspapers in
India were full of statements of the satisfaction
which the A ~ n i r had felt and expressed at llis
receptioti.
"Then comcs the point whether my gift o l arms
and money to Shere Ali i n 1867 ivas unfortunate,
that is to say, impolitic. I believe that it was
not so. T h c ai.rangcmcnt was approved of by the
Secretary or State fol. lodia at the timc. l'eople
1vho [corn their lcno~vledge of the Afgl~nnquestion
had cvcn thougllt that thc Government of India
was ~vrongin not suppo~.tingShere Ali in the contest betwcen IlimsclT and his brothers for the throne
of Cabul, and ivho may gcneraliy bc considered the
advocates [or an active and interfering policy, cannot
really object t o our having thus assisted him. .And
these gifts werc not volunteered, but granted on his
especialapplication; showing that the stmgglethrough
~vhiclilic had passed had bercrt him of resources, and
had lcft hirn no clioice but to apply to us for hclp.
Again, as a mattcr of fact, I did not grant the Alnir
'a11 a n ~ u ~subsidy-it
al
was a single gift which I rnade
on the part of the 13ritisl1 Govern~ncnt,and its renewal from time to tirnc was to be dependent on the
Government of India's satisfaction with his conduct.
This arrangement was considered more lilcely to ivorlc
well tllnri if wc llad gmnted Shere Ali an annual
subsidy-a subsidy ivliich wc could not justly intermit
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without sliowing spccific rcasolis for so doing. I t
scelns unrcasonablc to supposc that this grant of
inoney and arms 11ad an unfortunate influence on thc
Amir's mind. No moncy has, since tlie Uii~ballah
Confcrcncc, becl~givcn to him, csccpt solnc two lacs
of ri111ccs b y Lord Nortl~brool~,
and tc11 lacs which
tllis Viceroy offcrecl, slid w l ~ i c ltlic
~ Amir rcf~~scd.
" I t is truc tflnt prcvious to tlic arrival of tlic prcscnt Viccroy t l ~ cAmir nppcavs to l~avctalxn offc~~cc
011accoiuit of tlic dccision in tllc Scistan boundary
disputc, wllich h c is said to havc considered vcry
:tdvcrsc to his rights mid il~tcrcsts; ailcl it was on
t h a t account that Lorcl Nortlibl.oolc proposcd to givc
11i1na grant of moncy-riot that it was tliouglit that
his intcrcsts llad not bccn duly regnrdcd in thc abovc
dccisiol~,but simply ~\*itlitlic gcncrous intention of
s o f t c t ~ i ~his
~ g mind, whicli nl~pcarctlto bc brooding
ovcr tlie subjcct.
" T h e Aniir was also said to llavc fclt aggricvcd at
3 rcqucst tilaclc to him, that so111c or thc English
oficcrs rctnrning from thc Yarlcalld Mission might
bc pcnnittctl t o journcy to India by way of Walclian
a n d Cabul. A n o t l ~ c rallcgucl gricvancc was that tlic
Viccroy had sent tlic Govcrnor of Walcllan a slnall
prcscnt in r e c o g i i t i o ~of~ liis politc11css to tlic oficcrs
abovc ~nclitioocd. Hot tlicse two cnscs wcrc in thcir
naturc trivial and i~niml~ortant,
and cannot rcolly bc
supposed to liavc irritatctl t l ~ ci\mir, morc particularly as in ncitl~cr casc wcrc tlic wishcs of thc
Viccroy prcsscd 011 him.
"'Pace T u a ' asks wliat otlicr coursc was to bc
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l > u r ~ ~ ~than
e d ' t h a t of seiidi~iga Mission to Cabul,
unless me were prepared to leave Russia in undisturbed possession or the field.' Considering the
wayward and jealous disposition of Shere Ali, ready
to take offence a t trifles light as air, the best coursc
w a s to leavc him alone for a time. I t did not follo~v,
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w h a t Russia might be doing in Afghanistan.
"The Amir's real grievance arose from several
causes wllich I have stated in former letters, sucl~as
the occupation of Quettah, the pressiilg on him of a
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a g e n t from that city, and our not sending any one of
t h e same character to take 11;s place, the arming of
t h e I<ashmere t ~ o o p with
s
arms or precision, and the
directions given to their chiers to watch tlie passes
leading t o Chitral, and the embargo laid OII tlle
export of arms, &c., from llidia to Cabul.
" I t has been latelystatcd that the Conference a t
Pesha~varbetween Sir Lewis Pelly and tlle Amir's
A g e n t toolc place solnewhere about six months
before the occupation of Quettah, aud that it could
n o t therefore h a v e been one of the causes of the
failure of that Conference. But if the readers of the
Dnib Nezus will refer to the Blue-Book 'Bilucllistan,'
N o . a, page 324, they will fit~dby comparison of
dates that the occupation of Quettah preceded and
d i d not follow that Conference. Froin a letter of
Captain Scott, commanding the detachment of the

4th Sikh Infantry, it is sliowvn that he arrived a t
Q u c t t a l ~on tlie 2nd November, 1876, and began
marking out barracks for his men on the 5th of that
~nontli,wliereas tlie Conference at Pcsliawar began
towards tlie encl of December of that year, atid is
stated it1 the Times of the ~ 1 s itist,
t
as taki~igplace
in January, 1877.
" I n what I havc now said I by no means intend
t o place tlie rupture of our amicable relations with
tlie Afglians solely on the shoulders of tlie presetit
Viceroy of India. What I desire to convey is that
thc causes which led to that ruphire really arose
after his assumption of the Gover~ime~it,
and that
our previous relations wit11 the cliiefs of tlint country
werc 011 the whole of a frie~idlynature.
" I n what proportion tlic responsibility of the state
of things in Afglia~iistanis to be divided betweeti
t h c Viccroy and the Ministry of tltc day, time
atid the prodoction of the corresponde~ice call
alone show.
" Yours faithfully,

" Sfolre fI07tse, S t . P e f e ~ ' s ,
" TsLc

" LAIVRENCE.
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APPENDIX E.
SALE'S DEFENCE 01;JALALABAD.
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T I I E following account of Gencral Sale's gallant

d e f e ~ l c eof Jalalabad is talcen from the Dnih N e w
of 30th September, 1878, and is quoted here as a
very complete summary of that noble achievem e n t :" F e w of the lnany gallant feats of British soldiers
c a n compare wit11 General Sale's gallant and successful defence o i Jalalabacl. After the deeply disheartening tiews had reached him that the Cab111
force, under General Elphinstone, had been cut to
pieces in the defiles, Sale, throughout that terrible
winter, bated no jot of heart or hope, and liis example
is tlie more remarkable since it establishes the tlxth
t h a t tlie calamity wliicl~ had beiallen our soldiers
m i g h t have been avoided if wiser counsels and a
m o r e resolute policy had been adopted. During our
t w o years' occupation o i Afghanistan, nothing had
b e e n more clearly proved than the fact that the
native races were unable to withstand a resolute
a t t a c k either from British troops or Sepoys lcd by
British officers. Treachery and ambush, intrigue
a n d assassination, were still their chosen modes of
offence ; and, thougli they had hovered about our

f;~misllecl and enfeebled solcliers and catnp-followers,
ant1 assailccl thcm cautiously in momctits of clificulty
and cmbarrasstncnt with only too tnucli effect, tlic
very Inst remnant of our forces hacl again and again
put thcir assailants to fligllt. In tlic facc of tlicsc
circumstances, it is i~npossiblcnot to concur in Sir
John Icayc's opinion that thc truc policy of Gcncral
Elphinstonc was not to capitulate ancl retreat, but
to strengthen his positions in Cabul, and endeavour
t o obtain supplies b y hold sorties and incursions into
thc surrounding country. Such, in fact, were tllc
tactics of Gcncral Salc, by which, cvcn after receipt
of intelligcticc of thc clisastcrs of thc I<oorcl Cabul,
h c was c~iablccl to tnaintain hirnsclf ancl protect his
army agaitist all thc efforts of Alcbar I<han to obtai~l
possessioll of the fortress.
" A lcss cautious c o ~ n ~ n a ~ i d
miglit
c r casily havc
bccn hctraycd into a step which mould have becn no
lcss fatal than tlic cvacuatio~lof Cabul. Only a fcw
clays bcfore tliat event, a i c l while as yct thcrc was 110
token of thc calamity tliat cnsucd, a band of strange
Ilorscmcn hacl suddenly prcscntcd li~cmsclvesnt thc
gntcs of the ~OIVII. T h c y carriccl a flag of truce,
nncl tlcscribcd themsclvcs as the bearers o l a letter
from Cnhul. Conducted into t l ~ eprcscnceof Gcncral
Salc, thc strangers prcscntcd tlicir missivc, whicll
provcd to be n dcspateh written in English, and
signctl by Gencml Elpllinstone hi~nsclf. I t s contcnls
lvcrc startling atid cxtmordinary; but of tlic gclloincncss of thc document thcrc could bc no qocstion.
I t convcyccl thc intelligence o l the convention that
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had been entered into mith Alcbar, and directed
General Sale forthrvith to march with arms, stores,
ancl a~nmunitio~lfor Peshawar. I11 brief, General
Sale's superior orclercd an iinmediate retreat in thc
depth of winter by the ominous IChaibar Pass, acconpanying his instructions with the assurance that
' our troops would not be molested on the way.' I t
is needless to say that the writer had no sufficient
grounds for such an assurance. The evacuation of
Jalalabad had simply becn wrung froin him as one
of the conclitions of tlie protection which was promised, but was ncver intended to be accorcled ; ancl,
though General Elpbinstone proved his faith in the
word of his foe, and suffered the penalty of his
confidence, the order was not the Icss remarkable for
the wealcness and infatuation that it displayecl.
Peremptory as the directions were, and serious ns
was tlie responsibility of neglecting t o obey, Sale
nevertheless wisely toolc the latter course. A council
of war was held, at which it was formally rcsolvecl
that ' i t would not bc prudent to act upon suc11 a
document, ancl that the garrison would, therefore,
remain where it was until further orders.' This
timely act of disobedience unquestionably saved the
army unclcr Sale from certain destruction. A t the
very moment when the cou~icilwas deliberating the
deep snows of the ICoorcl Cabul were crimson with
the blood of the struggling Inass who were vainly
endeavotlring to make their way through, to rejoin
their more fortunate co~nl.acIesa t less than a Iiunclrccl
miles distance. There can be no question that thc

dcspatcli tliat had been extorted Tram tlie siclc and
feeble commander-in-cliier formed part of a cunning
scheme, the aim of \\~hicliwas to give to the destruction oC tlie Feriogliees a degree of completeness, and
all air of sudden a n d overwlicltning retribution,
~ v h i c lcould
~
not but affect pa\verfifirllythe imagination
of a n y future expedition to be despatched for the
invasion or the Afghan territory. Instead of capitulating, Sale set t o work to dig trenches round the
bastiotis of tlie town, and to drill every camp
follower capable of bearing arms. Only thrcc days
after this bold and energetic determination was
takcn, a sentry upon the walls o n tlie side towards
Gtwdamaclc called aloud tliat he saw ' a mounted
man in the clistance.' Glassesn~ereout in a moment ;
a n d there was clearly to be seen, sitting upon a halfstarved pony, a rider who appeared to be a European,
a n d w a s manifestly faint or wounded. Long before
the stranger reacl~ecl the walls a foreboding of liis
melancholy story was in the liearts of tlie defenders.
I t was Dr. Bryclon-not
tllc only survivor of tlie
final liorrors of the Jagdullah, but certainly tlie only
one who had escaped to convey tlie news. H e was
bleeding, faint, and covered 1vit11 ~vounds,but still
grasping in his riglit hand liis only weapon of
defence-a small fragment of a sword.
" N o t h i n g could now seem more rorlorn than the
position of tlie defctiders of Jalalabad, surrounded
b y t h e triumphant ATgIians and entirely cut OK from
communication with Pesliawar. That their late
comrades were destroyed they well knew. On tlie
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first news of their fate, Sale ordered the cavalry to
mount forthwith, and to patrol along the Cabul road
to the farthest reach which might seem to be compatible with their own safety. Many officers accompanied them. I n the striking words of Mr. Gleig,
' They had not ridden above four miles from the
town ere they came upon the mutilated remains of
the three out of Dr. Rrydon's four ill-fated companions, of whom he could give no account. Not a
straggler, however-not
a living soul, man, woman,
or child-appeared either there, or as far as the eye

was

*wards
ounted
>mellt ;
a half-opean,
before
of h i s
endel-s.
of the
,e only
Ie w a s
.it
stilI
p o r l of

turned their horses' heads with sorrow homewards,
and rejoined their comrades. That night lanterns
were suspended from poles at different points about
the ramparts ; while from timc to time the bugles
sounded the advance, in the hope that one or other
of these beacons might guide some wanderer to a
place of rest. But none came; and though on the
morrow, and for several days and nightssubsequently
a like course was pursued, not one man, European or
native, seemed to be alive--certainly none profited
by it.' On the side of Peshawar no adequate preparations had been made in view of troubles so unexpected ; nor did any succour come. The first
thought was to increase the stock of provisions.
While the non-combatants trained to handle pikes
tnanufactured out of old hooks and any other available bits of iron thilt could be found, were assigned
to duty on the ramparts, foraging parties were sent

forth, who ill two days brought back ~vitlithem 170
head of cattle and bcttvcen Goo and 700 sheep. T h c
cattle s e r e sla~~glitered
immediately, and salted donTii,
a s fodder was wanting; tlie slicep mere sent out
evely morning to graze in the marshes between tlic
river and tlie town walls, attcnded by sliephcrds and
a n a r ~ n c d covering-party. Every tree and bush
which could afford cover for niarLsmen was cut down,
a n d all tlie doors and timber-work from the houses
outside tlie walls were cal.ried off and laid up as
winter fuel. About the elid of tlie month numerous
bodics of tlie enemy were observed inarcliing in vario u s directions, and on the morni~ig of thc 15th,
instead of the melco~ncsight of tlie advanced guard
o f General l'ollock's army of relief, they beheld tlie
white tents of Alcbar IChali on tlie farther side of thc
river, about six miles distant from the \valls. Still
t h e men laboured cheerfully in tlie ditclies and on
t l ~ c ramparts. T h e works were daily becoming
stronger; but tlieir labours were destiiied to be
frustrated by an clie~nyInore swift and destructive
than a n y they had yet encountered in Afghanistan.
On the 19th tlie meti inal.ched out as usual, ~vitlitheir
pickaxes and spades ; the guards were a t the gates,
t h e sentries on the walls. Colotiel Monteith, the
field officer for tlie day, had ascended one of tlie
bastions, and was scanni~igtlie horizon with his glass,
when suddenly the ground trembled, and a noise was
heard which is described as not so much like thunder
as the sound of a thousand lieavily-laden waggons
rolling and jolting over an ill-paved street. T h e
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diggers loolcecl around them with a stare of consternation ; and then, as if actuated by one common
influence, the parties in the trenches, seizing their
arms, rushed out. I t was well for tliem that they
did s o ; for scarcely had they reached the glacis ere
t h e wl~olcof the plain hcgan to heave like billows
o n the surface of the ocean, and walls and houses,
splitting asunder, came tumbling down upon the
space which but nn instant before had been crowded
with workmen.' In a moment the earthquake had
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parapets \vliich had been with so mucli skill and
diligence constructed were tlirown down ~vitha fearfill crash into heaps of ruins. I n the walls, breaches
were made, more accessible than any which the
troops found when they first entered the place; and
t h e entire circuit was more or less shaken. As to the
houses in the town, there mas scarcely one of them
which escaped more or less of damage. Some fell in
altogether; others had their fronts or flanks destroyed and the roofs shaken down ; and the cloud
o f dust which rose immediately on the occurrellce of
tlie catastrophe is described as having been portentous. Happily, very few lives were lost. By far
t h e greater number of the troops, being \vitliout the
walls when the shock came, stood upon the glacis,
o r lay flat, while it heaved beneath them, to witness
t h e overthrow ; and the guards, making for opeci
spaces, escaped. Some natives were overwhelmed in
t h e ruins of the houses where they sojourned ; and
I 7-2

'

Colonel Monteith, before h e could escape from the
rampart, sustainecl some bruises. But, on the whole,
were wonderfully rare ; and the stores,
the cas~~alties
both of ammunition and salted provisions, sustained
no damagc.'
"Nothing could Letter cxliibit thc wliolesome rcspect inspired by the attitude of thc garrison than
the neglect of Akbar Khan t o seize this moment for
assaulting the place. T h e opportunity ivas so011
lost. 011 the morrou. the piclcaxcs and spades of
the indefatigable garrison were again b ~ ~ s i al yt work.
Grass-cutting and foraging parlies still went forth
daily, sustaining occasionally losses from the attacks
of thc enemy's cavalry, but always repulsing their
assailants, and rarely returning empty-Iiandecl. The
~.iflewas not at that time the trusty friend of the
1'21iglish soldier wliich it has since bccome, but the
whole country within long range of Lhc walls had
bee11 so carefi~lly measured, ancl tf~cpractiee had
been so effective that every shot tllrown where a
group o l Afghans asselnblcd told. To such perfection, indeed, was the art o f gunnery carried by the
besieged, t l ~ a tit is stated tliat on onc occasion Captain Uackhouse strudc down a si~iglchorseman more
than a ~ n i l cdistant froin the fort, A s the month
worc on, the Afghal~i ~ ~ v e s t r n e ~
bccatne
it
closer, and
the harassment o l their fire more galling to the
working parties and thc lncn 011 thc ramparts. On
the 2nd of March, towards cvcning, a party of
sappew sallied forth and dl.ovc thc c11cm~'sskirmishers away. Tllc Afghans more contiuuously re-
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ceiving reinforcements, but the besieged, tliough.
co~npelled to husband their failing stock of ammunition, made many successful sorties, a ~ i d the
attempts to interfere with the foraging parties
were rarely completely successful. On one occasion
a - party of cavalry and infantry, suddenly issuing
from the gates, boldly marched down upon the
l d i~iterflocks of the enemy, and, before they c o ~ ~ be
fered with, actually returned into the town, driving
before them not fewer than $m head of sheep.
Both food and ammunition, however, begau at last
to fail. For upwards of four months the 'arcison
1,
, --had thus maintained itself isolated in the heart of an
enemy's country; the time had come when more
decisive steps must be talcen. I t was now the 7th
of April, and instead of the deep snows and bitter
frosts wliich the forces under Genera1 Elphinsto~le
had to encountel; the weather was fine and favourable for military operations. T h e army was, moreover, in comparatively good condition-inured to
]lard worlc and harder fighting, and too well accustomed t o take the measure of their enemy to be
daunted by his greatly superior numbers. On that
day mas fought the tnemorable battle outside the
walls of Jalalabad. Some of the most valuable
officers in the army of the Indus fell in that obstinately-contested struggle, but the result was a
victory which could not have been more complete.
Camp baggage, artillely, standards, horses, and arms
of every Bind fell into our hands, together with
abundant ammuaition.
The redoubtable Akbar

. fled towards Cabul with tlie wreck of liis army ; and
in onc day the besicged in Jalalabad, who had beell
put on half-rations, round thc~nsclvcs in possession
or abundance of provisiolls. Thc tide had already
turlled ; and i t is important to obscrve that all this
w x achievcd herorc tlie arrival of any succour fro~n
without. What more co~~clusive
evidence could be
rumislied o l t l ~ e melancholy truth that the over~vl~elrning
clisasters of thc Icoord Cabul werc literally
of our owii sculcing? \Vho can reasonably doubt
that what Sale hn<l doltc a t Jalalnhad, Elphinstonc.
or some com~nandcr less cnfecbled by ill-health,
could havc acco~nplishedat Cabul ! To lnect death
fighting in tlie cantontnents, or witl~in tlic strong
walls of the Bala I-Iissar, would a t lcast havc been
prclerablc to the tender lnercies of tllc Algl~ansand
tlie rigours or a winter in tlie rugged and tortoous
passes of t.11~
White Mountains; but, with unaccountable inratuation, tlic cfrorts to obtain supplics had
been delayed a t Cabul until cven the means of
equipping loraging parties werc wai~ting.
"011the morrow o l that baLLlc a innrl<ct was
actually opcned outsiclc the gates of Jnlalabad, to
~vl~icli
t l ~ ccountry people Lrougl~t thcit. watts to bc
exchanged Tor the coin or tlic Feringhecs. On the
loth, Pollocl('s army was heard or as llaving reachcd
the ~niddleof thc I<haibar. Tlie dificulties or the
Pass, in spitc or the resistance or tlic Afrecdis, who
11ad seized the fort oT Ali Musjid, had all bee11surmounted with the loss or only one ofiecr killed, two
or threc woonded, atid abolit 135 men Idled and
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woundeJ. O n thc 16th, Polloclc's column marched
into the &leaguered city, accompanied by the bands
of the garrison regiments, who had come forth to
meet them, and \vIlo greeted them, as Mr. Gleig tells
us, with the old Jacobite melody, 'Oh, but ye've been
lang a comin'.' T h e forward movement up011 Cabul,
however, was not begun until August. Wave after
wave of the troops despatched to Afghanistan arrived,
until the entire force, consisting of nine or ten
thousand well-disciplined troops, attended by five or
six thousand Silch soldiers, and the enormous number
of 40,000 camp followers, were ready to march. In
the fatal passes of Jugdulluck and the Icoord Cabul
thpv
bones of their unfortunate
-.--, fnnnd the bleached
comrades. Preparations had been made by the
Ghilzyes to oppose our advance; but our troops
swept the heights, and their resistance was overcome
with but trifling losses. In the valley of the Tezeen,
where so many of General Elpllinstone's army had
fallen, Akbar I<han made a 1 s t stand, but was defeated with scarcely more sacrifice of life on 0-ur side.
Similar successes attended General Nott's advance in
Western Afghanistan. Ghazni was retaken with
little dificulty, the march continued triumphantly on
both sidcs, and 011 the 17th September the combined
forces re-entered Cabul. I n brier, the second invasion of Afghanistan byacomparatively small English
a r m y had been accomplished with scarcely more
difticulty than thc first. Ooly three days later the
brave Sale had the happiness of regaining his longlost wife, together with his daughter, Mts. Sturt,
~

~

~

whose husband had fallen in the disastrous retreat.
T h e prisoners had, OIL the whole, been kindly t r e a t e d ,
though their privations, hurried as they had b e e n
about the country, and frequently removed f r o m
place to place, had necessarily bee11 considerable ;
and Akbar, embittered by his defeats, had a t last
threatened to make presents of them to the cl~ielsof
t h e barbarous tribes of Turkestan. Their relcasc
was ultilnately obtained by bribing the ICl~an i n
charge of the fort a t Bameean, to whose custody
A k b a r had confided them. The total list of prisoners released on General Polloclc's arrival a t Cabnl,
as given in the appendix to Lieutenant Eyrc's
Journal, comprise thirty-six officers, nine ladies,
twenty-one children, and fifty-five privates a ~ t do t h e r
persons."

